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Abstract
Major changes inside Finland catalyzed the internationalization of its construction industry to
initial growth in the late 1960s/early 1970s. In the year 2008, the value of its international business was
app. 16 Bn€ i.e. at the same level as that of new building production in Finland. It is forecast to grow.
Practitioners understand that by effective risk management (RM), the occurrence and significance of
failures (or successes) can be reduced (or, alternatively, increased). Two research questions, to
explain causal links in real-life interventions and look for a positive effect on RM practices, are posed:
“How can the main internationalization process risks of leading Finnish construction contractors and
building product suppliers be managed?” and “What are those main risks, and how can they be
managed?
The purpose of this study is to find better ways to manage major risks within the context. The impact of
proven project RM methods at the business level is analyzed and the major risks embedded within key
managers and their competencies in managing, in particular, cross-cultural issues and contractual
arrangements, are identified. Hypothesis 1 is that proven project RM methods can be applied reliably at
the business level and the effectiveness of managing major international business risks can be improved.
Hypothesis 2 is that major risks related to the business objectives are inherent within key managers’
competencies, in particular in (2a) managing cross-cultural issues and (2b) contractual arrangements.
Overall, the scope encompasses Finnish firms managing international businesses and projects and the
related risks, in growth situations. The main parts are a literature review and qualitative insider
action research with case studies.
In the reviewed literature, international aspects are covered thinly or in a country-specific manner. RM
is increasingly being transformed into uncertainty or opportunity management, and becoming more
proactive. “Early warnings” are relied upon more frequently. Besides, RM is ever more important in
international projects and acquisitions, while new tools and models are being created. Hypothesis 1 is a
novelty i.e. it is not addressed in the reviewed literature. The hypothetical management competencies, as
sources of success and failure, surface frequently but in unstructured ways. Thus, Hypothesis 2 cannot
be considered as a novelty, although, within the context, the cross-cultural risks are a novel research
object when connected to key managers’ competencies to manage cross-cultural issues. The
challenge for RM research is to replace “management by rear-window view” with the management of
more multi-cross-cultural, complex, and global networks which look actively into the future.
The action research is based on authentic documentation, as systematically collected by the
researcher since the completion of his licentiate thesis (Palojärvi 1986), except for Case 1, which sums
up the findings of five construction projects in the years 1974-1984. Cases 2-9 are growth strategies,
mergers, and acquisition and delivery projects in the years 1984-2006, and they are causally coupled to
deepen the longitudinal analysis. In the cases, the formal risk identification mostly meant “what can go
wrong?” However, the product suppliers recognized the opportunities as well. Early risk identification at
the business level often led further to proactive RM. The case evidence conforms well to Hypothesis 1.
To manage the hypothetical major risks, it was more beneficial to take measures proactively, i.e.
early on and at the business level, rather than to wait until firm commitments had been made. It was
useful to have ample calendar time available when analyzing contractual role alternatives, key
appointments, or the entry mode, which are difficult to change at the project level. The case evidence
also conforms well to Hypothesis 2. In all the cases, the major risks that occurred were inherent in
at least one or often even both of the two hypothetical managerial competencies. Other major risks
appeared only sporadically. Thus, at least the two hypothetical major risks should always be identified
and further managed in each project. The key managers’ competencies regarding cross-cultural issues
were a more common major risk (or source of one) than the selected contractual role and other
arrangements, although major risks were also inherent in the contractual arrangements.
Other interesting observations include the following. (i) Uncertainty management may be well suited
to projects with unclear objectives. Traditional RM, focused on goal attainment as a “positive outcome”,
needed clear objectives for the most appropriate response. (ii) The development of practical RM over
time was also reflected in the cases. In the focal business, the formal identification of risks and their
responses became standard relatively late. (iii) Complexity reduction should be the goal when fighting
risks with potentially negative consequences, which may rapidly develop into crises.
The main result of the internally valid study, i.e. proven project RM methods could be applied at the
business level, thus enabling the major risks inherent in the key managers’ competencies regarding
cross-cultural and contractual issues to be managed early and proactively, is a novelty. It is considered
reliable and applicable to any investment project businesses with cross-cultural, e.g. international
contexts.
The main contribution to practice is to convert the hypotheses to practical action. The novel, early
(i.e. business-level) response-oriented risk and opportunity management method (EROM) should be
further developed for growth and other change business transactions, with the capacity to identify and
respond to – but definitely not to ignore – opportunities. Besides, the key managers competencies,
related to the areas of the major contextual risks, must be managed. The potential gain from better
contextual RM is quite significant.
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Tiivistelmä
Suomen rakennusteollisuuden kansainvälinen toiminta käynnistyi 1960/1970-lukujen vaihteessa
taloudellisten muutosten seurauksena. Kansainvälisen liiketoiminnan arvo oli jo 16 miljardia euroa
vuonna 2008 eli yhtä suuri kuin koko kotimaan uudisrakennustoiminnan arvo, ja sen ennustetaan
edelleen kasvavan. Tehokas riskienhallinta (RH) on käytännössä hankkeiden onnistumisen edellytys
ja RH:n puuttuminen on merkittävä epäonnistumisten syy. Siten asetettiin kaksi tutkimuskysymystä:
"Miten voidaan hallita johtavien suomalaisten rakennusteollisuusyritysten kansainvälistymisriskejä?" ja
"Mitkä ovat yritysten kansainvälistymisprosessin tärkeimmät riskit?"
Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on löytää parempia tapoja hallita aihealueen riskejä. Yleisesti käytettyjen
projektin RH-menetelmien käytön vaikutuksia liiketoimintatasolla analysoidaan ja riskejä, jotka liittyvät
avainjohtajien osaamiseen, erityisesti kulttuurien vuorovaikutuksen (cross-cultural) ja sopimuksellisten
kysymysten (contractual arrangements) hallinnan yhteydessä, tunnistetaan. Hypoteesi 1 on, että koetellut
hankkeiden RH menetelmät soveltuvat luotettavasti myös liiketoimintatasolle ja että kansainvälistymiseen
liittyvien tärkeimpien riskien hallintaa voidaan näin tehostaa. Hypoteesi 2 on, että liiketoiminta-
tavoitteisiin liittyvät tärkeimmät riskit aiheutuvat puutteista avainjohtajien osaamisissa erityisesti (2a)
kulttuurien välisten ja (2b) sopimuksellisten kysymysten hallinnan alueella. Tutkimus käsittelee
suomalaisten yritysten kansainvälisiä liiketoimia, hankkeita ja näiden riskejä erityisesti kasvutilanteissa.
Pääosat ovat kirjallisuustutkimus ja laadullinen, sisäinen toimintatutkimus yhdistettynä
tapaustutkimuksiin.
Tutkittu kirjallisuus käsittelee kansainvälisiä kysymyksiä vain suppeasti tai maakohtaisesti. RH
samaistetaan yhä useammin ennalta aktiiviseen epävarmuuden (tai mahdollisuuksien) hallintaan.
Heikkoihin signaaleihin tukeudutaan usein. Kansainvälisten hankkeiden tai yritysostojen RH on yhä
tärkeämpää ja uusia välineitä ja metodeja ehdotetaan. Hypoteesi 1 on uutuus, ts. kirjallisuus ei käsittele
sitä. Hypoteesin 2 mukaista johdon osaamista käsitellään (hajanaisesti) epä- ja onnistumisten syynä. Siten
Hypoteesi 2 ei ole uutuus mutta kulttuurien välisiin kysymyksiin liittyvien riskien kytkentä johdon
osaamiseen on uusi tutkimuskohde. Kirjallisuuden mukaan RH:n haaste on luopuminen "peruutuspeili-
johtamisesta” ja siirtyminen tulevaisuushakuiseen tapaan johtaa monikulttuurisia, monimutkaisia ja
globaaleja verkostoja.
Toimintatutkimus perustuu autenttiseen, aikanaan systemaattisesti kerättyyn aineistoon
poikkeuksena Tapaus 1, joka koostaa viiden rakennushankkeen havainnot vuosilta 1975–1984.
Tapaukset 2-9 käsittelevät kansainvälisiä yritysostoja ja -yhdistämisiä, muutos- ja toimitushankkeita
vuosina 1984–2006 sekä niiden taustana olleita strategioita pitkittäisanalyysin syventämiseksi.
Tapauksissa riski yleensä tarkoitti ”Mikä voi mennä huonosti?”, joskin rakennustuoteteollisuus tunnisti
myös mahdollisuuksia. Ajoissa tehty riskien tunnistaminen johti usein ennalta aktiivisiin vastatoimiin.
Tapausperusteiset havainnot tukevat merkittävästi Hypoteesia 1. Tarkasteltujen tärkeimpien
riskien hallinta onnistui paremmin, kun RH käynnistettiin ajoissa jo liiketoimintatasolla,
verrattuna käynnistämiseen vasta, kun tärkeimmät sitoumukset oli tehty. Oli eduksi käyttää riittävästi
aikaa esimerkiksi sopimusrakenteen, avainnimitysten tai investointitavan pohtimiseen, koska näitä
ratkaisuja on vaikeaa muuttaa hanketasolla. Hypoteesi 2 saa myös merkittävää tukea
tapausperusteisista havainnoista. Kaikissa tapauksissa tärkeitä riskejä liittyi vähintään toiseen ja
useissa molempiin tarkasteltuihin johdon osaamisalueisiin. Muitakin merkittäviä riskejä ilmeni ilman
säännönmukaisuutta. Johtopäätös on, että vähintään Hypoteesin 2 mukaiset riskit tulee tunnistaa ja
hallita kaikissa hankkeissa. Avainjohtajien kulttuurien välisten kysymysten osaamiseen liittyvät riskit
olivat yleisempiä kuin sopimusosaamiseen liittyvät, vaikka tärkeitä riskejä liittyi jälkimmäiseenkin
ryhmään.
Muita merkittäviä havaintoja olivat mm. seuraavat: (i) Epävarmuuden hallinta saattaa
menettelytapana sopia hankkeisiin, joiden tavoitteet ovat epäselvät. Perinteisen RH:n puitteissa
tavoitteiden saavuttaminen katsotaan jo "myönteiseksi seuraukseksi". Käytännössä saavuttaminen vaati
selkeät tavoitteet. (ii) RH:n kehittyminen vuosikymmenten aikana tuli hyvin esille myös tapauksissa.
Tarkastellussa liiketoiminnassa riskien muodollinen tunnistaminen ja siitä seuraavat vastatoimet
muuttuivat standardiksi kuitenkin melko myöhään. (iii) Monimutkaisuuden vähentäminen tulisi olla
tavoitteena, kun on tunnistettu riskejä, joiden suuri kielteinen seuraus voi kehittyä kriisiksi.
Päätulos (uutuus) on, että koeteltuja hankkeiden RH-menetelmiä ja -välineitä voidaan käyttää
liiketoimintatasolla, ja siten hallita ennalta aktiivisesti tärkeitä riskejä, jotka tässä kontekstissa liittyvät
avainjohtajien osaamisiin kulttuurien välisissä ja sopimuksellisissa kysymyksissä. Sisäisesti validia
tulosta voidaan soveltaa rakentamisen lisäksi muussa liiketoiminnassa, jossa kohteena ovat
investointihankkeet kulttuurienvälisissä, tyypillisesti kansainvälisissä konteksteissa.
Käytännön kannalta merkittävintä on muuntaa hypoteesit toiminnaksi. Uusi, ennalta aktiivinen
(liiketoimintatasolla käynnistyvä) riskien ja mahdollisuuksien hallintamenetelmä (EROM) tuleekin
nopeasti kehittää yritysten kasvu- ja muiden suurten muutosten tilanteiden hallintaan. Menetelmän
avulla tulee kyetä tunnistamaan ja hyödyntämään myös mahdollisuudet. Lisäksi avainjohtajien
osaaminen  kontekstin mukaisten tärkeiden riskien alueilla tulee varmistaa. Vaikka vain tarkasteltu
konteksti otetaan huomioon, on hyötypotentiaali  merkittävä.
Asiasanat Epävarmuus, kansainvälinen rakentaminen, kulttuurienvälisyys, kriisi, monimutkaisuus,
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FOREWORD
My professional background includes more than 30 years in management and top management
positions within the Finnish construction industry, mainly involved in duties related to the
internationalization processes of those firms. On top of that, I have served the Finnish Government
for 5 years on duties related to the management of public risk financing for the benefit of firms and
enterprises. Many of my assignments included a long-term stay abroad (in Africa, South-East Asia,
and  Western  Europe),  besides  extensive  business  travel  from my home in  Finland  into  Europe  and
Russia, Africa, the North America, the Middle East, and Asia. During my career, I have continuously
come across the phenomenon of “risk” via its numerous definitions, sources, and derivatives in
various businesses and projects. Mostly, it was spiced by the peculiar circumstances and conditions
of the international or foreign business environment. The management of such risks, whether
foreseen or not, has always been an issue in all the business and project endeavors of my career.
At the TKK/CME, in turn, Professor Juhani Kiiras has, with the help of a great number of his co-
researchers and students, businessmen and administrators, conducted an extensive range of the
studies on construction project management focusing on various forms, sizes, and types of projects.
Within the same unit, University Teacher Pekka Huovinen has focused his research and teaching on
the strategy issues in the international construction business from the Finnish point of view.
Previously, these two gentlemen supervised and instructed me to complete a licentiate thesis (1986)
on the risk management of Finnish construction project exports. On the  basis  of  that  work,  I
decided to proceed with a doctoral dissertation to complete my earlier attempt to enter the research
community, and commenced a systematic collection of authentic documentation on interesting
risky situations connected  with  my  respective  work  duties.  However,  I  managed  to  turn  to full-
time research only from the beginning of the year 2007, within  the  office  premises  of  the
TKK/CME. After that, the work for this dissertation went on, almost without an interruption, until
the end of the summer of 2009.
During the work, several important sub-issues have been put forward in a form of seven papers
presented at the international conferences, particularly within their scientific tracks. The
organizers invited the researcher to give the oral presentations on the papers in Reykjavik (2007 and
2009), Shanghai (2008), Rome (2008), and Helsinki (2008 and 2009). These papers appear within
the List of References. Additionally, the researcher has had an opportunity to participate in various
round table and panel discussions on the subjects related to the research within the construction
business community.
This research was financed by myself but leaned heavily on the significant contribution of the Wood
Product Industry of Metsäliitto at the start of the work in the year 2007. The expensive tours to the
international conferences, for the oral presentations of the papers above, were financed by the TKK/
CME. The minor financial contributions were received from the Confederation of the Finnish
Construction Industry (RT), Association of Finnish Civil Engineers (RIL) and LIP Consulting Inc.
Many of the books included within the reviewed literature were purchased by the TKK/CME.
Espoo, 5th of August, 2009 Signed by:
                    Lauri Palojärvi
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EXPLAINING THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCHER within this dissertation
This doctoral dissertation was prepared within the unit of Construction Management and Economics
(CME) at the Helsinki University of Technology (TKK) within the time period between January
2007 and August, 2009. The novelties, innovations, and other theoretical or practical advances
have been found, developed, or suggested solely by the researcher himself on the basis of,  on
the one hand, his nearly 40-year-long business career, mainly in the service of the Finnish
construction industry and Government, primarily in international duties in top management positions,
and, on the other hand, of an extensive review of the relevant literature and a deep longitudinal case
study.
Previously, the researcher has completed a licentiate thesis on an entangling and yet more limited
subject (Palojärvi 1986).The licentiate thesis at HUT is performed by the post-graduate
students after completing the Master´s degree (HUT Guide for Doctoral Students, 2007). In that,
they must demonstrate a sound, in-depth knowledge of their research field and an ability to apply
scientific research methods independently and critically. Researcher has also spent more than 10
years abroad (i.e. in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the Western Europe).
The important roles of supervising, instructing and tutoring the researcher, regarding various
issues, were vested in the following persons:
- Professor Juhani Kiiras, the Supervisor and Instructor, TKK/CME
- University Teacher Pekka Huovinen, the Tutor, TKK/CME.
In connection with this dissertation, one Master’s Thesis was completed by Ms. Liisa Ahonen, who
reviewed the literature on enlarged risk management (ERM). Several special assignments, also in a
form of literature reviews with a narrower focus, have been completed by the students of
TKK/CME, i.e. Ms. Laura Evälahti (contractual issues), Mr. Nicodemus Jansson (an article review
on ERM), and Ms. Ulla Judström (crises in the construction business).
The authentic case documentation, including the scoring results on the competencies of the key
managers in the cases, was collected by the researcher himself. The Supervisor has verified its
existence and is acquainted with its contents. To protect the intimacy of the respective key managers,
the competency assessments are presented on a team basis only.
The partial results and the early conclusions have been published at the six international scientific
conferences in Reykjavik (Nordnet), Rome (IPMA), Shanghai (CIB), and Helsinki (CIB, IPMA) in
the years 2007-2009, via the seven papers (used as the references of the dissertation) co-authored by
the researcher (the prime author and presenter), the supervisor, and the instructor. Some
professional articles have also been published in the magazines on the respective topics, authored by
the researcher alone or with the others.
The dissertation contains an imperative to develop early risk and opportunity management (EROM)
methods for contextual and other applicable uses. The scientific ground for such methods, i.e. this
dissertation, has been laid by the researcher, who has extensively, solely, and on his own studied the
literature and carried out the nine challenging case studies as the insider action researcher.
Espoo, 5th August, 2009      Signed by:
Lauri Palojärvi, Lic.Sc. (Tech.)
I hereby declare that the role of Lauri Palojärvi in this study fully complies with the criteria for the
independence as set for a dissertation.
Juhani Kiiras, Professor
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BOT Build-operate-transfer, a procurement method or a contracting form





FIDIC The International Federation of Consulting Engineers
GM General Manager
HRD Human resources development
IAR Insider action research
JV Joint venture
PM Project management
RAKLI The Finnish Federation of the Building Clients and Owners
RC Relational contracting
RM Risk management
RT The Finnish Federation of the Building Contractors and Product Suppliers
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS OF NAMES OF CASE FIRMS
LOY Lemminkäinen Company Ltd. Its subsidiary:
AAP Alfred A. Palmberg Company Ltd.
Partek Partek Corporation or Partek Group. Its subsidiaries:
CBR Cimenterie Belgique Royale – a cement-arm of Societe Generale
EP     Eastern Partek Private Ltd. – an associate company in Singapore
PC     Partek Concrete – a division (or a sector) that was an incorporated
          as a subsidiary in the 1990s
PCE  Partek Concrete Engineering (PCE) Company Ltd.
PCI   Partek Concrete International -  a holding arm established to own
         firms in Benelux countries
VBI  Vereinigte Bouw Industries N.V.
ML Metsäliitto Group (a cooperative).  The owner of:
FF     Finnforest Company Ltd – an arm for mechanical wood product
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LIST OF DEFINITIONS
Capability
Capability is a repeatable pattern of action in the use of assets to offer products to a market.
(Sanchez et al. 1996b).
Catastrophe
Catastrophe is herein used as a synonym for disaster.
Chaos
Chaos is present when fully stochastic phenomena appear within a deterministic system. Within a
chaotic system environment significant changes may occur completely unexpectedly. Chaos
theory has been applied  on project management by Kiiras (2001).
Crisis
Crisis  is a low-probability, unexpected, high-impact event that is not covered with contingency
plans (Booth 1993). Crisis is looked at as a special consequence of mismanaged risk. Depending
on how the crisis is managed, the consequence can be positive or negative till the extreme i.e.
disaster.
Competence
Competence [organizational] is an ability to sustain coordinated deployment of assets in a way
that helps a firm to achieve its goals. (Sanchez et al. 1996b)
Competency
Competency [individual] is an individual competence of a human being.
Complexity
Complexity is  a  characteristic  of  a  system.  The  rate  of  complexity  of  a  system depends  on  the
number of its elements and their interconnections (Shenhar and Dvir 2004).
Contractual arrangements
Contractual arrangements include herein, apart of preparing and signing the contract itself,
particularly the selection of the contractual main partners and their roles, the contractual form
and the way of managing the contract in all aspects.
Disaster
Disaster is the consequence of a mismanaged crisis (Loosemore 2000).
Finnish construction contractors and building product suppliers
Finnish construction contractors and building product suppliers (often shortened to “construction
industry” or “industry”) are industrial firms which are essentially managed from Finnish soil,
regardless of their ownership. Design and engineering firms (often consultants), nor
administrative organizations are not included because they are not considered “industrial”.
Enlarged risk management (ERM)
Enlarged risk management (ERM) is a causal chain of uncertainty (often shortened to “UnC”)
management >> risk management (shortened to RM) >> crisis management, in conditions of
high complexity. ERM´s holistic aim is to grab all activities during the transaction from an early
idea till the goals either have been attained or cannot be any more.
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Foreign investments
A foreign investment is either a green field operation or a company acquisition. Passively
acquiring a minor share in a company actively run by other shareholders is generally not
considered as a “foreign investment” measure. Such a measure may, however, support or even
manage export activities.
Goals
Goals are (here: business) objectives which motivate a firm’s decision making (Sanchez et al.
1996b).
Growth situations are situations were the focal company is actively and knowingly looking for
an opportunity to grow by transactions serving the purpose e.g. entering new market, increasing
the previous business volume considerably, accepting new type of orders, and so forth.
International construction projects
International construction projects include projects undertaken by an enterprise both outside its
home country (Strassman and Wells 1988) and in a home country but which involve foreign
competitors (Momaya and Selby 1998).
International market entry
International (or foreign) business covers export, contractual and investment entry modes that
make possible the entry of a company’s products, technology, human skills, management or
other resources into a foreign country (Root 1994).
Level of strategy
Project or production level involves decisions on an operating or production strategy, and the
competencies of site or production management is a key issue. Business level involves decisions
on what business the firm should be in and also how to compete successfully (Langford and Male
2001).
Risk
Risk is a possibility that the expectations – as often set e.g. in business plans and project
schedules – will not be met (Palojärvi 1986). A risky event has a probability (p) of occurring.
Risk consequence
Risk consequence is the outcome of an event, considered as a risky event from the observer’s
point of view. It can be given a value (M). The consequences may not be known for certain, but
their distribution might be known or at least it can be given a sufficient estimate (aligning with
Flanagan and Norman 1993). The magnitude of risk at hand is thus p x M. A major risk may, if
it occurs, by itself prevent a firm from meeting its business objectives.
Risk management; proven (or traditional) risk management
Risk  management  (  RM) is  herein  considered  as  a  process  which  has  two major  objectives:  to
avoid the downside risks and to exploit the opportunities (includes at least the steps of goal
setting, risk identification and response. In some other definitions goal setting is excluded, while
e.g. risk analysis and risk control are included (e.g. Flanagan and Norman 1993).
Proven (or traditional) RM is defined as RM measures generally recognized and applied by the
practicants.
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Uncertainty
Uncertainty is considered here as a source of risk. Uncertainty prevails when a decision maker
has no historical data (e.g. a group of instances) relating to a situation for an event, conditions,
etc. to occur (Knight 1921, Smith 2003).
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The internationalization of Finnish construction firms and building product suppliers is
interrelated with the overall development of the Finnish construction industry. Major changes inside
Finland catalyzed its internationalization in the early 1960s and its initial growth in the 1970s. The
further international growth in the 1980s, the painful domestic recession and the consequent
restructuring with the exits from foreign markets in the early 1990s, and the recent developments in
the new millennium have resulted in the international and profitable growth of the business of the
Finnish construction industry. In the year 2008, the value of the industry’s international business
was app. 16Bn€, i.e. at the same level as that of new building production in Finland. It is estimated
that this international business will grow further both in absolute and relative terms. The nine
major breakpoints in the internationalization process of the Finnish construction industry are here
perceived to be as follows (Figure 1-1).
· The export of Finnish construction was pioneered with projects in the Middle East in the
late 1950s and the 1960s.
· The Finnish construction industry secured many large Soviet contracts, mainly close to the
border between the Soviet Union and Finland, in the 1970s.
· The long-term international commitments resulted in the need for competent Finnish
managers and staff in the 1970s.
· The foreign order books grew to an all-time high in the early 1980s.
· The adoption of the construction management (CM) approach in the domestic markets in
Finland in the early 1980s.
· The Nordic recession and the collapse of the Soviet  market wiped out about 50% of the
Finnish construction capacity in the early 1990s.
· The various forms of CM have been relied upon extensively since the mid-1990s.
· The EU membership of Finland did not make much difference to the internationalization
towards the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s.
· Finnish construction contractors and building product suppliers have achieved high
international growth in their businesses in the 2000s.
(i) The pioneering construction export projects to the Middle East in the late 1950s and the
1960s were the indicators of the opening of post-World War 2 Finnish society. Besides the Soviet-
Finnish barter trade, only the Finnish forest industry developed its exports in the early 1950s. In
turn, the construction industry also stepped over the national borders. Its leaders had a boom time
thanks to post-war reconstruction inside Finland. Some of them wanted to know what foreign
business was like. The early try-outs in the Middle East were not significant in comparison with
domestic  business,  except  for  one  major  loss  in  a  bridge  project  in  Iraq  as  a  result  of  a  lack  of
knowledge of the local environment. Nevertheless, a few leading personalities, e.g. Antero Kallio
and some others1, were soon recognized as “the export experts” within the business community in
Finland. Strong relationships were built between key Iraqis (e.g. Mr. Mohammed Makzoumi) and
the respective Finns during the first joint contracts. Those contacts were re-established in the 1970s
and the 1980s, when Finnish contractors secured huge contracts in Iraq (e.g. Brax 2005).
1 Otto Vänttinen and Ville Korhonen
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(ii) The Finnish construction industry was able to secure many large contracts, mainly close to
the Soviet border, in the 1970s.  Finland paid its war compensation to the Soviet Union mainly by
delivering goods, equipment, and construction projects. This barter trade flourished until the mid-
1980s. For example, a new town and industrial complex was constructed in Kostamuksha. These
huge and profitable contracts dominated in the minds of the management of the leading Finnish
firms. Consequently, actual efforts to develop true competitiveness – i.e. new competencies – for
targeted foreign markets were reduced, particularly as a result of management capacity and for
financing reasons. The most important risk management strategy was to establish Finn-Stroi Oy – a
joint venture of over 10 construction contractors – which was able to obtain vital governmental
guarantees and share the remaining risk efficiently concerning its contracts. At the same time, this
setup reduced competition inside Finland. Thus, the impact of the Soviet contracts on the
internationalization of the Finnish construction industry was mixed. While the financial positions of
most companies were strengthened, project exports to non-Soviet foreign markets were only taken
on as sporadic ventures and not as strategic businesses. Nevertheless, long-term commitments were
made by some firms, e.g. by YIT and Partek in Saudi Arabia, Polar in Iraq, and Lemminkäinen in
Iraq and Africa. Through these ventures, the companies tried, among other features, to learn as
much as possible about the “problems and peculiarities” of the local environment as a key response
in managing risks and repatriating as much as possible of any profits earned (Brax 2005).
Figure 1-1. Timeline schedule of the nine major breakpoints of the internationalization process of
                      the Finnish construction industry from the late 1950s until the 2000s.
(iii) The long-term international commitments resulted in a need for competent Finnish
managers and staff in the 1970s. They had to take care of the rapidly-growing order books of the
contractors, followed by building product suppliers, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. An
alarming sign was the sudden growth of the order books to exceed 400 million euros in the year
1978, i.e. more than triple the value in comparison with the past years’ values (see Figure 1-2).
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However, the universities of technology in Finland were neither able nor willing to set up any
permanent educational structure to enable companies to solve their key personnel needs. Therefore,
some trial recruitments were carried out mainly from among British nationals. Their performance
was not encouraging for problems related to their adaption to the Finnish employers´ corporate
culture. The only available solution to ensure the managerial resources for the imminent contracts
was for the Finnish companies to organize extensive training courses by themselves, assisted by the
universities, in the late 1970s.
Figure 1-2. Value of the international construction business of Finnish contractors during the years
1970-2006 (published by the Confederation of Finnish Construction Industry (RT) in
2007 in Finnish; translated by the author).
(iv) The foreign order books grew to an all-time high in the early 1980s. Despite the exits from
Nigeria (when the government stopped paying its bills at the end of the 1970s), the foreign order
books peaked in the early 1980s. The share of the foreign business in the Middle East (and the
Soviet Union) became strategically important, in particular in the case of YIT and its parent,
Perusyhtymä. The latter had pioneered the export of construction projects to Nigeria.
Lemminkäinen grew in Africa but it ended up with a heavy loss in its joint venture with Polar and
the Conference Palace contract in Baghdad in Iraq. Likewise, the joint venture of the other Finnish
contractors had to leave Iran as a result  of the revolution and to re-establish themselves in Egypt.
On the other hand, large contracts were secured in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Libya. In turn, the
building product industry followed the contractors and it soon surpassed the international business
volume of the contractors (see Figure 1-3). Partek expanded its Saudi concrete operation, entered
the Iraqi and Southeast Asian markets with precast concrete plants, and expanded its concrete
technology sales. Lohja, the archrival of Partek, went to Alabama in the USA for its ready-mix and
precast operations. The attainment of strategically significant foreign business volumes was a result
of this decade, particularly for the leading building product and contracting firms. The cadres of
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corporate training programs, again assisted by the Finnish universities. In the 1980s, the building
product industry recruited many key managers from the contractors’ organizations. In the early
1990s, the Russian business was scaled down after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Barter trade
was not possible any more and the Russian building contracts diminished.
(v) The adoption of the construction management (CM) approach by the Finns in the early
1980s. The Conference Palace in Baghdad was built with a large amount of Finnish skilled labor,
along with foreign labor from various developing countries. At the same time, the idea of sending
only small teams of key managers and some special experts was being adopted by most Finnish
firms. Only a few Finnish (or other expatriate) construction managers were sent from the home
offices in the case of the leading building product (plant) suppliers. The latter considered large,
traditional general contracts as risky on the basis of the well-known examples in e.g. Nigeria, Iran,
and Iraq. In addition, it was realized that new contenders from developing countries, e.g. South
Korea, Taiwan, and China, could offer much lower contract prices than those that Finns considered
feasible. In turn, the Finnish contractors had to limit their intake of foreign orders because of a lack
of competent personnel, despite their well-planned, systematic training efforts. At the same time,
Finnish building product suppliers hired Finnish key managers, which already had gained
relevant experience abroad at the service of the Finnish contractors, for their new subsidiaries
and associate companies abroad.
(vi) The Nordic recession and the collapse of the Soviet market wiped out about 50% of the
Finnish construction capacity in the early 1990s. The two fairly internationalized contractors,
YIT and Lemminkäinen, were competitive enough to strengthen their relative positions (along with
Hartela and Viitoset). However, Haka, Polar, and Puolimatka (which had started to internationalize
later) were taken over by foreign contractors. The bankruptcy of Haka was particularly striking
because it was trying to fill up its ailing owner’s (Cooperative EKA) coffers with badly needed cash
from the advances of several low-priced Russian Military Village orders. Although the bankruptcy
caused a severe risk for its business associates, such as Partek (because of its long-planned
Sertolovo contract; see Case No. 7 for the details), this resulted in a major, well-hidden move by
Skanska  AB  of  Sweden  to  establish  itself  in  Finland  with  the  ex-Haka  managers  on  the  ruins  of
Haka.  In  addition,  NCC  AB  of  Sweden  acquired  Puolimatka.  In  turn,  Polar  and  Ruola  became
additional victims of the restructuring process of the construction industry in Finland. In turn, the
two leading Finnish building product suppliers, Partek and Lohja, were forced to merge their
primary operations. Lohja’s concrete venture in the USA was closed. Partek’s readily
internationalized precast concrete operations were able to continue. The third player, Novera
(containing the former Puolimatka) ceased to exist, while its versatile building product subsidiaries
were sold. The recession implied that the survivors had to succeed in developing their domestic cost
competitiveness. At the same time, the recession reduced their desire to re-invest in foreign
operations, not to mention any significant R&D projects (unless financed from public funds). For
the remaining contractors, the domestic real estate development business, with very few foreign
competitors, was more lucrative and profitable than focusing on competitive bidding. Later, many
more leading suppliers of cement, concrete, bricks, blocks, and rock wool – including all the ex-
Partek and/or ex-Lohja subsidiaries – were acquired by major foreign players (e.g. Palojärvi 1993).
The ultimate decision-makers in the restructuring process were the Finnish banks. Ex post, it is
assessed here that this restructuring was prolonged too much and was thus expensive for all the
stakeholders, including the banks themselves.
(vii) The extensive reliance on the various forms of CM after the mid-1990s. Lemminkäinen
was already a CM pioneer in the 1970s, but CM forms were widely adopted in Finland only after
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the mid-1990s. In essence, the adapted, national CM concept enables owners to mobilize a string of
various specialty contractors and suppliers under the management of an independent CM consultant
or CM contractor (e.g. Kähkönen and Kiiras 2009). The most visible standard-bearers of this
fundamental  change  were  two  CM  contractors,  the  SRV  Corporation  (originally  Viitoset)  and
Lemminkäinen, and one CM consultant, CM-Urakointi (today Sweco PM). Thus, the leading
building contractors became more selective in obtaining new orders. The CM approach also
encouraged the building product suppliers to add services to their standard products and to offer
system solutions and specialized subcontracting (e.g. the erection of building products). Thus, the
companies were able first to pilot the CM forms and improve their competitiveness inside Finland.
Thereafter, they applied similar CM forms successfully in foreign markets as well.
(viii) The EU membership of Finland did not make much difference to internationalization
towards the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s. Finnish construction designers, however, won
many foreign orders from the Commission. The contractors increased their foreign business fast,
especially in the Nordic countries. Most importantly, the product suppliers’ foreign business
continued to grow steadily, particularly within the EU countries (Figure 1-3). The growth was both
organic and acquisition-based, despite the fact that no efficient standardization was put through
within the EU, as many believed would happen. This indicates strongly that the construction
business still remains local by nature. The question of “what to do globally and locally?” is of the
utmost importance. This differs from the earlier slogan of being “multinational”, which was
advocated e.g. by Nokia’s management in the late 1990s.
(ix) Finnish contractors and building product suppliers have achieved high levels of growth in
their international business in the 2000s. In particular, the leading Finnish (or ex-Finnish-owned)
firms include Kone Elevators, Consolis, Ruukki Construction, Rockwool, Rettig, YIT, and Lemcon.
Asia, particularly China, has been the target market of pioneering ventures and try-outs with some
major permanent establishments. In addition, Russia has experienced its long-awaited economic
growth, primarily fuelled by growing global oil and gas prices. The construction markets have
boomed in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the other bigger cities. This has also benefited many
Finnish firms. The housing development business has also been ventured into, e.g. YIT was
developing many blocks with thousands of apartments in early 2009. In turn, the leading building
product suppliers have been cautious about establishing production plants in Russia. In addition, the
export of building products and systems, particularly HVAC systems (e.g. Halton), has grown
rapidly.
In the case of Finnish construction contractors, it is here summarized that internationalization
was commenced in the late 1950s from scratch in the form of export projects. The export operations
of the leading contractors peaked in both absolute and relative terms from the end of the 1970s until
the mid-1980s. Thereafter, the value and importance of the international business of Finnish
contractors diminished compared with their domestic business as a result of e.g. the increasing
competition on the part of Turkish and Asian contractors. The domestic recession and the
disappearance of the Soviet market overnight accelerated this development and caused major
restructuring among the biggest Finnish actors in the early 1990s. Moreover, some leading firms,
e.g. Puolimatka, ended up under foreign ownership. During the 2000s, the remaining contractors
have become more local and established themselves inside targeted foreign markets in order to
grow,  as  well  as  to  sustain  and  to  deepen  their  competitive  positions.  In  the  autumn of  2008,  the
global credit crunch had its negative consequences across all markets in terms of postponed,
downsized, and canceled construction investments. During the spring of 2009, Finland-based
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contractors experienced moderate growth in their international business because of the rising
economic expectations around the Baltic Sea region, Eastern Europe, and Asia (Figure 1-2).
In the case of Finnish building product suppliers, it is here summarized that after starting slightly
later than the contractors, this industry internationalized itself consistently and fairly fast, primarily
in continental Europe, until the early 1980s. After the recession during the early 1990s, the value of
the foreign turnover of the building product industry grew significantly. It reached a total of 13
billion euros in the year 2005 (Figure 1-3). During the same 15-year period, many building product
suppliers were acquired by foreign owners, e.g. Partek and Lohja’s concrete divisions (now
Consolis), Partek Rockwool (now Paroc), and Partek and Lohja’s cement divisions (now
Finnsementti and Lohja Rudus). During the spring of 2009, internationalized, Finland-based
suppliers have already experienced the first positive signs of a global market recovery.
Figure 1-3. Value of the international business of the Finnish construction industry
      during the years 1980-2005, by business type (published by RT 2007 in
      Finnish; translated by the author).
Overall, it has been forecast that the international growth business of the Finnish construction
industry will continue. It is here re-evaluated that the total international turnover will exceed the
domestic one by the year 2015 (Figure 1-4).
1.2 Two contextual research questions
It is likely that the Finnish construction industry will continue to operate in the EU, Russian, and
Asian markets in the future and companies will continue to seize new opportunities, as well as to
take and to manage risk in this growing international business. Otherwise, there would be no
growth. Among the Finnish practitioners, the general understanding has been that effective risk
management (RM) can reduce the occurrence and significance of failures, as well as being able to
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Figure 1-4. Actual and forecast value of the international turnover of the Finnish construction
industry in the years 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013, by business type (published
by RT 2004 in Finnish; translated by the author).
In reality, the past performance of the Finnish companies provides more valuable experience of
failures and less of successes. The practitioners usually assume that international transactions may
well be at least as risky as transactions on average. In the US context, Schweiger (2002 p.4) has
reported that only 20-30% (depending on his references) of all merger and acquisition
transactions lived up to their financial expectations, which is also the researcher’s  belief.
In the literature, many key authors (e.g. Flanagan and Norman 1993) posit that contextual risk
identification is  the  base  of  RM.  If  identification  fails,  one  usually  has  to  deal  with  more  costly
consequences, should a risk occur, or an opportunity might be entirely lost. Both the past outcomes
of the internationalization of the Finnish construction industry and the relevant literature (e.g.
Ahonen 2007) indicate that severe losses can be avoided and/or opportunities can be seized with
sound RM. In general, the more competitive the international operations of companies are, the
better their performance also is in the domestic market (Palojärvi, 1991).
Since the late 1980s, the author has been convinced that it is up to this longitudinal study to
analyze the phenomenon of the international growth business of Finnish contractors and building
product suppliers and to come up with some relevant answers and proposals for the further
development of the art of RM practices. When the Confederation of the Finnish Construction
Industry (RT 2004) forecast a 5-billion Euro growth during the five-year period from 2009-2013, it
is easy to see the size of the RM issue, both as negative problems and positive opportunities.
Therefore,  the  author  believes  that  it  is  highly  appropriate  to  push  on  and  to  develop  better  RM
ways for growth business situations. It is here evaluated that the success rates of Finnish contractors
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Within the focal context of the internationalization of the Finnish construction industry, the two
research questions for this study are posed as follows. “How can the internationalization process
risks of the leading Finnish construction contractors and building product suppliers be managed?”
and “What are the main risks of the internationally growing Finnish contractors and suppliers,
respectively, and how can they be managed, in particular in the selected evolving EU, Russian, and
Asian construction markets?
1.3 Purpose, hypotheses, and limitations of the study
The risks inherent in the international growth business situations of Finnish construction contractors
and building product suppliers are approached in this study. The roots of the study were, however,
laid down in the mid-1980s with the author’s licentiate thesis on the management of risks in Finnish
construction project exports. On the basis of its findings, it was posited that the most significant
risks were twofold. They were related to key managers and the contractual balance between project
stakeholders. Against the general expectation in the prior literature, this thesis revealed that the
much-feared political risks had not directly caused severe problems for Finnish actors (Palojärvi
1986). Nevertheless, the two principal risk types, i.e. political risks and economic risks, are hidden
in all the country contexts of international construction, which is beset with more types of risks than
domestic construction (Han and Diekmann 2001, Ling et al. 2005).
Accordingly, the purpose of  this  study  is  to  find  and  to  develop  better  ways  for  construction
contractors and building product suppliers to manage their major risks in both business-level and
project-level situations on the basis of a literature review and combined case and insider action
research. In broad terms, the impacts of  (i) applying proven project-level RM methods at the upper
business level within the focal context (“transfer upwards”) will be analyzed, (ii) the combined  use
of business-level RM methods and project-level ones within the focal context (“combined use”) will
be studied, and (iii) the risks embedded within key managers and their competencies on managing,
in particular, cross-cultural issues and contractual arrangements within the focal context (“major
risk identification”), will be identified. Contextually, the outcomes should benefit focal Finnish
companies in their operations, e.g. in the strongly emerging Asian and Russian markets.
This dissertation will focus on the two hypotheses, which are examined empirically as part of the
combined case and insider action research. The first hypothesis was developed after the author’s
licentiate thesis. Proven project RM methods can also be applied reliably at the business level and,
thus, the effectiveness of managing major international business risks can be improved within the
focal context. The second hypothesis, which is addressed in two subparts “2a” and “2b” for the
clarity sake, stems from the grounds of the author’s licentiate thesis. Major risks related to the
attainment of targeted business objectives are inherent within key managers´ competencies and the
insufficiency of these in particular to manage: (2a) cross-cultural issues, and (2b) contractual
arrangements within the focal context.
Overall, the scope of this study encompasses firms managing their international businesses and
projects, including the related risks. The focus is on growth situations, the major risk types, and
proven project RM methods and their applications at the business level. Enlarged risk management
(ERM) is here defined as a causal chain of uncertainty => RM => crisis management, in conditions
of high complexity. The focal context involves the internationalization of Finnish construction
contractors and building product suppliers, as well as the international operations of foreign-owned
subsidiaries based in Finland.
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The basic limitations are as follows. (i) Chaos has been excluded from  among  the  units  of
analysis, because the available case data do not contain any situation which could be characterized
as truly chaotic, e.g. in which new plans are continuously prepared but they are never implemented
(e.g. Kiiras 2005). (ii) The measurement of the managerial competencies has been limited to
three basic components, i.e. education, experience, and motivation, which are considered to be
sufficient vis-à-vis the examination of the hypotheses. (iii)  In this work, the main features,  as a
foundation, of a novel, proactive RM will be laid out. The further development will follow
after the dissertation, also to protect this study from the possible argument that it is just another
R&D project rather than a scientific endeavor. (iv) Financial RM and its derivatives (e.g. Busch
2005) are not addressed. (v) The subject is not the project export, nor the strategic management of
the Finnish contractors but the RM in international construction business. (vi) The focal issue is not
the uncertainty management.
1.4 Overview of the report
The report of this study includes 10 chapters (Figure 1-5). Chapter  1 contains the contextual
background, the contextual research questions, the purpose, the objectives, the hypotheses, the
limitations, and an overview of the report’s structure. Chapter  2 explains the reliability of the
research methods, the rationale for selecting them, and the respective discussion. Both one
extensive literature review of enlarged RM (including uncertainty, crisis, and complexity
management) and some limited literature reviews of the contextual, hypothetical major risks are
presented. The main method is longitudinal insider action research based on 9 real cases, where the
author assumed the roles of an active insider over a period from the year 1974 until the year 2005.
The combination of the selected methods makes possible a relevant comparison of the findings,
besides the examination of the two hypotheses. Some interesting new references have emerged as
well.
Chapter 3 reports on the conduct and findings of the extensive review of “enlarged” RM, including
uncertainty,  complexity,  risk,  and  crisis  management.  The  results  of  some  limited  reviews  of  the
areas of hypothetical, contextual, major risks are also presented. In addition, the author’s insights
into these findings are revealed. The relevant literature on project-level RM in general is abundant.
On the other hand, very few references deal with the international context. The scarce contextual
literature on cross-cultural and contractual issues points to key managers’ competencies and
contractual arrangements as the two potential success or failure factors, i.e. major risks and/or their
sources. However, the literature does not provide any advanced, structured framework for a further
analysis in the context of international construction.
Chapter 4 includes the reporting of the design, conduct, and justification of the methodological
choices behind the combined insider action and case study. The main features of the RM method
that the author and his colleagues applied within all the 9 cases are described. This reflects the
development of RM thinking in the case companies from the early 1970s until the early 2000s. It
also complements the background of the study (presented in Ch. 1). In all the 9 cases, the
applications of this RM method contained at least the setting of business objectives, major risk
identification, and the launching of a response (if any did take place).
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Background, research questions, purpose, objectives, hypotheses, and limitations
Chapter 2: Research methodology
A review of alternative approaches; a rationale of the selected methods, i.e. the literature
reviews and the longitudinal insider action research on 9 real cases in 1974-2005.
Chapter 3: Literature reviews
An extensive review of “enlarged” RM including uncertainty, complexity, risk, and crisis
management. Limited reviews of the areas of the hypothetical major risks.
Chapter 4: Design and conduct of the combined insider action and case study
The justification of the methodological choices and the description of the RM approach and
methods applied during the cases (Ch. 5)
Chapter 5: Case descriptions
The case briefs, issues studied, the RM measures applied, the rivaling major risks if any; “how
did it go?” (More detailed descriptions are available if and when required.)
Chapter 6: Cross-case analysis
Cross-case analysis examines and validates the hypothetical major risks and the applicability of
proven project-level RM methods at the business level.
Chapter 7: Discussion on the literature findings versus the case findings
The literature findings (of Ch. 3), with the author’s insights, are compared with the case
findings (of Ch. 5-6) to lay the ground for a call for a novel, proactive RM method.
Chapter 8: Discussion and critique on the study
The research method and its limitations, the examination of the hypothesis, and the potential
rivaling major risks and their management are discussed.
Chapter 9: Conclusions and contribution
The outcomes of the examination of the hypotheses are discussed and the features of the
proactive RM method are suggested for practitioners in international construction and project
businesses.
Chapter 10: Summary
The rationale of the study, the steps of its conduct, the findings, the critique, the conclusions,
and the contribution are summarized.
Figure 1- 5. Structure of the report.
Chapter 5 contains the essentials of the case descriptions. They all have a similar structure and are
all presented in a similar order: (1) the case in a nutshell – product, organization, schedule, etc.; (2)
the key issues to be observed and studied; (3) the RM measures applied both at the business level
and the project level, if any, versus the occurrence of the two hypothetical and possible rivaling
major risks, and (4) a concluding note on “How did it go?”. The essentials of each case are packed
into 5-7 pages. The first case consists of a summary of the findings of five limited cases of
Lemminkäinen Oy between the years 1974 and 1984. Originally, these cases were already reported
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upon as part of the author’s licentiate thesis (Palojärvi 1986). The eight other cases are either
business-level cases or project-level ones that are also causally coupled. These couplings deepen the
longitudinal explanatory analysis.
Chapter 6 contains a cross-case analysis, i.e. an examination of the two hypotheses. The case
findings are used to test and validate the hypotheses, that is, to see whether the findings conform to
each of the hypotheses or not. Initially, it is here revealed that the findings seem to support the
hypotheses. In addition, some potentially interesting observations are brought up within this chapter
(but the related discussion and the critique take place later, in Ch. 8).
Chapter 7 includes a comparison of the findings of the literature reviews (Ch. 3) and the cross-case
analysis (Ch. 6). No framework, which could have been considered (contextually) as “advanced”,
surfaced in the reviewed literature. The corporate-level RM was not on the focus, and as one of the
consequences, the financial RM was limited outside of the work. In turn, the cases validate the
significance of the two hypothetical major risks. Moreover, the case findings lay the ground for a
further imperative on a novel, proactive RM method, which could be launched at the business level
well before the forthcoming implementation of respective transactions or projects.
Chapter 8 contains the discussion and the criticisms. Many relevant issues are raised, such as: (i)
the lack of a structural framework for studying the international construction industry; (ii) the
scarcity of the literature reviewed; (iii) the joint long span of the selected cases and reflections on
them, and (iv) the rivaling major risks (whether identified or not) and their significance versus the
major outcomes.
Chapter 9 contains the conclusions on the major outcomes and the contribution of the study. The
hypotheses seem to withstand the examination, yet they are also the subjects of a certain critique,
discussion, and the obvious need for further research. The need to develop more proactive hands-on
RM method for practitioners is suggested. Only the main features of the suggested novel proactive
RM method are presented. The method is particularly applicable for managing growth and major
change situations within the international construction business. A rough estimate of the possible
financial benefits (“significance”) is also presented. Some typical growth situations of the building
product business, such as market entries, company turnarounds, corporate acquisitions and post-
merger integrations, capacity expansions, and complex deliveries are addressed within the selected
cases to point out the suggestion that building product suppliers can also benefit from this novel
RM method as long as there is a notable change involved. (It is hoped that this chapter will invite
many constructive comments and critiques to contribute to the complementary development work,
which, it is foreseen, will be continued until the year 2010.)
Chapter 10 contains a summary of the design and conduct of this study, its key findings, critique,
conclusions, and contribution.
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2. RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA
2.1 Relevance of the study
The relevance of the study is grounded on: (i) the past failures of Finnish construction firms and
building product suppliers (e.g. the Diyala bridge project of JV Finnish Contractors in Iraq, where
the floods destroyed the unfinished constructions twice; the housing business of Lemminkäinen,
Ruola, and Perusyhtymä in Nigeria, where the Government stopped the payments and the
companies had to cease their operations;  the precast concrete business of Lohja and the rock wool
business of Partek in the culturally and contractually quite new US environment, both resulting into
great losses;  the conference palace of the IRCO consortium in Iraq where the Client demanded,
based on the turn-key clause, scope of works and design far above the view of the contractor;  the
housing business of SRV in Berlin, and the   cross-culturally and contractually demanding Russo-
German-Finnish housing projects of Teräsbetoni and Haka, eventually at too low price, as part of
the  military  program of  90s  in  Russia; (ii) the past successes of  the  same (e.g.  the  Kostamuksha
town of Finn-Stroi , as part of the competition-free barter trade between Soviet Union and Finland;
the projects of Lemminkäinen in Liberia where cross-cultural and contractual competences were
coupled with motivated and solid construction performance; the precast concrete business,
particularly on floor slabs, of Partek in Western Europe, the housing project of Puolimatka as one of
the very first projects of the military program in Russia, and the  project export business to allover
of  the  world,  with  already  more  than  three  decades  of  experience,  of  Lemcon),  and (iii) the
literature on the failure and success factors of managing businesses and project actors in general
and in non-Finnish contexts. The author realized that the analysis of the accumulated knowledge,
the finding and design of effective ways of managing major risks, and the application of the
outcomes to the forecast high international business volume of the Finnish construction industry
 (Figure 1-3) together provide an exceptional research opportunity (Figure 2-0). The author
strongly believes that Finland-based firms, public organizations, research institutes, individual
researchers, and other actors may benefit from this effort.
Figure 2-0. Anatomy of risk (Rowe 1976).
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Thus, the purpose of this study was chosen to be the ground-laying and development of better
ways of managing major risks inherent in the international growth operations of Finnish
construction firms and building product suppliers. At the outset, it was perceived that most effective
ways can be based on the 2-level management of a firm’s business, its projects, and the inherent
risks, and, in particular, on the better identification of major risks and, consequently, a better
response to risks. Moreover, such better ways would help firms seize new business opportunities in
e.g. the growing EU, Russian, and Asian markets. The outcomes of the study should also facilitate
the further development of practical RM tools for practitioners both inside and outside Finland.
The two methodological parts of the study are as follows: (i) a state-of-the-art review in the form
of one comprehensive RM literature review and two focused ones, and (ii) an examination of the
two hypotheses via longitudinal insider action research on 9 real-life cases of the three leading
corporations of the Finnish construction industry that were carried out between the years 1974 and
2005. The case selection resulted in both business-level cases and embedded, project-level cases of
the same corporations, respectively, to deepen the longitudinal analysis.
2.2 Rationale for the study
2.2.1 Role of the literature review
Reliance on a literature review is recommended by many scholars, e.g. Sekaran 1999, Walker
1994, and Rahman 2003. The latter states that four typical methods, i.e. literature reviews, case
studies, interviews, and surveys, can be employed in research on project management or
construction management. The purpose of the literature review as part of this study is: (i) to find
support, if any, for choosing the hypotheses for the examination; (ii) to find competing hypotheses,
(iii) to reveal any progress that may have been made in managing risks in construction since the
licentiate thesis (Palojärvi 1986), (iv) to synthesize insights in traditional and enlarged RM, and (v)
to  identify  the  key  concepts  or  elements  that  could  be  assessed  as  belonging  among  the  targeted
“better” RM methods.
In the 1980s, contextual RM literature was practically non-existent. By the mid-2000s, some
hundreds of relevant references on RM had been published as part of the management of
(construction) projects. However, a limited number of such books and articles address international
RM at the project level and only a handful deal with RM at the business level. This was surprising
in comparison with the growing volume of international construction business across the globe.
Instead, such coverage is broader vis-à-vis the other internationalized industries and, for example,
their failure and success factors. Therefore, it was considered essential to screen the recent books
and journal articles published primarily in English,, the traditional main lingua franca of
international construction business, between the years 2000 and 2006.
The emerging most effective 12 RM concepts have been selected from the reviewed literature.
These concepts are placed on a timeline in Figure 2-1, i.e. they were published between the years
1982 and 2007 (see sub-chapter 3.3). In turn, the nine real-life cases were carried out between the
years 1974 and 2005. They are placed on a timeline in Figure 2-2. This rough comparison indicates
that it is likely that most of the 12 RM concepts were not applied to the management of the nine
real-life cases for an obvious reason, i.e. the non-coupled timing. During the early stages of the
primary review, it was discovered that the identified enlarged RM literature published between the
years 2000 and 2006 does not contain any relevant references related to the two hypothetical major
Lauri Palojärvi (2009) RM in the international growth business of Finnish construction firms
14
risk types. Thus, two limited reviews of the articles on competencies to manage cross-cultural and
contractual issues were conducted to find such references (see Chapter 3).
Figure 2-1. Timeline schedule of 12 emerging RM concepts identified as part of the review of
                         the books on enlarged RM published between the years 1982 and 2007 (Ahonen
2007).
Figure 2-2. Timeline schedule of the real-life cases Nos. 1-9 carried out between the
                                 years 1974 and 2005.
2.2.2 Choice of case study research
The theoretical thinking behind the effective RM approach is rooted in the case-based findings of
the author’s licentiate thesis (Palojärvi 1986). These findings pointed out to a future investigation of
RM insights and examination of hypotheses. On the one hand, many empirical research approaches
for this study were found to be non-valid for the following reasons. (i) Within the construction
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industry, test projects or other business transactions cannot be implemented only for the purposes of
research. (ii) Official statistics lack valid information (and basic data). (iii) No RM studies with
valid case projects were available for the purposes of the examination of hypotheses or comparison
as part of future studies such as this one. One reason for this state of affairs may be that the case
documentation for a deeper analysis is not easy to accomplish with the context of the construction
industry. (iv) In addition, interviews, surveys, and Delphi techniques were considered unreliable
(see sub-chapter 2.4) for various reasons.
On the other hand, the conduct of a set of longitudinal case studies on individual projects was
found easier to justify. The methodological guidelines for conducting case studies were sought
primarily within Yin’s original and revised handbooks. A case study investigates a phenomenon in
order to understand its dynamics in respective case settings (Yin 2003a-b, 2004). Recently, Yin
(2003b pp. 10-11) has strongly encouraged the use of case studies. In performing a case study, the
goal is to expand and generalize theories – not to enumerate frequencies. Further, a case study
covers the contextual (i.e. international and growth-related) conditions, which are highly pertinent
in this study. A case study is particularly applicable to explain presumed causal links in real-life
interventions that are too complex for survey or experimental (research) strategies. In addition,
Eisenhardt (1989) posits that case studies are a suitable method for theory-building when current
perspectives seem inadequate or conflicting. On the other hand, Stake (1995) states that qualitative
case studies are used to extrapolate from data and not to make generalizations.
Thus, the author decided to compile more case-based data for the likely examination of
hypotheses as part of a study that would meet the requirements of a doctoral thesis. Since the mid-
1980s, the author has collected the key documentation of the major international business growth
projects at hand during the phases of his career and while serving with the two corporations. The
design and conduct of the investigation and examination of the hypotheses with the help of the nine
real-life cases is reported upon in more detail in Chapter 4.
2.2.3 Choice of insider action research
In  this  study,  the  case  study  approach  was  combined  with insider action research (IAR) for the
following reasons. In other words, the question “Why adopt a case study research with this author’s
active involvement, i.e. action research?” is here addressed as follows. In general, action research is
considered valid vis-à-vis hypothesis testing (e.g. Alderfer 1993). The roles of action researchers
may vary between e.g. that of an insider action researcher (Coghlan and Brannick 2005), an
observing participant (Alvesson 2003), a participating action researcher as participating fully in the
organizational life (Ottosson 2003), and a research-oriented action researcher (Roth et al. 2007). All
of them exclude more passive roles, such as that of “a fly on the wall”.
For this study, the most important choice was to rely on case studies where the author will have a
direct, strong influence. This principal choice was made because: (i) it had not been possible to
collect relevant new data on risks from “outside” cases, particularly if they had turned out to be the
failures of competitors. Most firms are not willing to share their experiences except in the case of
positive marketing efforts; (ii) the cases published in the reviewed literature are thin and short and,
thus, they do not render sufficient information for a deeper (comparative) analysis; (iii) it seems that
the samples within the literature are based on questionnaires and/or semi-structured interviews
(even recently, e.g. Ahadzie et al. 2008, Jha and Devaya 2008).Despite of the questionnaires´
relative advantages of speed and limited cost, their reliability is severely weakened by the fact that
many real respondents are randomly chosen from within firms’ younger cadres of employees; (iv)
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Lewin (1946), the initiator of the action research “school”, argued early on that research for social
practice should be concerned with “... two ... questions … study of general laws … and the
diagnosis of a specific situation.” The latter is what the construction business, with its one-of-a-kind
projects, is all about.
Admittedly, it has taken a long time to collect the case documentation – nearly a quarter of a
century. The main reason is that international growth projects (e.g. entries, acquisitions, and
complex and large delivery projects) tend to take a long time to mature when counting from an
embryonic idea or their strategy planning phases until their implementation phases. This long period
of time has, however, brought along with it five advantages of the selected empirical research
methodology,  as  follows.  There  was  ample  time:  (i)  to  build  a  solid  pre-understanding  of  the
targeted situations (Gummesson 1991) or focal business contexts (Eden and Huxham 2006); (ii) to
assume the multiple role sets of an insider action researcher, and (iii) to gain familiarity with the
case-specific, organizational politics. These factors trigger the complex dynamics of IAR (Coghlan
and Brannick 2005). At the same time they exclude the optional role of an outside research-oriented
action researcher who is not trusted enough to gain access to classified or secret meetings,
documents, and other forms of information. (iv) An additional advantage of the longish “maturing”
of this researcher is mentioned by Eden and Huxham (2006 p. 401), as when theoretical
constructs develop over many cases and often many years, the range of their validity will be
extended. (v) Over the years, some key parts of the “total picture”, not fully recognizable within the
occurrence of the respective cases, have surfaced more clearly. This has made it easier to explain
the process of the exploration to others, as suggested by Eden and Huxham (2006).
Many features of Eden and Huxham’s (2006) well-defined research-oriented action research (RO-
AR) approach have also been incorporated into this IAR approach, i.e. pre-understanding, multiple
role sets, and the development of new organizational capabilities. Concerning the issue of validity,
i.e. to what extent each finding is interpreted in a correct way, the explainability of the process of
exploration to others is here recalled. Kirk and Miller’s (1986 p. 20) statement on the trade-off
between validity and reliability is also taken into account. Therefore, systematic methods and
critical  reflection  are  relied  upon  when  the  validity  of  this  study  is  being  assessed  (Eden  and
Huxham 2006). In this respect, the time that elapsed from the first case until the last one has turned
out to be an advantage.
The above-mentioned rationale resulted in the conclusion that the empirical approach of this study
has been like qualitative IAR with the practical aim of solving typical severe management
problems – instead of trying to follow the RO-AR approach. This understanding surfaced while this
researcher was reading Eden and Huxham’s (2006 p. 403) statement on RO-AR, i.e. “it is not an
achievable challenge”. Besides, this study is looking for a positive effect on management practices
(Ford et al. 2003), i.e. on RM practices within the focal context. Moreover, the IAR has been about
undertaking RM measures and studying those measures as they took place while being a member
of the organization (in alignment with Coghlan and Brannick 2005).
This study also aligns with Alvesson (2003), who posits that in qualitative research the action
being investigated must be understood from the actor’s viewpoint. This criterion is fulfilled
because the author has acted, through most of his nearly 40-year-long professional career, in
relevant managerial positions within the case firms and/or projects or businesses (see the timeline,
Figure 2-3). The ground is laid with Case No. 1, which is a summary of the five cases of
Lemminkäinen carried out between the years 1974 and 1984. In these, the author assumed the role
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of a semi-insider action researcher. The author has already used the same five cases as part of his
licentiate thesis (Palojärvi 1986).
Since the year 1986, the author has systematically compiled a large amount of authentic
documentation on the selected construction project, building product project, and building product
business cases. They are due for reporting only now because of the lack of time caused by the
author’s mainly international duties. Consequently, the author himself has been directly involved as
an insider action researcher with each of the eight cases or international growth projects, Nos. 2-9,
at Partek Group between the years 1984 and 1995 and at Metsäliitto’s Finnforest Corporation
between the years 2000 and 2006.
Figure 2-3. Timeline schedule of the action researcher’s multiple roles within the cases
                              Nos. 1-9 between the years 1974 and 2005.
2.2.4 Awareness and avoidance of biases inherent in the combined approach
A bias is a tendency to observe a phenomenon in a manner that differs from a “true” observation in
some consistent fashion (Simon and Burstein 1985). Biases are here fought against by relying on
the original case documentation, evaluating the data chronologically and logically, and identifying
any discrepancies within such “messy” data. This study is also self-ethnographic as a result of the
direct involvement of an insider action researcher. In this approach, a common danger is to remain
in frozen positions. The reliance on the authentic case documentation has helped avoid such a
danger.  Instead,  this  researcher  has  targeted  the  opportunity  to  come  up  with  really  new  and
interesting findings, such as some underlying currencies of a theoretical nature, even when picked
out from a fully practical business. The richness of one or a few risky situations is explored and
fairly typical features are compared with what is outside the mainstream, based on the author’s
general knowledge (applying Alvesson 1996, 2003). An additional danger is inherent in cross-
cultural contexts, i.e. researchers believe that the whole research system rests on dominant
assumptions and they are afraid of challenging them (Usunier 1998 p. 137). In this study, both
dangers have been avoided. It is perceived that this researcher has been competent enough to
analytically and logically draw the findings from the cases (and the references) as well as to validate
them. This is so because the researcher has performed the relevant duties and he has experienced
many divergent project- or business-level situations of change during his long career.
In addition, this researcher has followed with keen interest the public discussion on the suggested
shortcomings in the validity of Laitila’s (2008) doctoral dissertation at the University of Jyväskylä
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in Finland. It seems that the examiners’ critique stems from the fact that the reporting of the results
of the research and development work is an essential  part  of the dissertation. In other words,  that
dissertation is not sufficiently theory-based when it aims at solving practical problems. In this
study, the empirical, case-based part was, however, launched on the basis of the theoretical findings
of the licentiate thesis (Palojärvi 1986). The screened cases, in turn, serve as the data for the
examination of the hypotheses, as the prevailing emphasis in action research assumes (Alferder
1993). Therefore, a risk of an IAR-related bias is to be managed accordingly. Thus, only the main
features of a novel contextual RM method are determined as part of this study (see Chapter 9). The
actual development of such a method will be an independent piece of R&D work after the
finalization of this study (as a doctoral dissertation).
2.3 Design and examination of the two hypotheses
The design of the two hypotheses is  based  on  the  theoretical  and  empirical  findings  of  the
licentiate thesis (Palojärvi 1986) and the author’s real-life experiences during the subsequent quarter
of a century. The licentiate thesis serves as an important developmental phase of the author’s
thinking. Besides, this theoretical background was sufficient to design the hypotheses, to describe
the cases systematically, and to examine the hypotheses. Alternatively, the hypotheses could have
been designed solely on the basis of empirical data, provided that at least a series of semi-structured
interviews could have been organized. In alignment with Alvesson (2003), the results of such
interviews might not have been reliable enough for various reasons.
During a 20-year period, the author compiled a large amount of relevant literature and
documentation on his project and business assignments (Figure 2-3). At the outset, this systematic
follow-up was justified by: (i) the relative scarcity of the contextual literature with a focus on the
management of risks in international construction, and (ii) the fact that longitudinal observations
upon RM practices within the construction industry have not exploited any computer-aided
simulation methods for risk identification, assessment, or response actions. Instead, it seems that
many older and recent references alike suggest that human expert knowledge is still the main tool
for both risk identification and response measures (e.g. Flanagan and Norman 1993, Palojärvi et al.
2008c).
In general, the validation of hypotheses can be carried out by applying the theory of consensus,
pragmatism, coherence, or correspondence (Alanen 1989). In particular, Niiniluoto (1997) analyzes
this issue in a profound way. In turn, Johnston et al. (1999) recommend an assessment of each
research question for every case of a multiple case study, in particular when case studies are being
conducted in business-to-business contexts.
In this study, each of the two hypotheses is examined against the findings from within the
literature and the results of the case studies by  applying  the  theory  of  pragmatism.  The  most
important encouragement to examine the hypotheses with the combined insider action and case
study research was found within Yin’s (2003b p. 111) notion that the most preferable strategy to
analyze case study evidence is to follow the theoretical propositions (i.e. the hypotheses) that led to
your case study. In other words, Yin considers it relevant to have a proposition (i.e. a hypothesis in
this study) already designed at the time when the actual research begins. Case studies are then used
as a tool to measure the key variables that were supposed to be measured – which brings us back to
the two hypotheses in this study. Yin adds that other interesting findings may emerge from within
the cases even to an extent that forces the researcher to change his proposition. In this study, this did
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not happen. But the internal priority order of the two hypotheses did change. Further details on the
conduct of the examination of the hypotheses are reported upon in Chapter 4.
To ensure the sufficient balance on the discussion of the case study approach, the potential
difficulties of the retrospective accounts have been extensively discussed in further chapters, e.g. in
4.1., 4.4., and quite thoroughly in 8.4.
2.4 Exclusion of alternative research methods
In industrial contexts, most strategic and risky decisions are qualitative by nature, e.g. whether to
internationalize or not, whether to accept the very first major contract in a new foreign market or
not, whether to stop work on a site in a culture that is foreign to the focal actor, or whether or not to
divest a production unit without certain knowledge about the future. Therefore, statistical or
quantitative research methods are not valid in this study, which addresses management
situations without a history. No firm-, business-, or project-specific situation in construction has
such a long history that quantitative research methods would become a highly valid tool for actual
decision making. Available data are often too scattered across individual projects, even in the case
of  one  focal  firm.  The  old  slogan  “every  project  is  unique”  applies  to  business  decisions  as  well.
Nevertheless, the firm-specific compilation of project data serves well as background information.
Structured interviews were initially considered among quantitative research approaches. The
reliance of interviews aims at “the angle of the actors”. The conduct of such interviews would have
been limited by the experience and memory of each of the interviewees. Besides, interviews
themselves are a highly social setting and sometimes quite far from objective (Alvesson 2003,
1996). Similarly, Rahman (2003) posits that personal interaction between an interviewer and an
interviewee is troublesome and no similarity is to be found with other data collection methods.
Surveys based on questionnaires are used in many construction management studies across
national contexts. However, the data gathered via questionnaires were deemed to be unreliable for
the reasons given in sub-chapter 2.2. Delphi techniques, in turn, were found to struggle with the
danger of too low a response level and a tendency towards consensus (e.g. Robinson 1991).
Consequently, the adoption of a Delphi technique was dismissed.
Regarding the potential difficulties of retrospective accounts, as a part of the selected case study
approach, the last note of the above 2.3. is referred to here as well.
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Purpose of the literature review
The purpose of the literature review is: (i) to find support, if any, for choosing the hypotheses for
the examination in this study; (ii) to find competing hypotheses; (iii) to reveal any progress that may
have been made in managing risks in international construction since the licentiate thesis (Palojärvi
1986); (iv) to synthesize and gain insights into traditional and enlarged RM, and (v) to identify the
key  concepts  and  their  elements  that  could  be  assessed  as  belonging  to  the  targeted  “better”  RM
method.
3.2 Search for the key concepts and insights from within the literature
Besides the literature on RM, the review was enlarged to encompass the key references on three
entangling areas, i.e. uncertainty, complexity, and crisis as well. Various authors have considered
for a long time that uncertainty is inherent in all circumstances and RM becomes an issue when a
probability is assigned to uncertainty, subjectively or objectively. Therefore, it was considered
necessary to review the representative literature on uncertainty, i.e. an entangling area of RM.
Indeed, it seems that RM becomes a concern only after a decision to give uncertainty a probability
(e.g. Flanagan and Norman 1993 p. 22). In some other industries, e.g. financing and venture
capitalism, risk and uncertainty are considered to be almost two synonymous expressions.
Complexity is an important characteristic of businesses and projects. The recent literature on
complexity was also reviewed because complexity has a direct impact on risk. The more complex a
business or a project is, the more risk there is to be managed. Crisis management is here seen as a
special case of RM. When complex construction involves many actors and interdependencies, the
mismanagement of major risks – with negative consequences – may escalate rapidly into a crisis,
which Booth (1993) characterizes as a state of “no reserve plan prepared”. Loosemore (2000)
emphasizes that a mismanaged crisis can in turn escalate further into a disaster.
As a whole, the primary literature review is here reported as one with 116 eligible references on
enlarged RM published between 2000 and 2006. The “eligible” reference was (i) to have a view
on uncertainty, complexity, risk and/or crisis, and (ii) to be written in English and (iii) to be
published within the years of 2000-2006. Out of the large number of potential references ,
excluded were typically those with (i) no emphasis on RM, (ii) only technical risks in
construction projects handled, and (iii) focus on a limited market (e.g. a country) or distinct
business (e.g. pharmaceutical) without an analogy to construction contracting and building
product supply.
 The reporting is based on two sub-reviews. Ahonen (2007) reports the results of a book-focused
review of 64 references. In turn, these books were complemented by a sub-review of 52 articles.
The article review, for the time being an unpublished one,  was conducted by Huovinen, Palojärvi,
Kiiras and Jansson (2007).The reviewed literature was selected on the basis of the relevance of each
reference from the hypotheses’ point of view. This was deemed necessary because a large
proportion of the identified books and articles address only fairly narrow areas of RM outside the
focal context of international construction. In addition, the other two reviews focused on the
identification of relevant references on the hypothetical major risk types, i.e. competencies to
manage cross-cultural aspects (see sub-chapter 3.6) and contractual arrangements (see 3.7) in
international construction.
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3.3 Overview of the key concepts identified
The selected 116 references on enlarged RM – written in English and published between the years
2000 and 2006 – are overviewed as follows. Most, i.e. 81 references (71%), address traditional
RM, 19 references (16%) offer frameworks around uncertainty, 10 references (9%) approach
complexity as an amplifier, and only 6 references (5%) deal with crisis management as a derivative
of RM. The majority, or 67 references (58%), are generic or they deal with non-construction
contexts from four viewpoints. Nevertheless, the literature on construction-related enlarged RM
is now more abundant than in the 1980s. 40 references (34%) address traditional RM with
construction-related contexts. On the other hand, only 6 references (5%) deal with uncertainty and 3
references (3%) with crises in construction. No references were found that addressed complex
construction (Table 3-1).
Table 3-1. Distribution of 116 references (published between the years 2000 and 2006) by
                              views on enlarged RM and focal contexts (Ahonen 2007).







           No.       (%)            No.       (%)       No.     (%)
Uncertainty            13      (11%)              6        (5%)       19      (16%)
Complexity            10        (9%)              0        (0%)       10        (9%)
Risk            41      (35%)            40      (34%)       81      (70%)
Crisis              3        (3%)              3        (3%)         6        (5%)
Sum            67      (58%)            49      (42%)     116    (100%)
Overall, 69 references (59%) deal with enlarged RM as part of managing a project. Of those,
50, 13, 4, and 2 references were written from the primary viewpoints of managing traditional risks,
uncertainty, complexity, and crisis at the project level. In turn, 47 references (41%) deal with
enlarged RM as part of managing a firm and/or a business. Of those, 31, 6, 6, and 4 references were
written from the primary viewpoints of managing traditional risks, uncertainty, complexity, and
crisis at the firm level or the business level (Table 3-2). The construction-related RM literature
mainly deals rather with the project level than the business level.
Table 3-2. Distribution of 116 references (published between the years 2000 and 2006) by views on
                      enlarged RM and the level of management (Ahonen 2007).
Views References with a focus on
firm/business management
References with a focus on
project management
Sum
           No.       (%)            No.       (%)       No.     (%)
Uncertainty              6        (5%)             13     (11%)       19      (16%)
Complexity              6        (5%)               4       (3%)       10        (9%)
Risk            31      (27%)             50     (43%)       81      (70%)
Crisis              4        (3%)               2       (2%)         6        (5%)
Sum            47      (41%)             69     (59%)     116    (100%)
International or foreign aspects are not covered well. Among the 64 books, only 11 authors
(17%) focus on international or country-specific management in non-construction contexts. Of
those, 6 and 3 references were written from the primary viewpoints of managing traditional risks at
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the firm/business level and the project level, respectively. Only 2 references address complexity as
part of firm-/business-level management (Table 3-3). Thus, the reviewed literature (Ahonen 2007)
findings support the claim of Ofori (2003) and Huovinen (2003) that there is no suitable framework
for international construction.
Table 3-3. International focus within the 64 reviewed references on enlarged RM published
                         between the years 2000 and 2006 (Ahonen 2007).
























































As to the reviewed books, the most interesting ones are referred to by several times in this work at
appropriate  spots.  As  to  the  articles,  the  researcher  found  that  some  reviewed articles contain
interesting new trends in  enlarged  RM,  not  yet  appearing  as  visibly   in  the  books (e.g.
Chapman, 2001; Han and Diekmann, 2001; Nikander and Eloranta, 2001; Raz and Michael, 2001;
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Ward and Chapman, 2003; Fang et al, 2004a, 2004b; Wang et al, 2004; Kaliprasad, 2006; Touran,
2006) as follows: (i) RM is increasingly being transformed into uncertainty or opportunity
management; (ii) RM is becoming more important in international projects and acquisitions, and
(iii) new tools and models for enlarged RM are being created and more frequently used.
In addition, the other two reviews focused on recent articles on competencies to manage cross-
cultural aspects and contractual arrangements in international construction. The latter indicate that
embeddedness (managerial competences) and contractual arrangements are sources of success and
failure. However, the verification is so far based on questionnaire data or case descriptions only (see
sub-chapters 3-6 and 3-7). In particular, the 20 articles on managing contractual risks within the
focal context of international construction are of interest because they highlight the trends in
construction management (Table 3-4). In turn, no such trend setting could be compiled vis-à-vis
competencies in managing cross-cultural issues related to the focal context.
Table 3-4. Topics of the 20 relevant articles on managing contractual risks.
                          Key: RC refers to relational contracting, BOT refers to build-operate-transfer,
                          and CM refers to construction management.
Primary party
Owner Contractor
¤ Contractual risks (Japan) ¤ Conditions in contracts (FIDIC)
¤ RC (Hong Kong) ¤ RC/disputes (Saudi Arabia)
¤ RC (Hong Kong) ¤ BOT contracts (China)
¤ RC/Risks (China/Hong Kong)
















¤ Profit/risks (South Korea)
¤ Contractual risks (UK) ¤ CM contract risks (USA)
¤ Contract strategy ¤ Partnering contracts (USA)
                                 ¤ Mistakes in contracts (USA)
                                 ¤ Contract changes (USA)










¤ Procurement contract strategy
   (Norway)
¤ Subcontracts and relationships
Vienna Convention
3.4 Traditional and enlarged risk management
3.4.1  Representative definitions of risk, crisis, disaster, and complexity
Risk is defined as arising from uncertainty by assessing – either rationally or intuitively – the
probability and impact of an uncertain event (e.g. Flanagan and Norman 1993). Within the recent
references (Ahonen 2007), the variety of risk typologies is rich (Table 3-5). Loosemore´s (2000)
external and internal risk types may be the broadest list. Flanagan and Norman (1993) emphasize
external risks such as economic and political scenarios, a lack of awareness of social conditions,
and the governing authority in an international environment. Besides the tabulated typologies, the
richness can easily be shown with many additional typologies, e.g. those of Perry and Hayes (1985),
Kangari (1995), Tah and Carr (2001), Smith (2003), Busch (2005), Cooper et al. (2005), and
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Kähkönen (2006). In particular, the detailed list of Songer et al. (1997) includes political, financial,
market, intellectual property, social, and safety risks. In turn, Hastak and Shaked (2000) classified
risks on the country, market, and project levels.
Table 3-5. Risk typologies as part of 10 typical references published between the years 1993
                 and 2006 (Ahonen 2007).
Here, the broadest typology is adopted, i.e. external, internal, and unforeseen risks. Such risks are
assigned to firm-, business-, and project-specific situations for the purposes of effective
management. This preference is partly due to the uniqueness of the construction industry compared
with other industries, and partly to favor a pragmatic approach relying on human expert knowledge,
supported e.g. by computer-aided simulations (e.g. Palojärvi et al. 2008c).
Within enlarged RM, a crisis is understood as a consequence of mismanaged risk (Loosemore
2000). A crisis is a low-probability, unexpected, high-impact event that is not covered by
Author (year) Typology Basis
Flanagan R. and Norman G. (1993) Types of risk: Pure risk (specific risk)and speculative risk (market risk) Relevance for management
Sawczuk B. (1996)
Sources of risk: the brief, team,
finance, construction process,
information, variations, poor
workmanship and design failures
Sources
Turner J. (1999) Typology: Business risks, insurablerisks Relevance for management
DeLoach J. (2000)






Risks in alliances: "co-opetition",
scope, governance, relationships,
trust, internal support system
Sources and consequences
Knight R. and Pretty D. (2001)
Enterprise risk typology: Market risk,




Risk categories: Product, market,
operational, input, tax, regulatory,
legal, and financial risks
Sources and consequences
Westney R. (2001) Risk categories: External, technical,PM, site-related Sources








Various typologies, e.g. 8 possible





Lauri Palojärvi (2009) RM in the international growth business of Finnish construction firms
25
contingency plans (Booth 1993). A disaster (or catastrophe) is the ultimate negative outcome of a
mismanaged crisis. In turn, complexity is  a  characteristic  of  a  system arising  from the  individual
elements and the interactions between them. Project complexity depends on the number and
varieties of elements, and the interconnections between them (Shenhar and Dvir 2004).
3.4.2 Risk management versus uncertainty management
The two groups of diverging approaches can be easily identified within the books on RM (Ahonen
2007). Within traditional one-way approaches, project risks are treated as events which may have
only negative consequences. The focus is more on how to deal with such events when they occur
and less on how to avoid or to reduce their negative consequences. In turn, two-way approaches –
where risk is assumed to have positive and negative consequences – are relied upon to manage
uncertainty rather than risky conditions (e.g. Lifson and Scheifer 1982, PMI 2000, Smith 2002,
Hetland 2003). Typically, Chapman and Ward (2002 p. 6) deal with the upside and downside of
uncertainty. Therein, RM begins by giving an uncertain event – considered a risky event – a
probability (e.g. Flanagan and Norman 1993 p. 29). Thus, more explanatory views were sought
through the review of articles .
Overall, the most relevant views and trends are considered as boiling down as follows.
(i) There is unanimous agreement only on the profound importance of proper risk
identification between the various authors and their preferred RM approaches. Risk identification
is the cornerstone of all further RM actions (e.g. Flanagan and Norman 1993, Artto et al. 2000).
(ii) RM can be transformed into uncertainty or opportunity management. The increasing
emphasis on uncertainty and opportunities changes RM from being purely an attempt to avoid
negative outcomes to one that also considers possible positive outcomes. The upside of risks is
recognized and a new terminology on uncertainty management is developed on a continuous basis.
Typically, Ward and Chapman (2003) transform project RM into project uncertainty management.
(iii) The importance of RM increases in the context of international projects and acquisitions.
There  are  many  risks  associated  with  international  projects  and  acquisitions,  such  as  country,
economic,  and  political  risks.  Risks  are  addressed  as  country-specific  and  especially  the  risks
encountered in Chinese markets are frequently addressed in the journals. China’s entry into the
WTO has opened a huge market with new opportunities for international firms, but the country-
specific risks may eventually have consequences of very high impact, due to the exceptional scale
of activities in comparison with e.g. European countries.
(iv) Efforts to integrate the views on uncertainty, risk and crisis under conditions of high
complexity.
The enlarged RM is defined as causal chain of uncertainty, risk and crisis management, as being
based on the uncertainty of all events, including risky events. It further facilitates the discussion on
many important subfields e.g. on proactiveness in RM leading to the growing importance of the
foresight , applying the proven project RM methods on business level, management of crisis as a
consequence of mismanaged risk, etc. However, this study will focus on risk and RM and will only
lightly touch the uncertainty and crisis when appropriate. Yet, the first hypothesis, i.e. to apply the
proven RM of the major risks already in the business level, could, at will, be considered as an
holistic effort to integrate the three views on uncertainty, risk and crisis as well. In relation to
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the view of enlarged RM,  as  applied  to  the  focal  context,  this  study  relies  in  particular  on  the
following references:
(i) Flanagan and Norman (1993) for managing risk in construction
(ii) DeLoach (2000) for managing risk in international non-construction businesses
(iii) Loosemore (2000) for managing crises in construction projects
(iv) Lichtenberg (2000) for uncertainty in firms, businesses, and projects
(v) Shenhar and Dvir (2004) for complexity in non-construction projects.
From many edited significant manuals and guide books, perhaps the most applicable one is:
(vi)  Institute of Civil Engineers (2005) Risk analysis and management for projects
(RAMP) manual.
(v) The overlapping development of models and tools for enlarged RM is taking place.
Based on the above, it is understandable that many existing models and tools are being improved
and new ones developed. The utilization of appropriate IT technology is the main trend. Most
models and tools are computer-based and program-enabled. Typically, Raz and Michael (2001)
investigate the use and benefits of tools for project RM. However, it seems that it is still difficult to
find the most suitable and effective models or tools vis-à-vis managing a specific project at hand
effectively.
3.5 Insights into enlarged risk management in international construction
3.5.1 Managing uncertainty, risk, crisis, and complexity in international construction
It seems that the rare definitions of risk of the 1980s are still valid in the focal context of
international construction in the 2000s (Table 3-6). Uncertainty prevails when a decision maker
has no historical data (e.g. a group of instances) relating to a situation for an event, conditions, etc.
to occur (Knight 1921, Smith 2003). Chapman and Ward (2002) define uncertainty as a lack of
certainty and uncertainty management as managing perceived threats and opportunities and their
risk implications but also managing sources of uncertainty which give rise to and shape risk, threat,
and opportunity. Langlo et al. (2007) consider uncertainty management as a project owner’s way to
tap into opportunities, while RM is the domain of project management (PM). It is here defined that
uncertainty is an everlasting framework of all future events, including risk events.
Lifson and Scheifer (1982) posited that risk is a possibility that expectations will not be met. This
definition was created for the construction management (CM) contracting business, where risk was
usually understood as the possibility of an event with a negative consequence. Later, Flanagan and
Norman (1993) defined risk as arising from uncertainty by assessing the probability and impact of
an uncertain event (Flanagan and Norman 1993 p. 22). Here, the latter definition is supported,
without a statement on the quality of the consequences. In turn, the following three definitions of
risk highlight the development from a one- to two-way position in RM. Risk is a potential for
unwanted or negative consequences of an event or an activity (Rowe 1976).  Risk is uncertainty of
outcome,  within  a  range  of  potential  exposures,  arising  from a  combination  of  an  impact  and  the
probability of potential events (HM Treasury 2000). Risk is adverse but as it is unknown by nature
it can have positive and negative effects (Smith 2002). The definitions also acknowledge the
magnitude of the consequences as an impact. Here, risk and consequence (impact) are kept
separate for the sake of clarity. Probability alone, without an idea of impact, makes no sense. In
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turn, low-impact, high-frequency risks should not be considered as risks but rather as normal units
of managing e.g. costs, time, etc.
Table 3-6. Founding definitions of risk published between the years 1976 and 1993. The definitions
                      were reported in Palojärvi (1986), except that of Flanagan and Norman.
Reference Definition
Rowe (1976) Risk is a potential for the realization of an unwanted negative
consequence of an event.
Lifson and Scheifer (1982) Risk is an uncertainty related to estimated consequences and
risk means that the results may be worse or better than
expected.
Palojärvi (1986) Risk is a possibility that the set expectations will not be met.
Flanagan and Norman (1993) … a decision is made under risk when a decision-maker can
assess, either intuitively or rationally, the probability of a
particular event occurring.
This synthesis of uncertainty and risk leads to a pre-conclusion that a construction firm or a building
product supplier has to be prepared to face a certain amount of uncertainty. It is most likely that
some amount of uncertainty is converted to e.g. project risks which can be managed. In addition, the
remaining part of the uncertainty – e.g. over time spans longer than 1 to 2 years as a standard for
construction projects – must somehow be dealt with as well. For this purpose, there are many
generic or non-construction-tailored ways and tools for managing uncertainty e.g. foresight
capacity, flexibility, the ability to change and react quickly, and the avoidance of capital
commitments. However, there are no applied business-level RM methods to be found from within
the literature within the context of international construction. In the same vein, opportunities are
rarely grasped within this context. Consequently, proven project RM methods are here also applied
to managing risks at the business level and exploiting a prolonged time frame to maneuver.
A crisis is a low-probability, unexpected, high-impact event that is not covered by contingency
plans (Booth 1993). In more common words, a crisis is a consequence of a risk which is not
properly managed (e.g. Kiiras 2005). Mismanagement of a crisis may result in a disaster
(Loosemore 2000 p. 6). Herein, a crisis is perceived as a type of consequence of risk, and crisis
management as a special case of RM.
Complexity is a characteristic of a system arising from the interactions between its individual
elements rather than from those elements (Bar-Yam 2003). Likewise, project complexity depends
on the number and variety of elements,  as well  as the interconnections among them (Shenhar and
Dvir 2004). However, Whitty (2007) argues that so far complex PM has not been properly defined.
Here it is assumed that complexity has a direct impact on risk. The more complex a project or
business is, the more risk there is. When the number of the elements or their interconnections
increases, risk increases consequently. Therefore, the probability of mismanaging a risk and thus a
crisis (as a consequence of a risk) increases, too.
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3.5.2 Managing risks in traditional, proven ways in international construction
The literature review highlighted many recent converging and diverging RM approaches and
concepts. However, the similarities to Palojärvi’s (1986) “old” design of an RM process (Figure
3-1) can still be traced within the more recent references, e.g. Flanagan and Norman’s (1993) RM
framework (Figure 3-2), Fang et al.’s (2005) risk assessment model (Table 3-7), and the Institution
of Civil Engineers and the Actuarial Profession’s (1998/2005) risk analysis and management
process or RAMP (Figure 3-3).
Figure 3-1. Phases of an RM process (Palojärvi 1986).
Figure 3-2. RM framework (Flanagan and Norman 1993).
Fang et al.’s (2005) model exemplifies risk assessment in complex projects for the construction of













2 ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES
3 ASSESSMENT OF THE PROBABILITY OF THE
RISK
4 RISK AVERSION AND MITIGATION
5 ALLOWING FOR THE CONSEQUENCES
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among the project objectives. The Analytical Hierarchy process (AHP) is adopted to evaluate the
overall risk (Table 3-7), which is authentic and includes eventual typing errors).
Table 3-7. Risk assessment model (Fang et al. 2005).
Among the generic or non-construction RM concepts, there are also topic-related concepts with
alternatives such as avoidance, abatement, retention, transfer, or allocation. Within the contextual
literature, no RM strategy concept was, however, found to be designed for managing international
construction businesses and projects. Thus, Flanagan and Norman’s (1993) RM method is
perceived to be highly applicable to managing international construction businesses and projects.
The  conversion  of  uncertainty  to  specific  and  market  risks  and  the  response  planning  also
accommodate the management of risks versus the attainment of the objectives at the business level.
This RM approach enables a firm to identify proactively the most serious risks as early as possible,
which ensures a maximal period of time for response plans and measures. In addition, early risk
identification is a prerequisite for better proactiveness, which is advocated within the recent
literature. Thus, novel and better RM models should be based on robust foresights and agile
structures inside the respective firms vis-a-vis the proactive launching of measures within firm-
specific control (e.g. Smith 2002 p. 21, Kiiras and Huovinen 2005, Palojärvi 2009). Otherwise,
risky situations have to be managed by dealing with the consequences instead of the timely
avoidance or reduction of negative impacts, let alone the grasping of opportunities.
Lauri Palojärvi (2009) RM in the international growth business of Finnish construction firms
30
Figure 3-3. Risk analysis and management process (RAMP) (Institution of Civil Engineers
                           and the Actuarial Profession (1998/2005). Redone from the original one.
Activity A: Process launch
1. Plan, organise and launch RAMP process including:
- confirm perspective
- appoint risk process manager and team
- define investment brief
- determine timing of risk reviews
- decide level, scope and purpose of RAMP
- establish budget for RAMP
2. Establish baseline, covering:
- objectives and key parameters of investment
- baseline plans
- underlying assumptions.
Activity B: Risk Review
1. Plan and initiate risk review
2. Identify risks
3. Evaluate risks
4. Devise measures for responding to risks, including:
- reducing -  avoiding
- eliminating -  aborting
- transferring -  pooling
- insuring -  reducing uncertainty
- optimising favourable outcomes and define response strategy.
5. Assess residual risks and decide whether to continue
6. Plan responses to residual risks
7. Communicate risk response strategy and response plan.
Activity C: Risk management
1. Implement strategy plans:
- integrate with main stream management
- manage the agreed risk response initiatives
- report changes
2. Control risks:
- ensure effective resourcing and implementation
- monitor progress
- continually review and categorise ‘trends’
- identify and evaluate emerging risks and changes
- initiate full risk review, if necessary.
Activity D: Process close-down
1. Assess invertment outturn:
- consider results of investment against original objectives
- compare risk impacts with those anticipated.
2. Review RAMP process:
- assess effectiveness of process and its application
- draw lessons for future investments
- propose improvements to process
- communicate results.
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For the sake of order, risks are usually classified upon identification (e.g. Palojärvi 1986, Flanagan
and Norman 1993). Risk types vary considerably and consequently RM strategies and responses do,
too. Diversified lists of situation-specific risks are emphasized in the literature. Walewski and
Gibson (2003) report on four major sections made up of 14 categories which are broken down into
82 risk elements in international projects. Cooper et al. (2005) suggest that organizations develop
their own lists of risks. For example, Sun et al. (2008) report on a list of the identified safety risks of
the construction of the Beijing Olympic venues. Zhang and Zou (2007) also provide a list of
situation-specific risks within a context of Sino-foreign construction joint ventures. In principle, risk
typologies are built on the basis of the two primary criteria of causes (sources) or consequences.
Risk typologies based on causes (sources) support proactive RM approaches (Figure 3-4).
Emerging requirements on the part of e.g. stock exchanges concerning corporate information on
their management and business risks accelerate the adoption of cause-based typologies. Typically,
risks are divided into external and internal risks (e.g. Loosemore 2000, Palojärvi 1986,
Abrahamson 1984) or market and project risks or technical, organizational, and financial risks.
Additional references on cause-based typologies include e.g. Leung et al. (1998), Baloi and Price
(2003), and Li et al. (2005). Business or project objectives are coupled with external risks, such as
political,  social,  and economic risks,  which actors have no control over (e.g.  Kurtzman and Yago
2007). In turn, unforeseen risks are not predictable, but possible.
Risk typologies based on consequences are defined along the dimensions of actors’ performance,
quality, time, cost, etc. Among unforeseen risks, force majeure risks occur with overwhelming
consequences for the respective actors. Contractually, such risks are dealt with by specific clauses
(see 3.7). In well-defined construction contracts, a force majeure event has to fulfill certain criteria,
such as “overwhelming”, “beyond a party’s control”, “it could not reasonably be… provided
against”, or “not substantially attributable to the other party” (FIDIC 2005).
The insurance coverage is payable by consequences (e.g. death), not by sources. It seems that the
impact of the insurance- and other consequence-based approaches may undermine the importance
of the identification of causes of risks. Moreover, if the preprepared risk registers or lists are used
without going to the root causes of risks, the same might happen. Therefore it is here perceived that
within the contextual construction project business, the pre-prepared risk registers or lists are by
no means exhaustive and they can serve as check lists only.
Appropriate risk identification is mandatory for any consecutive proactive RM steps. Loosemore
(2000) posits that the purpose of maintaining an alignment between a firm’s organizational goals
and performance cannot be achieved without the identification and reaction of events that may
cause major deviations. Risk identification is built on predefined expectations. If expectations (e.g.
objectives) are ill-defined, or entirely missing, it is neither possible to define whether they will be
met or not, nor to identify a respective risk and to respond to it. In construction projects, objectives
are usually set in terms of cost (and/or profit), time and quality (comprising scope and standard),
embedded in contracts. Other objectives may be expressed e.g. in the form of building the corporate
image, too. At the firm/business level, two-way approaches are more common. In many references,
computer-aided models for risk identification and assessment are suggested to produce distributions
for risky and uncertain parameters, e.g. cost and time schedules, or their consequences.
Alternatively, sole reliance on human expert knowledge is advocated for typically one-of-a-kind
decision situations where no statistical history is available. Among others, Gruneberg et al. (2007 p.
692) emphasize (in short) that buildings are too dissimilar for statistical RM methods, and state that
, inturn, the inputs (e.g. supplying bricks, concrete or labor) could be scrutinized statistically.
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The  next  figure  (Figure  3-4)  is  to  recall  how  the  structure  between  the  roots  of  the  risk,  the  risk
itself, and the consequences of the risk, was presented as the early state of this research (Palojärvi,
1986), to clarify the that-time common confusion on risks and their consequences, particularly
prevailing among the practitioners.
Figure 3-4. Prime event, risk, and consequence (Palojärvi 1986).
Here, it is perceived that – instead of searching for theoretical statistical distributions of risk
occurrence or their consequences – managers’ attention and expert knowledge should be
directed to proactive RM, i.e. (a) competent risk identification, (b) RM strategy formulation, and
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3.5.3 Converting uncertainty to risk management in international construction
Each construction project is one of a kind. No prior history exists and future events are
uncertain. This uncertainty is amplified, i.e. a new project type or a new business environment
results in a high degree of complexity. In order to convert uncertainty to competent RM, one has to
identify risks and to assess the probabilities and impacts of such uncertain events and consequently
to launch responsive measures. As a matter of fact, a more holistic view, i.e. combined uncertainty
and risk management, exists in the literature. For example, the context of Langlo et al. (2007) is the
Norwegian oil and gas industry. However, there are only a few applied concepts for the context of
the construction industry (Ahonen 2007). Thus, Lichtenberg’s (2000) successive principle is here
perceived to be also applicable in the context of international construction. It is based on the
proactiveness and iterative rounds of expert work for the identification of uncertainties, action
planning, and the definition of unavoidable “minimum uncertainty” levels (Figure 3-5). The
remaining uncertainty (e.g. for events not converted to risks) has to be managed as well.
Figure 3-5. Successive principle (Lichtenberg 2000). Redone from the original one.
In this study, uncertainty management is not the focal issue. This is why uncertainty management is
not elaborated further as part of this review. However, some additional observations of a broad
nature are briefly made in Chapter 9.
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3.5.4 Managing crisis as a consequence of a mismanaged risk and the Black Swan
phenomenon in international construction
Here, crisis management is considered to be a special case of RM. In practice, a disaster as a
consequence cannot be accepted even in the case of a low probability of its occurrence. The
researcher considers that Loosemore’s (2000) concept, based on trust, open culture, and structural
flexibility, is applicable for managing crises in international construction because it deals with the
context of construction. Risks should be eliminated, e.g. by transferring them to other firms, or their
consequences should be reduced to a tolerable level before any of them leads directly or via a crisis
to a disaster. Competent risk identification is again the first action. Risk identification capacity may
be a source of risk as well. Thus, this capacity should be enhanced among firms and other actors.
Therein,  an understanding of the Black Swan phenomenon may help.  A Black Swan is an event,
such as a crisis, with respect to unpredictability and a huge impact. Its signifying feature is that
ex ante it seems to be less random and more predictable than ex post, i.e. how it turned out to be
(e.g. Taleb 2007). It may be spotted outside the usual field of observation. Theoretically, however,
the concept boils down to the issue of competent risk identification. Therein, a search for unique
features, such as a Black Swan versus the rest of the flock, may help. “What is unusual?” is the
question to be posed. Consequently, divergent opinions within an organization are such Black
Swans to be watched. Without trust and an open culture, no divergence may emerge and be
expressed in words inside organizations.
3.5.5 Managing complexity in international construction
Herein, complexity is considered to be a condition of a system or an action rather than an
intermediate step between uncertainty and risk. The greater the complexity of the system, the higher
the related risk. No construction-related complexity management concepts could be identified from
within the reviewed literature (Ahonen 2007; several article references in 3.3.). Thus, it is perceived
that Shenhar and Dvir’s (2004) generic concept and Van der Velde and van Donk’s (2002)
notion are also applicable in the context of international construction. The former is based on a
number and variety of elements and their interconnections. The latter reminds us that the
engineering of large industrial construction projects is a complex task because of the many co-
operating actors. Van der Velde and van Donk (2002) suggest to owners “bi-project management”,
where engineering offices assume responsibility for the construction-related part, anticipate risks,
and postpone the works to the last possible moment. This exemplifies complex networking as a
success factor. Networking is also increasing in international construction. In turn, increased
networking also leads to a higher degree of uncertainty and risk.
3.6 Relevance of managerial and cross-cultural competencies in international
construction
3.6.1 Contextual introduction to managers’ competencies
When Finnish construction firms and building product suppliers enter new international
construction markets, they find that many conditions differ from those of their domestic market.
Technologies and resources differ or they are applied in different ways. Knowledge (managerial
competence) embedded in local environments varies from the local conditions in developing
countries to those in industrialized countries. Besides, an entrant’s capabilities to act in new
conditions are usually weaker than those used in their domestic ones. In alignment with Ofori
(2003), new business environments cause firms to encounter new “problems and peculiarities in
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overseas conditions”. (We may note that what is “peculiar” for one focal actor may not be so for
another.) Here, it is perceived that local cultures differ, too, and such differences, often as prime
sources, explain at least in part most difficulties that entrants meet in new international
construction markets.
In international construction, it is uncertain whether the managers assigned are competent to
manage various e.g. cross-cultural issues. This uncertainty is converted to risks when managers are
assigned to their tasks. The issue of cross-cultural risk boils down to the following questions. Are
key managers competent to manage cross-cultural issues, e.g. “problems and peculiarities”? How
can managerial competence be assessed? If the available competence does not match that required,
how is this situation to be solved? A lack of cross-cultural competencies at the managerial level
may jeopardize the attainment of a business growth goal (Palojärvi et al. 2008b).
3.6.2 Relevance of managerial competencies
According to Sanchez et al. (1996b p. 8), an organizational competence is an ability to sustain the
coordinated deployment of assets in a way that helps a firm achieve its goals.  Management, when
considered as a (part of a) competence, should be organizational and intentional, and its primary
task  is  to  attain  goals  (of  a  firm). Competences are leveraged e.g. by producing and marketing
current products. In this, existing managerial competences are necessary. However, the
development and production of new kinds of products require competence building first. Overall,
managerial components can be traced within many generic definitions suggested by e.g. van den
Bosch and van Wijk (1998 p. 165), Langford and Male (2001 p. 206), Robinson et al. (2002 p. 212),
and Huovinen (2003 pp. 195-202).
Jubb and Robotham (1997) posit that it is a myth that there is one precise and widely-accepted
definition of competence. It seems that this is still the state of affairs today. Knowledge and values
(or attitudes) are often mentioned as part of the content of competence. Knowledge alone is
understood to be more passive than competence as if it meant “knowing but yet not doing”.
Huovinen (2003, 2006) states that no research tradition exists concerning construction-related
business management. With a reference to Beer (1985), Huovinen states that a competence consists
of all the technology, embedded knowledge (which Haapalainen (2007) defines as representing e.g.
products, prototypes, process technology, roles, routines, and rituals), capabilities, and resources
needed for the attainment of a firm’s business goals.
In alignment with Sanchez et al. (1996b) and Huovinen (2003), it is here considered that
managerial competencies are a pivotal component of a firm’s competence that help a firm
attain its goals. Managerial competencies are considered to comprise both acquired knowledge on
management issues and capabilities (or skills) to put that knowledge into use. The term “expertise”
is later used as a synonym for a managerial competency in a given specific area or field.
3.6.3 Relevance of managers’ cross-cultural competencies in international construction
Sanchez and Heene (1996 p. 48) refer to a need to identify and to build new organizational
competences in dynamic, uncertain competitive environments (managerial cognition). Kiiras and
Huovinen (2005) specify that a firm’s management-driven business competences are embedded
in management teams and individual managers, as well as in management systems and processes
(applying Sanchez 2001b). Much individual knowledge must be shared with other members before
joint and coordinated measures are taken. The competencies of individual managers refer to the
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knowledge, skills, and values of individuals in order to perform management tasks. To enter
successfully a new environment, where new cultures or disciplines will be encountered, a firm may
have to build new cross-cultural or cross-disciplinary competences. For that, aligning with Kiiras
and Huovinen (2005), the firm´s management systems and processes are central to implant the
new knowledge (cross-cultural or cross-disciplinary) into the internal knowledge base.
The recent generic references on successes and failures in international business address two
main themes, expatriate failures and an inability of headquarters’ managers to appreciate the
cultural challenges of doing business overseas (e.g. Johnson et al. 2006 p. 525). Gratton and
Erickson (2007 p. 103) discovered that the qualities required for success are the same ones that
undermine success among more than 100 factors. Four general categories, i.e. executive support,
HR practices, the strength of team leaders, and the structure of teams, support success. Among
practices, it seems that key enablers become involved in particular task- and relationship-oriented
leadership, as well as role clarity (task ambiguity). Olson and Olson (2000) state that cultural
differences form the single biggest factor that affects global projects. Mäkilouko (2004) found that
relationship-oriented project leaders (rather than task-oriented ones) may have a greater potential
for  success  since  they  tend  to  be  able  to  maintain  multicultural  team  cohesion.  The  design  of  an
organization can potentially be used to mitigate multicultural problems. Fisher and Ranasinghe
(2000) stress that people do not have competences independent of context. Jubb and Robotham
(1997) have stated that certain competences could be regarded as being situation-specific.
In the context of international construction, the Construction Industry Institute (1993) stresses
future needs and points out some success factors, i.e. leadership, efficient resource allocation,
innovation, and organizational effectiveness. Flanagan (1994) mentions speed in innovation and
delivery, flexibility in a delivery mix, environmental consciousness, human resource development
(HRD) and deployment, automation and information, joint ventures, alliances, and partnering, as
well as financial engineering. Langford (2000) stresses the importance of culture in international
construction projects. Fisher and Ranasinghe (2000) consider JVs as a cultural factor playing a role
in uncertainty avoidance. In turn, success (and failure) factors have been investigated with many
questionnaire-based studies on e.g. Korean or Turkish contractors in international contracts; e.g.
Han et al. (2007) and Kim et al. (2008) emphasize a contractor’s crucial ability to manage its
functions. Mawhinney (2001) and Oz (2001) even suggest government measures as an important
source of a firm’s competitiveness. In particular, Ofori (2003) posits that an internationalizing
contractor must possess certain prerequisites and that managerial expertise is considered the most
important factor (for  competitiveness)  because  of  the  peculiarities  and  problems  of  overseas
projects. In the same vein, Flanagan (1994 p. 388) made an early call for flatter organizations that
enable a firm to move quickly into new markets.
In alignment with Sanchez et al. (1996b), a manager’s cross-cultural competence is here defined
as an ability to achieve a firm’s goals by managing cross-cultural issues well. “Cross-cultural”
implies that at least two different patterns of human activity are present and active in focal events
such as international business growth situations. Cross-cultural encounters involve a variety of
presentations, negotiations, social gatherings, writing and reading documents, etc. In these, national,
ethnic, religious, and moral values and other cross-cultural factors typically clash with each other.
Similarly, differences in strong industrial cultures or technology patterns – which may
simultaneously reflect a cultural background – often diverge as well. In turn, a multicultural issue is
here seen as being more complex than an issue along only one cross-cultural dimension. Thus,
collaboration is one of the success factors.
Lauri Palojärvi (2009) RM in the international growth business of Finnish construction firms
37
3.6.4 Insights into managing cross-cultural risks in international construction
Within the reviewed literature, no risk typology is suggested in the area of the related hypothesis on
key managers’ cross-cultural competencies. These risks have, however, been approached indirectly.
For example, Keillor et al. (2003) point to the political behavior of firms. Nevertheless, there is a
risk that a key manager’s competency to manage cross-cultural issues and “peculiarities and
problems” in international construction is not adequate and its consequences can be disastrous.
When key managers cause real trouble, the underlying source of such a failure is often sheer
ignorance of cross-cultural issues and consequently incompetence in managing them. Thus, a set of
insights into the necessary cross-cultural competencies are here synthesized; they are based on
the findings from within the literature and the author’s (admittedly subjective) experiences in
various international business environments (partly published in Palojärvi 1986).
The generic literature on international business stresses the importance of cultural issues at all levels
of management. Unfortunately, the business-level competencies of managers have not been studied
much in the contexts of international construction. Likewise, this limited review has brought up
only some sketchy notes on how managers should perceive the requirements of international
construction in the future. The lists of various success factors have been reported upon without
stipulating the connections between those factors (e.g. a contractor’s ability or a team’s structure)
and managers’ competencies or other key management issues. However, the project-level
competencies of managers and staff in international construction are covered more. Overall, Ofori´s
(2003) rare view on necessary managerial expertise vis-à-vis managing overseas projects’
cross-cultural problems and peculiarities is acknowledged here.
No formal suggestions as to how to perceive, assess, or build cross-cultural competencies were
found within the relevant literature. This state of the art reflects a lack of (analytical) management
frameworks suitable for international construction. In the early 2000s, Ofori was able to summarize
that there was no suitable framework for analyzing success in international construction. (Ofori
2003). Practicing managers must deal with various cross-cultural issues and the related risks along
with the standard issues involved in general or project management. For the enhancement of the
understanding of the required competencies, the author has compiled an  exemplary  list  of  the
typical problematic cross-cultural issues in international construction (Palojärvi et al. 2009) as
follows:
(i) Local indigenous cultures have their own ways. In West Africa, the starting point could
not be marked in its place for the measurement of the streets, the sewer lines, and the
locations of 1200 residential dwellings. The main hindrance was that the Resident Engineer
was hesitant to take the responsibility. After two weeks of hassling back and forth, the
Project Manager decided to tramp down the mark with his big rubber boot and the surveyors
started from there. The rest of the project went according to the plans.
(ii) Visible local statement projects in order to demonstrate political ambitions, innovations,
new  technologies  etc.  are  indicators  of  good  intentions.  In  reality,  many  projects  disturb
local political ambitions. For example, an industrial dockyard in Vietnam, donated by
Finland, was not suitable for the surrounding infrastructure. The dockyard turned out to be a
big waste of the money, time, and efforts of the stakeholders.
(iii) Local corruption of all magnitudes is a highly peculiar and local venture. For example, the
Russian Military Village Program, funded by Germany, was coordinated well by the client
parties and thus it did not get “out of hand”. Many leading Finnish companies decided to
stay  out  of  the  program  and  let  the  German  main  contractors  deal  with  the  projects.
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However, one of the Finnish contractors, Haka, decided to obtain the huge advance
payments. Despite this, Haka went bankrupt. Since then, an unsettled legal process has been
ongoing. In some other regions, similar problems have been avoided by “sponsorship”. In
the Middle East, foreign entrants are required to enter relationships with local, high-level
sponsors.
(iv) Local national frictions may affect organizational structures. In an acquisition and merger
project in the Benelux countries, it turned out that it was not advisable to place a Dutch
manager and a Belgian one on top of each other in the organizational scheme despite the fact
that they spoke similar languages, Dutch and Flemish. In Nigeria, two sewerage systems
must be built separately for Moslem residents and Christian ones, even in the same building.
In South America, the Argentines were angry at a modern pulp plant being built in Uruguay
instead of on the Argentinean side of the border. On many similar occasions, Finns have
been effective intermediaries in mitigating frictions, provided that they have understood
local peculiarities deeply enough.
(v) The choice of and reliability on a local partner may be right – or wrong – when it comes
to winning orders, obtaining approvals and permits, or seeking political acceptance.
(vi) Expatriates are often in a weak position in many countries. Employed by foreign firms,
expatriates negotiate on issues of vital interest with e.g. local JV partners. Local
stakeholders control many critical issues, e.g. work permits in their native environments.
(vii) Local currencies may cause considerable risk. In Kenya, the Finnish contractor made a
significant gain on the local Shilling, because it had contracted a large part of the contract
sum to be payable in Swiss Francs.
(viii) Local geology, climate, and other natural conditions often  differ  from  the  domestic
conditions of foreign entrants. Such differences in construction cultures involve potential
risks. Entrants need to learn such differences in order to perform professionally.
It is here perceived that firms inevitably face unexpected cultural behaviors on the part of local
actors when firms assume new roles in international construction business or enter new
environments. Proper “cross-cultural homework” allows for the early anticipation of such risky
behavior. Homework may lead to building new competencies for each new culture. Firms and their
decision makers can ensure a sound basis for cross-cultural RM by relying on human expert
advice. It is a task of human experts to formally assess the required and available
competencies vis-à-vis managing cross-cultural issues as part of each managerial job or position. In
turn, competent experts are selected on the basis of their proven record of mastering this focal area.
Graphic tools and descriptions are widely used for cross-cultural competency assessments (see sub-
chapters 4.7 and 6.5).
3.7 Managing contractual risks in international construction
3.7.1 Contextual introduction to contractual risks
Although no generally accepted contextual theory was found on “what is the most important
success (or failure) factor, the culture-related issues seem to be highest ranking (e.g. Johnson et
al, 2006; Olson and Olson, 2000; Langford, 2000; Fisher and Ranasinghe, 2000). The contractual
issues seem often to appear as the next frequent one, within the reviewed literature and in
construction contexts, too.
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As to the uncertainty and risk, typically, Onishi et al. (2002) advocate that a contract should contain
agreements as to how to deal with expected incidents which may or may not occur. Besides a
contract document, there are a number of other contractually specified documents and formal
activities (attached to a contract or not) to be complied with. These complementary documents
include e.g. general and business-specific conditions, concurrent knowledge of general and local
business practices, and relevant laws and bye-laws. “Contractual arrangements” is used later to
refer to contractual structure, partners, and documents, as well as contract management.
The management of a contract is primarily an owner’s tool to ensure that his contractually defined
and documented objectives are met. In return, he is ready to take care of payments and to meet his
other obligations. In the context of Finland, state-of-the-art contract management includes an
owner’s choice of a valid structure for a contract and its attachments, the selection of competent
consultants, contractors, and suppliers, and the conduct of efficient supervision and control
measures (Kiiras 2005). In many countries, traditional main contract forms are still widely used. In
these, many owners find that the supervision of a main contractor (or a main supplier) is enough to
ensure that their contractual objectives will be attained satisfactorily.
The behaviors of the parties include uncertainty and they are a source of contractual risk in project-
specific contracts (Onishi et al. 2002). Thus, it is here posited that contractual risk is a possibility
that a party’s actual behavior will differ from the contractually specified expectation – i.e.
what a focal actor (e.g. an owner) expects.
3.7.2 Key approaches to managing contractual risks in international construction
Within the reviewed literature, no risk typology is suggested in the area of the related hypothesis on
key managers’ contractual competencies. These risks have, however, been approached indirectly.
For example, Brouthers and Brouthers (1998) posit that for firms investing in entering Central and
Eastern Europe, both culture risk and contractual risk have only a minimal influence. The reviewed
articles on the approaches of managing contractual risks in international projects address the
competent management of changes and contingencies, risk-sharing, preferred contract forms, the
avoidance of claims and disputes, public procurement improvements etc. (Evälahti 2008). The four
key approaches to managing contractual risks include: (i) relational contracting (RC); (ii)
partnering/alliancing; (iii) specific ways in evolving country-specific contexts, and (iv) owners’
alternative contract strategies and procurement strategies (see Table 3-4).
In the mid-1980s, Palojärvi (1986) stated that effective, contract-based RM is based on: (a) the
equilibrium of the benefits of the parties, (b) the mutual application and offer of incentives to other
parties, and (c) the specification and adjustment of contract documents. More recently, Turner
(2002) warns us that, within win-lose games, clients negotiate hard to achieve the lowest possible
prices from vendors. He prefers correct ways in which owners assemble resources and motivate
them to achieve the owners’ own objectives. Shumway et al. (2004) put it more bluntly, i.e. the
biggest  risks  that  contractors  face  today  may  have  nothing  to  do  with  timely  or  efficient
performance but with terms and clauses in prime contracts.
According to “best-for-project” approaches, critical competencies are mobilized for successful
performance. Contractual parties should look for win-win situations rather than each party seeking
only his own interest at the expense of others. For example, Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2002)
propose co-operative relationships and even “joint RM” in the contexts of Hong Kong and the rest
of China. Humphreys et al. (2003) mention the vital prerequisites of alliances, i.e. trust and common
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goals, as well as understanding each other’s expectations and values in the UK context. Sakal
(2005) suggests project alliancing for services that are difficult to define or that have a scope likely
to be changed in the context of heavy civil engineering in Australia. Cost savings or over-runs are
shared among all the project parties. Rowlinson et al. (2006) are crystal clear in connecting the
advantages of project alliances to proactive RM, i.e. parties openly expose “hidden” risks, as well as
sharing  all  outcomes  and  risks  in  the  context  of  Australia.  In  addition,  many authors  mention  the
issue of incentives in order to streamline the objectives of the contractual parties. Therein, changes
and variations are seen as the structural sources of eventual disputes.
The Institution of Civil Engineers and the Actuarial Profession (2005 p. 62) posit that the interests
of parties should be defined by contractual arrangements which also take full account of
residual risks, i.e. those risks that remain after response measures have been taken. Responsibilities
for each of these risk events, should they occur, should be clearly defined. Under the term “risk”,
the General Conditions for Construction Works of FIDIC (2005: 17.3 and 17.4) define only a list,
from a to h, of Employer’s risks and their consequences, which call for actions such as “Contractor
shall promptly give notice …” and “… rectify this loss to the extent required by Engineer.” The
contractor is entitled to an extension of time or to a payment of cost and, in certain cases, a profit on
cost as well. Losses and damages on works and a contractor’s equipment and resulting from causes
not listed in FIDIC (2005: 17.3) must be insured (18.2.) subject to some further qualifications.
Onishi  et  al.  (2002)  compare  the  General  Conditions  of  Construction  Works  of  FIDIC  and  those
used in Japan. Both of them connect uncertainty to contractual risk. Hart (1995) states that it is
impossible to draft a contract in large-scale projects with much uncertainty. On the other hand,
Kobayashi et al. (2001) complement this by saying that such contracts cannot help being
incomplete, i.e. contracts with much uncertainty are bound to be incomplete, whether we like it or
not.  Instead  of  specific  responses  for  all  contingencies,  Onishi  et  al.  (2002)  refer  to incomplete
contracts that provide rules to cope with contingencies, e.g. a risk-sharing rule. Consequently, they
refer to FIDIC’s contract forms as a typical example of incomplete contract forms and advocate that
the optimal design of a contract prevents endogenous (i.e. internal or project-related) risks. Further,
Onishi et al. (2002) define the  peril  of  internal  contractual  risk  as  being  inherent  in  the
behaviors of the contract parties. These parties may identify a risk that some party will not
behave as expected and as contractually specified. In turn, Posner and Rosenfield (1977) argue that
the sharing of external (or exogenous) risks in contract law boils down to which party would bear
a loss if they could have foreseen that contingency.
3.7.3 Insights into managing contractual risks in international construction
In the reviewed literature, international construction is frequently coupled with a high degree of
complexity. The main idea of viable risk management has traditionally been to shift each risk
to that contractual party who is the one most capable of managing it (Gruneberg et al. 2007).
Contracts need to be able to respond to unforeseen circumstances (Turner 2002). The key issue
is  the  sharing  of  the  consequences  of  more  or  less  unforeseeable  risk  events,  especially  when the
outcomes of those events are vaguely determined (FIDIC 2005: 17.3). Parties should be able to trust
that various unforeseeable events causing risk should, when occurring, be dealt with in a fair
and reasonable manner. In this way, bid prices and bidding costs could be optimized, as well as
bonds and guarantees being kept at a reasonable level. Contractors and suppliers should not need to
cover their bids unnecessarily or prepare for long, expensive court cases resulting from the
unpredictable settlements of lower courts.
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FIDIC has had, due to the strong position of English language in international construction, a
considerable impact on nation- or industry-borne general conditions of contracts of construction
works published nationally or internationally. FIDIC’s (2005) chain of action goes as follows. A
contractor identifies an unforeseen risk and gives notification of this, an engineer requires the
rectification of damage and loss, the contractor takes the respective measures, and the engineer
determines the extension of the schedule and the payment of the cost. This procedure serves well
the parties’ aim of limiting and possibly minimizing the consequences of a risk that occurs.
However, there are a number of events outside the parties’ control and with a great potential impact
on parties’ objectives that are not taken into account in these general conditions of contracts. For
example, cost escalation and changes in market demand and supply are usually not considered as
the employer’s risk. In particular, force majeure risks are contractually dealt with by specific
clauses resulting from overwhelming consequences. Such rare events may be an extreme case
where the behavior of a party could inflict major or even disastrous consequences. If a contractual
arrangement is not clear upon how to share this risk, then a prudent actor will certainly cover its bid
with some contractual measure.
Overall, it is here perceived that a clear contractual structure with aligned objectives and
balanced interests between parties allows for mobilizing combined expertise to manage risks
(also inherent in unforeseeable events) proactively. Early risk identification, balanced risk-
sharing, and proactive response measures result in joint benefits. A win-win-win approach may
turn out to be highly effective when dealing with unforeseen change and variation situations,
including force majeure events. A balance of interests should belong to each party’s management
strategy for contractual risk. Owners (clients) should act as key enabling parties. A balance of
interests is the key to success inside and across all cultures. The interest alignment motivates
towards the “best-for-project” approach. Contractors and other suppliers can also place their trust in
fair contractual arrangements in the case of unforeseeable events. Contract prices are optimized.
Contractors and suppliers may even share their special expertise with owners for joint benefits.
Indeed, the expertise of the parties to the contract should be combined, mobilized, and
exploited earlier for better performance rather than relying only on in-house or hired expertise
mobilized by an owner. Various concepts, e.g. relational contracting, many sorts of partnerships,
alliances, joint risk management (JRM) concepts etc. are readily suggested in the recent literature.
However, the enhancement of public sectors and owners requires  extra  care  across  the
construction globe. There, the combination of the expertise of public and private parties may result
in cooperation that is too close. If abused, this development disturbs healthy competition and
particularly procurement. Typically, the European Union’s (EU) competition rules on public
procurement may hinder any elaborate discussions between public clients, contractors, and
suppliers, even if their common aim is “the best for the project”. At a minimum, public clients may
continue to nurture in-house experts and to rely on truly independent consultants. It is not clear how
to incorporate these principles of proactive, contractual RM into the international construction
industry without disturbing competition rules.
For the enhancement of an understanding of the required competencies, the author has compiled an
exemplary list of the typical problematic contractual situations faced by Finnish firms. This
list is extracted from recent seminar proceedings (Brax 2005), issues of the key Finnish weekly
magazines, and the author’s licentiate thesis (Palojärvi 1986). The situations are well known to
Finnish stakeholders. In these situations, the behavior of one main party has not been as expected by
the other one(s). Contractual risks have occurred and their consequences may have been very
painful, as follows.
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(i) Iraq/Diyala Bridge. Floods – unforeseen by Finnish contractors in the 1960s – destroyed
the bridge twice during the subsequent winters. The Iraqi Government (the client) refused to
pay for the damages, considering the floods were foreseeable, although they were
“unexpected” to the Finns (at least that is what they claimed). After contractual negotiations
over 10 years, the client finally paid for the bridge once, the insurance company once, and
the Finnish contractors once (Brax 2005).
(ii) Nigeria, the housing development business. The federal government became insolvent,
despite its high oil income, at the end of the 1970s. This was a surprise to the Finnish
contractors. Many large negotiated construction contracts were stopped as a result of an
unexpected lack of payments. In the case of Finn-Niger Ltd, the shareholders
(Lemminkäinen and Ruola) were able to limit their losses, in part because their contractual
bonds were submitted by the local insurance firm without any counter-guarantees (Palojärvi
1986).
(iii) Iraq, Conference Palace. A Finnish consortium signed a turnkey contract in the 1980s with
the Iraqi government, which unexpectedly demanded during the contract period a much
larger building than had been foreseen during the contract negotiations. The client’s
contractual behavior was partly based on the contract’s turnkey clause and the overall
quality specification of “best available” in the Conditions. The burdensome negotiations
resulted in a very heavy financial loss to the Finnish consortium (Brax 2005).
(iv) Iran, the complex for the Shah’s life guards. The Finnish consortium IRCO had entered
this contract when the Shah was unexpectedly removed and the mullahs took power in the
1979. IRCO abandoned the site and argued that it was no longer possible to continue the
work. The unconditional performance bond, submitted by IRCO in favor of the Iranian
Government, was called upon by the new Iranian Government. Under the international
banking rules, the respective Finnish banks had to honor that demand. However, a local
court in Finland stopped the transfer of the funds, which it found contractually inappropriate
(Brax 2005). Different behaviors can be explained by different contractual cultures.
(v) Russia, Sertolovo project. Haka, the Finnish building contractor, went bankrupt just before
the single largest project of the Military Village Program was to start in the year 1994,
against the client’s expectations. For Partek, the technology contractor of the same German
client (GWU), Haka’s bankruptcy caused no contractual problem because Partek had no
contract  with  Haka.  This  contractual  arrangement  with  the  German client  in  Russia  was  a
better solution for Partek in comparison to the assignment of a direct contract with the big,
old Finnish client in a very complex mega-project. It was an efficient response measure
against the unexpected bankruptcy of Haka, which could have been the source of a
catastrophic risk for the project and its main parties (Brax 2005).
(vi) Finland, wooden systems business. Finnforest’s contractual role in the residential building
business was enlarged at the turn of 2004-2005 from the originally planned and
communicated “supply and erection of building elements” to the much more demanding role
and business culture of a residential building developer. This unexpected change in the
contractual behavior was beyond the acceptable role of the company belonging to the
Finnish wooden product industry. This new role was soon reversed by the owners
(Rakennuslehti 2005).
(vii) Finland, Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. It seems that the problems of this project are in
part caused by the cross-cultural situation between the French turnkey contractor, its Finnish
client, and the local construction industry. It remains to be seen how the parties will settle
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this highly problematic contractual arrangement and in particular the mutual disputes on the
serious delay of the completion and the huge cost over-run (e.g. Kauppalehti 17.10.2008).
During the implementation of the seven cases above, one main party’s behavior – e.g. the client’s
starting position of not paying for the changes and/or variations or the supplier’s refusal to pay for
the delay and/or damages – was not acceptable to the other party when foreseen or unforeseen
difficulties materialized. In addition, the change of the traditional role of the product supplier to that
of a housing developer was not as smooth as the top management expected. The amicable solving
of the disputes depend(ed) on the respective contractual arrangements and, indirectly, on the
parties’ negotiating power and skills. In several other cases, the contractual arrangements have
rendered contractors and suppliers additional profits without any particular disputes. Currency
clauses, basic cost indexes, and daily work schedules have often turned out to be generous sources
of additional profits for Finland-based contractors and suppliers.
To give some additional insights into the contractual arrangements in the case of international
mergers, acquisitions, market entries, and joint ventures, some problematic samples are drawn
on here to exemplify eventual surprises as well (Palojärvi, 1992).
(viii) In  mergers,  the  future  obligations  of  the  buyer  and  those  of  the  seller  were  specified
unclearly, and the post-merger activities were hampered by the poor transfer of the duties
between  the  two  organizations,  as  well  as  discontinuities  of  some  vital  measures  and
interruptions of communication taking place. The price mechanism was determined vaguely.
On the other hand, well-aligned and mutually set objectives encouraged the selling and
buying parties to maximize the performance of the traded company or business, resulting in
a great success.
(ix) Market entry projects through joint ventures with local partners suffered as a result of a
misunderstanding of the partner’s local culture in general and the contractual culture in
particular. This led to misinterpretations of the parties’ intentions and actual behavior on the
given vital business issues.
Finally, it is here perceived that firms inevitably face unexpected behaviors on the part of contract
parties when firms assume new roles in international construction business or enter new
environments. A proper “contractual homework” allows for the early anticipation of such risky
behavior. Homework may lead to the building of new competencies before each new venture. Firms
and their decision makers can ensure a sound basis for proactive contractual RM by relying on
contractual expert advice. It is a task of contractual experts to formally assess the required
and available competencies vis-à-vis managing contractual arrangements as part of each
managerial job or position. Various graphic tools and descriptions can be used for contractual
competency assessments (see sub-chapters 4.7 and 6.5).
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4. SELECTION AND CONDUCT OF THE COMBINED INSIDER
ACTION RESEARCH AND CASE-BASED STUDY
4.1  Why these cases?
The theoretical thinking behind an effective RM approach is rooted in the two-level, embedded
case-based findings of the author’s licentiate thesis (Palojärvi 1986). Since the mid-1980s, the
author has collected authentic documents on major international business growth projects as an
insider action researcher for the examination of the hypotheses. The grounds for the case studies
were found in Yin (2003b) and Eisenhardt (1989). The grounds for the insider action research were
found in Alvesson (2003) and Eden and Huxham (2006). At the same time, the alternative
qualitative and quantitative research methods were assessed to be non-valid (see Chapter 2).
The nine cases were selected to be included in this study on the basis of the following six
criteria : (i) The licentiate thesis indicated export management competencies and the contractual
balance as potential sources of major risks (Palojärvi 1986). Thereafter, the prequalification of the
relevant  cases  was  based  on  the  existence  of  these  two issues.  (ii)  The  selection  of  the  business-
level cases and the related project-level cases (e.g. Group 1 contains one business case and three
related project cases; see sub-chapter 4.2) implied the use of a longitudinal research approach. This
enables one of the hypotheses to be examined, i.e. whether proven project RM methods can also be
applied reliably at the business level and, thus, whether the effectiveness (defined herein as the
ability to (i) clarify the set goals, (ii) identify at least most of the major risks, and (iii) launch viable
response) of managing major international business risks can be improved within the focal context,
or whether combined RM is more efficient with coordinated execution at the two levels of
management. Within the reviewed literature, no similar longitudinal case frame could be identified.
(iii) The selected cases were pioneering ventures or the means by which the focal firm sought to
achieve growth within targeted markets in South-East Asia, Western Europe, Russia, and even more
globally. Therefore, the shortcomings within the key managers’ cross-cultural competencies and the
eventual  building  of  the  new competences  can  now be  reported.  Similarly,  selections  of  the  focal
actor’s contractual roles and the consequent contractual arrangements for managing the
complexities can be extracted and assessed. (iv) It was possible to document these cases well,
including the decisions made as part of ‘business as usual’ management. Thus, it is possible to map
and report on the actual business objectives, the relevant management decisions, and their outcomes
against  each  of  the  two  hypotheses.  (v)  The  most  typical  risky  situations  of  international  growth
needed to be covered. Such situations include market entries in terms of new establishments or
acquisitions, market expansions through acquisitions and capacity investments, large and complex
project deliveries, and implementing new business concepts in foreign markets. (vi) The targeted
varieties could be reached with these nine cases in terms of times of occurrence, sizes, and
outcomes. In particular, the latter varied from crisis (and eventual disaster) to great success, thus
providing more evidence for the cross-case analysis.
The “international” aspect appears in all the cases except one. Case 9 was built in Finland.
However, it qualified for the group, (i) because it was contractually extremely challenging, and (ii)
because the old culture of a giant bulk building product supplier and the targeted culture of a
sophisticated developer were intersecting with each other in very complex conditions. Besides, one
of the business-level objectives was to apply the new concept to operating in foreign markets and,
thus, to grow internationally.
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Finally, the author decided not to use routine cases or ordinary ones which did not contain the
element of a change within a cross-culturally and contractually challenging business environment
and/or a similar situation. Potential cases were also excluded when the author did not have the
opportunity already to be involved from the business level onwards. Therefore, the majority of the
projects with the author’s active involvement did not qualify for the selected group although
they  were  also  documented  in  the  same  satisfactory  way  as  the  qualified  ones.  The  strategy
documentation and the minutes of the meetings of the management boards and teams also deal with
all projects of some importance. Of course, the pioneering growth projects were followed up with
keener interest than the routine ones.
4.2  Arrangement of the nine cases into four groups
Each of the nine cases occupies a relevant place in the main phases of the internationalization
process of the Finnish construction industry from the 1970s until the year 2006 (see sub-chapter
1.1). The nine cases were selected in such a way as to form four groups, understandably inside the
four corporations, as follows (Figure 4-1):
Group 0 Five pioneering construction projects of Lemminkäinen in Nigeria, Iraq, Liberia, and
Kenya (based on Palojärvi,1986 ; “0” stands for the embryonic state of RM in the case)
Case 1. The summary of the findings of the five projects
             1. Satellite town, Lagos, Nigeria, 1976-1978
             2. Dorah civil infrastructure & foundations, Baghdad, Iraq, 1976-1980
             3. Matadi civil and electrical works, Monrovia, Liberia, 1977-1980
             4. Mau-Kisumu road works, Kenya, 1980-1984
             5. Underwater foundations for the Mano River railway bridge, Liberia, 1982-1984
Group 1 Growth of Partek´s precast concrete business in South East Asia and Western Europe
Case 2. International growth business in SE Asia and W. Europe, 1984-1991
Case 3. Joint venture project, Eastern Partek, Singapore, 1984-1987
Case 4. Acquisition project, CBR’s business, Benelux countries, 1987-1990
Case 5. Acquisition project, VBI companies, the Netherlands and Germany, 1989-1992
Group 2 Merger, restructuring, and growth project of Partek Concrete Engineering
Case 6. Restructuring of technology contracting business, Partek Concrete Engineering,
             1992-1995
Case 7. Delivery of the precast product plant financed by Germany, Sertolovo,
             Russia, 1991-1995
Group 3 “Adding value to wood products” growth strategy and signature project of Finnforest
Case 8. International wood product-based growth business of Finnforest, 2000-2005
Case 9. Development of Finnforest modular office, Tapiola, Finland, 2002-2005.
This enabled the hypothesis to be examined, i.e. proven project RM methods can also be applied
reliably at the business level and, thus, the effectiveness (defined here as the ability to (i) clarify the
goals, (ii) identify at least most of the major risks, and (iii) launch a viable response) of managing
major international business risks can be improved within the focal context (Figure 4-1). Preceding
the three later groups, Group 0 (Case 1) is a summary of the licentiate thesis containing short
descriptions of Lemminkäinen´s five sub-cases that occurred between the years 1974 and 1984.
This contractor’s RM was still in its embryonic phase, particularly during the first three sub-cases.
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Figure 4-1. Timeline schedule of the real-life business-level and project-level cases Nos. 1-9
                          between the years 1974 and 2005.
Thereafter, each of the longitudinal GROUPS 1-3 consists of one business-level case with its
internationalization strategy (i.e. Unit of analysis 1, according to Yin 2003 p. 40) and embedded
within it one or three project-level cases, such as market entry or the delivery of the project (Unit of
analysis 2). GROUP 1 contains: Case 2: International growth of Partek´s precast concrete business
in SE Asia and Western Europe between the years 1984 and 1991; Case 3: Eastern Partek’s market
entry and turnaround project; Case  4: CBR, and Case  5: VBI as acquisition and integration
projects. GROUP  2 contains: Case 6: Partek Concrete Engineering’s (PCE) start-up during the
years 1992-1995 and Case 7:  the PCE Sertolovo project. GROUP  3 contains Case  8:
Metsäliitto/Finnforest’s value-adding strategy and Case 9: the FMO Tapiola office building project.
4.3  Reporting on the key issues of risk management within the nine cases
4.3.1 Risk management practices
The RM practices within the nine cases are here previewed as follows. The formal corporate-level
RM function was assigned to deal only with insurable risks and it did not have much to do with
lower-level  RM.  Thus,  RM  was  one  of  the  duties  of  the  business  management  and  project
management, respectively. Therefore, a study has been performed of how the RM process
elements – setting goals and identifying and assessing risks, as well as responding to them – were
conducted in the cases.
During the 1970s and the early 1980s, the project management of Cases 1-3 dealt with  identified
risks that could have prevented the achievement of project-specific objectives. The RM actions
were  usually  launched  at  the  same  time  as  the  project  as  a  whole  without  any  proactiveness
(Palojärvi 1986). From the mid-1980s onwards, the respective management related to Cases 4-9
launched the RM process at the business level well before the implementation of each of the
projects. This method gave the focal actors more options to play with, e.g. risk avoidance and
mitigation, as well as dealing with consequences early. Besides, the major risks inherent in the key
managers’ competencies, if identified, had to be dealt with before the project implementation
because the option of replacing eventually incompetent manager(s) was painful and often this
resulted in no actual improvement.
As a rule, the following six tasks were pre-guided to be performed during each RM process: (i) to
acquire  a  relevant  foresight  regarding  an  actor’s  mission;  (ii)  to  confirm  business  objectives  as
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clearly as possible; (iii) to identify major risks in terms of asking what can cause a deviation from
business objectives; (iv) to assess the consequences of major risks; (v) to plan and launch an
efficient response, and (vi) to follow up and repeat the entire process (usually in principle only; the
repetition of the process was rarely actually implemented). In reality, the four last tasks (iii-vi) were
commonly carried out. On the other hand, the first two tasks (i-ii) were not usually connected to the
RM process, which was primarily designed for the project level (see e.g. Flanagan and Norman
1993).
4.3.2 Setting of the business objectives
Peter Drucker (1954) published the concept of management by objectives as early as in the mid-
1950s. Among others, Steiner (1969) designed more detailed versions for practicing managers. This
thinking was also easily adopted among the leading Finnish firms (e.g. Lemminkäinen) in their
domestic construction business and exports in the 1960s. Traditionally, at least cost and time
objectives had been used at the project level. Over the decades, many applications (e.g. Voutilainen
et al. 1987) became standard in Finland. Typical objectives in construction and product business
growth and/or change projects are quantitative e.g. financial, market share, or volume objectives.
Complementary objectives are operational (e.g. a capacity of…), functional (e.g. control procedures
are completed, a contract is signed, and a management system is established), or even qualitative
(e.g. a cross-cultural management team is in operation).
Palojärvi (1986) treated “objective” and “expectation” as synonyms when defining risk. It was
applicable as the founding step to prompt the RM process. Applicable business objectives had only
one mandatory feature, i.e. to be clear enough to allow the identification. This enabled aim
attainment to be assessed, too. In Case 1, the objectives may have been set with or without some
trigger events being identified as the roots of the risky events with their consequences. In  all  of
Cases 2-9, the business objectives were adequately set as the concept of management by objectives
was already standard within the big Finnish companies. The objectives contained the basic element
of money added with or without other objectives. The corporate risk-taking was to cover the
possibility of coming out with an outright business or project loss. The corporate or business level
was expected to withstand even the worst estimated loss of a given project. The negative examples
(e.g. the Conference Palace in Baghdad) and the similar literature findings (e.g. Busch 2006) both
confirm that the corporate or business-level management had beliefs that were too optimistic.
4.3.3 Focusing on the major risks
The construction-related references overwhelmingly favor the thinking of “consider negative
consequences only”. One early deviation from the mainstream, however, is Lifson and Scheifer’s
(1982) view on the two-way approach. Still, the culture of the practitioners has generally been to
avoid severe negative consequences and to ignore eventual positive consequences. Thus, attention
has been given to major risks with negative consequences.
In each of the nine cases, a major risk has been identified as one which can, independently of other
risks, prevent the focal actor from attaining the set goals. The value (a probability x a consequence)
of a major risk is high. Some very big and negative consequences even caused disastrous damage in
relation to the objectives. Force majeure events were taken into preliminary consideration
particularly by the contractors (Cases 1, 7, and 9) but also in one acquisition case (Case 5). Positive
consequences were usually not accounted for within the cases, which corresponds to the standard
attitude in construction at that time.
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In the developing countries, the Finnish actors recognized many major risks, such as sudden
unfavorable political or economic change, catastrophic weather conditions, and claims of
corruption. Several times those risks occurred and escalated into crises. Major risks also emerged
from among the expatriate personnel and the contractual arrangements. On the other hand, no
technical risks turned out to be major ones (e.g. Palojärvi, 1986). A worst case scenario, i.e. the risk
of losing all the invested capital, was considered in all the cases within the developing countries.
Usually, the possibility of that loss was limited to a given maximum (although this was sometimes
defined sporadically).
In the industrialized countries,  economic  development  and  the  acceptance  of  the  offering  (e.g.
technology) were considered the major risks. On the other hand, political developments were not
among the major risks. In turn, the managers’ competencies were identified as the success factor
and analyzed by the specialists. Such analyses were used as additional information to screen unfit
candidates out rather than to select the best one. The selection of the key managers was the task of
the higher-level management, with or without their own direct experience of the respective
environment.
4.3.4 Identification and documentation of the major risks
The major project risks – also called as threats - were identified and documented by the
management teams and/or boards. The managers listed the risks as they felt appropriate on the basis
of their own experience and the advice of experts. The planning of the responses, the launching, and
the follow-up were the standard management measures. Only a little time, if any, was used to go
systematically through the pre-prepared risk registers. The risk typologies and the classification of
the identified risks were applied to various extents. When the actors could influence the major risks,
they  also  addressed  and  monitored  such  risks  actively.  The  other  risks   were  monitored  and
responded to, too, but  not as keenly as the major risks.
The broad risk typology consisted of two types: (i) external, e.g. political or macro-economic risks
outside  an  actor’s  control,  and  (ii)  internal  risks  within  an  actor’s  control.  Unforeseen  risks  (e.g.
weather, revolution, or currency depreciation) were classified into both types. No force majeure
events (e.g. overwhelming weather conditions, material quality on site, or striking labor at the
factory) occurred within the cases that were studied. However, many such events were identified
and at least the appropriate prevailing legislation and/or the contractual clauses were adopted as
well as possible. This fact further stresses the fact that the risk must always be considered from the
respective actor’s point of view.
4.3.5 Risk assessment and response measures
Quantitative computerized techniques were not used for the RM measures per se. Only in the most
recent cases, Cases 8-9, were computerized databases used to build up the knowledge base, to
compare the design and/or implementation alternatives. In all the nine cases, the identified risks
were responded to in various ways, depending on their assessed impacts. No disasters could be
tolerated in any circumstances, regardless of the probability. Each such risk and its catastrophic
consequences were avoided, reduced enough, or transferred. The use of human expertise was the
only practical way to identify the possibility of these disastrous consequences of the risks (via crises
or directly) and to plan appropriate counter-measures (Palojärvi et al. 2008c). The other major
risks, with less severe consequences, were also managed by measures that were selected by experts.
The early measures included dealing with the risky events or their triggers by reducing the
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probabilities of the risks. Later, the same or new experts suggested additional response measures. In
the case of conflicting expert advice, ordinary managerial expertise was relied upon when selecting
the most appropriate measure(s).
Some of the planned response measures were launched earlier than the project
implementation activities. These included e.g. the gathering of vital intelligence, the building-up
of personal contacts, insurance, re-designs, changes in the implementation techniques, the ensuring
of motivation, and the development of new competences in the form of recruiting, educating, and
training new key managers and staff. Some measures were a part of the business or project
development, while some were launched as part of project planning, an investment decision, the
preparation of tenders and contracts, or at certain moments of the physical implementation of the
project. A fairly large number of ad hoc measures were also launched as a result of unidentified
risks, i.e. these risks were not responded to until they occurred. Some planned measures related to
the perceived consequences were never launched because the preceding risks never materialized.
The early response measures were mostly efficient. Expert evaluations on the proper execution of
the planned response measures were not made systematically. Some identified risks matured very
slowly, i.e. although the direction of the general political or economical development within the
business environment was correctly identified the pace yet was slow and did not really result into
major risk within the relatively short 1-3-year time schedules of the projects (e.g. Overholt,
1982).There are many examples of relatively slow-maturing and well-identified risks which did not
materialize within the foreseeable project span or even the business span. E.g. risks of “creeping”
socialism , European regulations on standardization, the impact of European integration on
economic growth, German unification, Russia’s decision to take control of its important natural
resources, the Russian export duty on logs, the availability of skilled labor, and climate change
increasing the occurrence of floods). If  identified, such risks were monitored by following up the
indicators and the symptoms of such (undesired) development in order to launch the planned
response, if any, early enough. The experts provided lists of the indicators to be watched. Besides
the firms’ own corporate cadres, many banks, insurance companies, and industry consultants, and
researchers (e.g. Overholt, 1982, Nikander 2002) have compiled lists of such indicators since the
1970s.
4.3.6 Management of uncertainty, complexity, and crises within the nine cases
In the nine cases, the conversion of uncertainty to RM was the standard management procedure.
Every case was unique and whether its variables could be reasonably managed or not had to be
assessed. Similarly, an assessment had to be made of whether new competencies or knowledge
should be implanted into the management team by e.g. permanent or temporary recruitments or
even by outsourcing. The management teams contained specialists in PM and general management.
The  other  competencies  were  assigned  (or  at  least  attempts  were  made  to  do  this)  to  some  other
areas as well.  Some managers were “specialists on local issues” on the culture of the host countries.
The “production specialists” mastered the respective “problems and peculiarities” of the product or
production process, e.g. the concrete structure, the laying of the asphalt, or the production of the
structural beams and columns of wood. Moreover, there were variables related to the expectations
and (limitations) of the client or the financier. In Case 1, Lemminkäinen´s way of partnering with
the Finnish pulp and paper corporations for their plant projects or bidding for the projects of the
international development agencies are examples of “specialists in client issues”. In Case  5, the
Dutch VBI bid likewise for the system delivery of hollow-core slabs for low-storey housing
builders in the Netherlands. In both cases, the overall uncertainty was reduced markedly and turned
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into RM because one or several key business variables could be pinned down reliably.
Consequently, the complexity and the magnitude of the total risk were reduced as well.
The reduction of complexity was achieved by relying on the available competencies and
restricting the number of new issues – requiring new competencies – to an acceptable and
manageable level. Combinations of a new product and a new market (or client) were considered too
risky. However, in Case 4 and Case 8 this situation clearly emerged. The new location increased
the complexity as well. Contractual qualifications, the choice of the business roles, partnering, and
subcontracting were the most common ways to limit complexity to an acceptable degree.
The positive consequence of a risk was not usually considered as an opportunity. If at all, the
opportunity was discussed at the business level (e.g. Cases 6 and 7), where it was considered to be
an opportunity to grasp potential growth. In all the cases, the project-specific objectives were
ambitious and their attainment was considered a major success.
In the cases from the 1970s and 1980s, no preparations were made for the possibility of an
emerging crisis that was caused internally. Should a crisis occur, it would be dealt with as a
normal management problem without any specific contingency plan, except preparations for the
replacement of the project manager, his boss, or both of them. External reasons, such as political
changes, economic crises, and changes in the legislation, particularly in Africa and the Middle East,
were keenly watched whenever such events were considered likely to have an impact on the
business objectives. The measures to be taken were planned for as the respective business and/or
project management saw fit. Demobilization plans became standard in Africa after the first
demobilization materialized in Case 1 (e.g. Nigeria and Liberia). Besides, the consequences of the
conceivable worst cases, including full demobilization, were pondered at the business level and they
were expressed e.g. as a maximum loss in financial terms. The corporate financial management
took that figure into account when monitoring the liquidity and solvency of the firm.
In the cases from the late 1980s and thereafter, the preparations for the possibility of an
emerging crisis were better. The preplanned methods to detect an emerging crisis included solid
management in all the cases, an extended amount of intelligence and communication between the
key parties in some cases, and the implanting of the acquisition and integration team physically
within the acquired organization in the others. Many internal reasons caused the crises in Cases 6-
9. A crisis could have occurred in both the acquisition Cases 4-5 as well, e.g. major friction
between  the  new  and  old  owners  or  several  key  managers  deciding  to  leave.  In  those  cases,  no
contingency plan existed because the primary source of such a crisis had been identified as the risk
and the response measure had been readily taken. Beyond that precaution, the respective
management was supposed to deal with the crisis, if any, as best as it could.
In turn, external reasons were not considered likely to cause crises in the western business
environment. For example, the development of technology, the general economy, or politics were
easy to watch and respond to without any surprises. In the Russian Case 7, it was duly accounted
for, i.e. the eventual crisis – leading to e.g. the abandoning of the site and/or full demobilization –
was eliminated with extensive intelligence and careful contractual arrangements, including large
advance payments and currency terms.
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4.4 Role of the case reporting
The main purpose of the case reporting is the examination of the two hypotheses. This boils
down to an inquiry into whether and how the cases support or do not support each of the
hypotheses. Secondarily, possible imperatives for a novel and concurrent model for contextual
RM are sought on the basis of a comparison of the case findings and the insights gained from the
literature review. Hypothetically, efficiency in managing major contextual risks should be improved
by: (i) transferring RM upwards onto the business level; (ii) combining the use of business- and
project-level RM methods, and (iii) developing techniques of situation-specific risk identification.
Therefore, the role of the case reporting is to facilitate the discussion of: (i) the effective RM
process, i.e. setting business objectives, conducting major risk identification, and launching
response measures, (ii) the key managers’ cross-cultural competencies, and (iii) the contractual
arrangements and their management vis-à-vis success and/or failure, respectively.  In other words,
the case reporting facilitates the cross-case analysis in Chapter 6, the comparison of the case
findings and those of the literature review in Chapter 7, the discussion and the critique in Chapter 8,
and the consequent conclusions and suggestions in Chapter 9.
4.5 Data and case-specific descriptions
4.5.1 Case-specific data and other sources
The type and collection of the data, which has been used to write the compact case descriptions, is
an essential part of the research method. Thus, the author has saved the most crucial, authentic
case-specific documentation of the key elements of the RM method applied, i.e. the setting of
objectives, the identification and assessment of the major risks, and the response between the years
1984 and 2006, in Cases 2-9. In Case 1 the licentiate thesis has been used as the documentation of
the data. Besides the case-specific documentation, a large number of less crucial, non-listed data
(internal company memos, messages, monthly reports, even personal notes) has been used to write
the initial descriptions.
Within each Group, the time span covered the origins of the case business idea and the
implementation of the case internationalization strategy, coupled with the marketing and
implementation phases of each case project.
The documentation consists of the minutes of the decision-making meetings of  the
management teams and boards, and/or Boards of Directors. During these three decades, these
meetings were run in ways that changed along with the changes in the guidance routines within
large Finnish corporations. The other important data sources were typically formally approved
strategy or action plans of the respective companies.  Except  for  the  Cases  8  and  9,  where  the
data exists in electronic files, the documents are paper documents only and available in the office
files.  Typically,  and  apart  of  the  routines  of  dates,  participants  and  so  forth,  the  minutes  include
decisions and also proposals and discussion notes. The complementary documents included the
memoranda, the expert studies, or the other messages, which the minutes may or may not observe,
pertaining to each case. Besides the case-specific data, a substantial amount of background
information was collected, too. Many books, reports, presentations and other relevant documents
explain the general and specific issues of international construction in the respective periods of time
although they may not always fall exactly on the same years than the Cases. In this way, the author
has gained a deeper understanding of the major situations.
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The inclusion of case-specific documents in  the  case-specific  descriptions  was  based  on  the
following criteria. In order to be quoted, a relevant issue such as objective, risk, decision, and
measure had to be mentioned in the relevant formal documentation, e.g. minutes of meetings or
their complements. The case-specific documents are listed by special “endnotes” (e.g. /C1-1/ for
Case 1)to keep them separate from public references, and shortly described at the end of each
case description. The causally related information was combined into chains of interrelated events.
After the identification of a risk, the planning and launching of the efficient response measures
often took place much later.
Some conclusions, ex post, do not exactly follow the past thinking of the actor’s management
cadres of that time. Some crucial reported facts may have surfaced many years after the actual
moment of the decision-making e.g. in Cases 4-5 (the reasons for PC’s planned acquisition in the
ex-GDR), Case 7 (Haka’s bankruptcy), and Case 8 (Metsäliitto/Finnforest’s “adding value to wood
products” strategy). This has enabled the author to draw more valid conclusions (compared to sole
reliance on the documents written during the actual case period).
4.5.2  Structure of a case-specific description
Initially, most case-specific descriptions contained 12-15 pages. For the reporting, the initial
descriptions were shortened down to five pages or so. The structure of the nine case-specific
descriptions consists of most of the following six parts.
1. Introduction: The case in a nutshell. The background in the light of uncertainty,
complexity, and RM. Observation level (business/project). The focal firm’s role
(contractor/building product supplier), the type of business transaction (e.g. a market
entry, an acquisition, or a delivery project).
2. Brief of the case business and/or the case project: business objectives of the respective
actors and their eventual changes in the relevant phases.
3. RM process: risk identification and assessment, and response measures. A list of the
identified and non-identified major risks and their sources and consequences. A list of the
primary RM measures. Comments on the risks that occurred and the actual risk-specific
management.
4. Combined RM at the business level and the project level: the measures at the business
level  and  those  at  the  project  level,  their  possible  causal  relations,  the  application  of  the
project-level tools at the business level, and their effectiveness.
5. Evidence related to the two hypotheses: the required competencies and the key managers’
competencies, particularly related to cross-cultural and contractual issues.
6. Conclusions: a statement on “How did it go, overall?”, i.e. the type of outcome (e.g. a big
success or a major failure). The conformity of the outcome to the hypothesis. Discussion
of the findings, including the potential rivaling major risks.
7. List and a short description of case-specific confidential references.
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4.6 Assessment of the main outcomes of the nine cases
The main outcomes of each of the nine cases include their overall success and conformity to each of
the two hypotheses. All assessments are qualitative, i.e. they are presented in a verbal, descriptive
manner  instead  of  being  e.g.  on  a  Likert’s  scale  (Table  4-1).  In  Chapter  5,  the  case-specific
assessments are presented in the last conclusive part of each description. In Chapter 6, the cross-
case analysis is made possible by compiling the same case-specific assessments in four tables
(Tables 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, and 6-4).
 Table 4-1. Assessment of the main outcomes of the nine cases. Key: The scale for “overall
                          success” is 5 (very high), 4 (high), 3 (medium), 2 (low), and 1 (very low). The










Case 3 High Medium Low High
…
The overall success is assessed on a scale of very high, high, medium, low, and very low,
corresponding to the evidence in the case-specific descriptions. "High" is applicable when the main
objectives were met. For "very high", an additional opportunity had to be grasped on top of the
attainment of the objectives (Case  7). “Medium” is applicable when only some main objectives
were reached.  "Low" implies that none of the main objectives were met but the project itself was
completed or a struggling business continued. "Very low" is characterized by the occurrence and
mismanagement of unidentified major risk(s) that should have been reasonably identified, besides
none of the main objectives being met.
The conformity to each of the two hypotheses is assessed on a qualitative scale of "high",
"medium”, and "low" support, corresponding to the evidence in the case-specific descriptions. The
assessment is presented in the conclusive part of each description. For Hypothesis 1, "high"
implies that the project RM method was applied at the business level at least to the setting of
objectives, the identification of most of the major risks, and the launching of a response. "Medium"
is applicable when some but not all of the major risks that occurred were identified at the business
level. "Low" is applicable when none of the major risks that occurred were identified. When an
unidentified major risk occurred, ex post the question "Could that major risk have been reasonably
identified?" is posed and answered. If the answer is positive, it supports conformity to Hypothesis 1,
and vice versa.
For each of Hypotheses 2a and 2b, "high" implies that a hypothetical major risk was identified or
it should reasonably have been identified, and it also occurred – directly related to cross-cultural
issues or contractual issues. An assessment is "medium" when a hypothetical major risk was
identified or it should reasonably have been identified, but it did not occur, or when such a risk was
not identified and yet it occurred. An assessment is "low" when a hypothetical major risk was not
identified, or it could not reasonably have been identified, and it did not occur either. In many of
Cases 1-9, the two hypothetical risk types were either identified or they could reasonably have been
identified. Such an identification of two simultaneous hypothetical major risk types suggests a need
to clarify whether one of them is actually the source of the other one, which again encourages the
launching of the respective RM at the business level. If the two risk types remain unidentified and
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yet both of them occur at the project level, the PM has a more complex RM task ahead to deal with
than in a situation where only one major risk type remains unidentified and yet it occurs.
4.7 Assessment of key managers’ cross-cultural and contractual competencies
4.7.1 Introduction to managerial competency assessment
In Cases 2-9, the personnel department and/or the HRD consultant prepared a required
competency profile for each open vacancy. These profiles were worked out during discussions
with the upper-level manager(s) assigning the new key manager. The basic characteristics (e.g.
experience, education, and general motivation) and a number of other task-specific issues (e.g.
personal, managerial, contextual, and cultural characteristics) were used to screen out 2-4
candidates. The business manager exchanged views with his colleagues on each of the remaining
candidates. Thereafter, the business manager made the final choice.
In alignment with Alvesson (2003), similar “interesting material” was sought for and found within
the  case-specific  data.  Overall,  new  key  managers  are  assigned  on  the  basis  of  the  results  of  the
assessment of all relevant competencies, i.e. (i) general business management, (ii) project
management, (iii) product management and expertise, including assembly, (iv) design management
and expertise, (v) international business management and expertise, including cross-cultural issues,
(vi) business contract management and expertise, and (vi) innovativeness.
Here, only the key managers’ cross-cultural and contractual competencies are roughly
assessed, as follows. To protect their intimacy, the results of these assessments are here reported by
revealing  the  average  of  the  group  of  six  key  managers  only,  in  each  case.  Most  of  the  assessed
groups contain 1 corporate-level manager, 1 business-level manager, 1-2 project managers, and 1
financial/administrative manager. The number of key managers and their positions reflect the
prevailing assumptions on the most vital roles in projects and project-like transactions in these big
Finnish companies. Besides, they also reflect the relative complexity of the transactions being
considered on an indicative scale of very complex, large, not necessarily “monstrous”, and
definitely not beyond the risk-taking capacity of the firm. Naturally, many managers have been left
outside the nine 6-manager groups as they played only secondary, supportive roles in the decision
making.
4.7.2 Grading and scoring scales of education, work experience, and motivation
In each case, the author has selected the six key managers partly on the rational basis of the
organizational hierarchy and their primary involvement in formal decision making, partly
subjectively. Their competencies to manage cross-cultural and contractual issues are assessed by
three components, i.e. relevant education, experience, and motivation versus the requirements of
performing the focal managerial tasks in the nine cases, respectively. This resembles a simulation of
the methods that the case firms used to assess the potential candidates and that could be repeated if
one re-lived the same cases again. The grading of education and experience is objective, i.e. they
can be verified on the basis of e.g. the respective individual’s curriculum vitae (CV). However, the
grading of motivation is subjective only.
Education in general and academic education in particular are highly appreciated in Finland because
they are perceived as preparing employees well for the challenges and requirements of key
managerial positions. The taking of additional relevant courses to update and complement one’s
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basic education is considered a plus. For managerial careers, primarily the universities of
technology and the schools of business administration and economics are considered relevant.
Therefore, this broad grading favors these two factors, which are quite easy to verify in the context
of Finland. For the grading of the relevance of the education, a 5-step Likert scale is used, as
follows: 5 (academic, relevant, post-academic courses), 4 (academic, relevant), 3 (non-academic,
relevant), 2 (academic, non-relevant), and 1 (non-academic, non-relevant).
The Finnish mentality in the construction business appreciates relevant work experience to a high
degree. Therefore, experience is here graded to favor time spent on relevant duties, which again is
fairly easy to verify in the context of Finland. For the grading of the relevance of the work
experience, a 5-step Likert scale is used, as follows: 5 (> 10 years), 4 (5-10 years), 3 (3-5 years), 2
(1-2 years), and 1 (0-1 year). Language skills are also a part of relevant experience.
Concerning motivation, Schneider and Barsoux’ (1997) list of the competencies that are required
when managing internationally is illustratively referred to. This list includes nine variables, as
follows, i.e. (a) interpersonal (relationship) skills, (b) linguistic ability, (c) motivation to live abroad
(cultural curiosity), (d) tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity, (e) flexibility, (f) patience and
respect, (g) cultural empathy, (h) a strong sense of self (or ego strength), and (i) a sense of humor.
Personal motivation varies a lot. Key managers may be highly motivated by the new challenges and
opportunities rendered by a new growth task. However, they may sometimes consider that their
power is not adequate or that their efforts are not reasonably rewarded. In some cases, they are not
confident in themselves. The grading logically favors high motivation. For the grading of the
motivation, a 5-step Likert scale is used, as follows: 5 (very high), 4 (high), 3 (fairly high), 2 (low),
and 1 (demotivated). The author has assessed each key manager subjectively.
The total score (“available competency”) of each individual manager is a multiplication of the
sub-scores of the three components to amplify the eventual differences and to demonstrate the
importance of each of the three components. The grading of each key manager is not displayed in
this report, to protect their intimacy. However, interested parties may request the author to show
them (for confidential purposes only).
The total score of each group is the total of all individuals, ranging from 1 to 5, and it is reported
in sub-chapter 6.5 only roughly to reflect each group’s available competencies to manage the
respective tasks ahead, after the cross-section of the focal years.
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5. NINE CASE DESCRIPTIONS
The nine case descriptions are here presented in sub-chapters 5.1-5.9. Except Case 1, they follow
the same structure of (i) introduction, (ii) brief and objectives, (iii) RM process and measures, (iv)
combined RM at the business and project levels, (v) evidence related to the hypotheses, and (vi)
conclusions (see sub-chapter 4.5.2). The case-specific documents are listed by special “endnotes”
(e.g. /C1-1/ for Case 1) to keep them separate from the public references, and shortly described, at
the end of each case description.
5.1Summary of the five selected construction projects of Lemminkäinen in Africa and
the Middle East between the years 1974 and 1984 (Case 1)
Map 5.1. Five selected projects of Lemminkäinen Oy between the years 1974 and 1984.
5.1.1 Introduction (Figure 5.1-1)
Case 1 encompasses the RM of the early internationalization of Lemminkäinen (LOY), the
pioneering Finnish contractor overseas between the years 1974 and1984. It sums up the findings of
five selected construction export projects of LOY at its early phase of the internationalization.
LOY´s construction project export business is highlighted. Consequently, Case 1 as “Group 0” lays
the organizational and personal ground to investigate the subsequent RM processes and measures
during Cases 2-9, too. The reporting is based solely on Palojärvi (1986), where the five sub-projects
have already been analyzed /1/. The rare opportunity to re-exploit the same authentic documentation
is seized here. It would not have been possible to gather these old documents today after 25-35
years. The original report has also been complemented by recent ex post observations made even by
the managers involved themselves (see /2/, /3/, /4/). Consequently, Case  1  is  a  summary  of  the
RM process and measures at the project level, during the five overseas construction projects
(see Figure 5.1-1). No formal documentation on the business-level RM was available while the
respective strategy was “to go overseas”. This insider action researcher occupied the five roles of
Resident Manager in Nigeria (1974-1976) and Liberia (1978-1980), Contracts Manager of the
Project Export Unit at the head office targeting Iraq (1976-1978), Director of the Africa Division
(1980-1983), and Marketing Director of the Overseas Division (1983-1984) during his career with
LOY.
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Figure 5.1-1. General timeline schedule of Lemminkäinen’s five sub-projects from their
                                  identification until their completion between the years 1976 and 1984.
5.1.2 Brief and LOY´s business objectives in Case 1
(1) Satellite Township in Lagos, Nigeria in 1976-1978 /1 pp. 109-116/
The first sub-project consisted of 1200 residential units and the related civil infrastructure for the
Federal Housing Authority near Lagos. The turnkey contractor was the Fin-Niger Company, in
which the shares of LOY, another major Finnish building contractor, and the influential local
partner Harold Sodipo were 30%, 30%, and 40% respectively. Fin-Niger had already completed an
entry contract of EUR 2.5 million with an acceptable financial result. By 1976, the Finnish partners
had  a  staff  of  about  20  Finns  with  varying  amounts  of  experience  in  Nigeria.  The  total  contract
value was about EUR 25 million (about 40% of LOY’s turnover). The combined turnover of the
partners was about EUR 160 million. The works proceeded as usual until 1978, when the Nigerian
Government stopped payments as a result of its overall liquidity problems and possible partnership-
related problems. The Finnish partners had to demobilize the joint venture (JV) company and leave
Nigeria. They won the consequent contractual litigations on the partnership disputes in the UK
courts much later.
(2) Dorah Housing Project in Baghdad, Iraq in 1976-1980 /1 pp. 117-122/
The second sub-project contained the construction of the foundations and the complete
infrastructure and roofing for 1200 precast concrete residential units for the State Organization of
Housing according to its design. The contractor was the “Malempo” consortium, where the shares
of Palmberg Oy (AAP, a subsidiary of LOY), the second leading Finnish building contractor Polar
Oy, and the influential local partner Mohammed Makzoumi were 25%, 25%, and 50%. A prior
consortium  of  the  local  partner,  AAP,  and  13  other  Finnish  contractors  had  completed  one  quite
difficult contract in 1968-1972. Therefore, the Finnish partners had available several Finns with the
relevant experience in Iraq. The contract value (1978) was about EUR 25 million. The combined
turnover of the partners was about EUR 250 million. The winning tender was submitted in 1977 and
the respective works were completed in 1980. The actual profit was as planned. It was even more
important that this contract led to subsequent 5-million-euro contracts for similar works as part of
the same scheme.
(3) Matadi Western Sector, Civil and Electrical Works in Monrovia, Liberia in 1977-1980
      /1 pp. 122-125/
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The third sub-project contained the construction of the complete infrastructure of 1200 residential
units for the National Housing Authority according to its design. The area was financed by Citibank
(of the USA). The contractor was LOY (Liberia), without any local partner. LOY had gained the
relevant African experience in Nigeria (the 2nd contract was still ongoing). The contract value
(1978) of the works in the Matadi Western Sector was about EUR 9 million. The turnover of LOY
was about EUR 90 million. In 1977, the first broader tender (including the residential units too) was
submitted by the JV with the major Finnish building contractor. In early 1978, LOY re-tendered for
the civil and electrical works alone, excluding the residential units (an Italian contractor won them).
In 1980, the works were completed on schedule and with a high profit that was more than planned.
It was even more important that this contract led LOY to continue its active and profitable
contracting during its 15 years in Liberia.
(4) Mau-Kisumu Road, in Western Kenya in 1980-1984 /1 pp. 125-131/
The fourth sub-project contained the reconstruction of 136 kilometers of the national main road,
including 300,000 tons of asphalt pavement and 300,000 m3 of crushed rocks for the base layer and
the pavement for the Ministry of Transport and Communication with Sir Alexander Gibb and
Partners for the design and supervision. The road was financed by the World Bank. The contractor
was AAP (a  subsidiary  of  Lemminkäinen).  The  job  was  handled  as an internal JV between the
Africa Division and Pavement Division. LOY had gained the relevant African experience in Nigeria
during 1974-78 and Liberia (the 1st contract was completed in early 1980 and more was to come).
In this internal JV, the Pavement Division worked abroad for the first time. The contract value
(1980) was about EUR 25 million. The turnover of LOY was about EUR 140 million. The contract
was completed in 1985, behind schedule. The loss was sizable, in part because the imported heavy
equipment i.e. the trucks, the asphalt and crushing plants, the other civil engineering equipment, the
machinery, and the site camp were depreciated fully. It was important that this contract led LOY to
continue active and profitable contracting over 10 years in Kenya and elsewhere in East Africa.
Finally, the imported plants and equipment were further sold on to British contractors.
(5) Mano River Bridge in Liberia in 1982-1984 /1 pp. 132-137/
The fifth sub-project contained the technically extremely demanding reconstruction of the
underwater concrete foundations of a heavy iron railway bridge for the state-owned National Iron
Ore Corporation on its very broad  design. The reconstruction was financed by the World Bank. The
contractor was the branch LOY (Liberia), a part of the Africa Division. It had gained the relevant
African experience in Nigeria in 1974-1978 and in Liberia (several contracts completed and more
were to come). The contract value (1983) was about EUR 5 million. The works were preceded by
an underwater study carried out by LOY (Liberia), without a tender, in order to finalize the client’s
preliminary design. The works were started in 1983 and completed in 1984 on schedule and with a
mighty profit, even considerably more than planned. It was also important that this contract re-
confirmed the determined, long, and profitable stay of LOY in Liberia until the mid-1990s.
Lemminkäinen’s business objectives in Case 1
LOY’s first international projects were considered to be (i) a strategy to exploit the surplus
capacity when the business cycle in Finland was going down. It was certainly the case with the
Soviet border projects. This was less so in the remote areas of the Middle East and Africa, where
the oil-rich countries were attractive. Nevertheless, (ii) local building and construction capacity was
lacking within the targeted markets. (iii) An additional drive was caused by the great personal
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interest of the young, dynamic Finnish managers who desired to internationalize the firm and
themselves (Brax 2005). The idea of the setting of sustainable logical strategic objectives for
LOY’s international business emerged from the many valuable lessons gained in the first projects.
This surpassed the prior individual and occasional projects. LOY’s objectives for the five sub-
projects were also shared with the PM. These objectives were as follows.
· The profit objectives were confirmed during the finalizing of the tender prices by LOY’s
top management (MD) in all the five sub-projects. Sometimes they were changed during
the contract negotiations.
· Compliance with the design and the specifications as set by the clients in all the five sub-
projects.
· The strategic objective of entering the new host country was coupled with the three sub-
projects (Dorah Housing in Iraq, Matadi in Liberia, and Mau Summit-Kisumu in Kenya).
· The strategic objective of expanding and/or continuing in the same market via the two
sub-projects (Satellite Township in Nigeria and Mano River Bridge in Liberia)
· The strategic objective of opening up the internationalization of LOY’s real core business,
i.e. asphalt-making via one sub-project (Mau Summit-Kisumu in Kenya).
The first four sub-projects were obviously linked to LOY’s overall goal of early 1970s, although
this did not appear within the project documentation, Likewise, LOY’s strategic objectives of
entering Nigeria and Saudi Arabia were not openly shared at the project management level or they
did  not  exist.  LOY’s  early  goal  was to become an international contractor, just like several
Swedish contractors, e.g. Skanska, John Mattson, and Armerad Betong, had become /3/. This was a
way to grow outside the limited domestic market. Besides, the internationalization was a strong
reinforcement of LOY’s image. This mattered in Finland when exploiting the juiciest fruits of the
barter trade with the Soviet Union via the Finn-Stroi consortium, which included nearly all the
major firms in Finland. The second, much smaller potential market was emerging on the basis of
Finnish aid to preferred developing countries in East Africa and Vietnam. When LOY had already
entered that region in Africa in the open competition for the development banks’ projects, it was no
longer so serious about pursuing the Finnish development aid projects.
5.1.3 RM process and measures during Case 1 (Table 5.1-1a-d)
The reporting is excerpted from Palojärvi, 1986 (pp.138-139). The obvious confusion between
risks and their consequences was typical for the Finnish construction project exports in the 1970s.
The accumulating experience, however, improved the accuracy of the risk identification and the
consequent RM. The most fatal risks that occurred were inherent within the national business
environment of the project or embedded inside LOY’s staff, i.e. the Finnish or other expatriate
managers. Risks with positive consequences often occurred, too. The most positive risks that
occurred and the second most fatal ones that occurred were both inherent in the contractual
forms, the partnerships, or again the key personnel . The political risks caused only minor positive
consequences. The much-feared payment delays occurred regularly and they were well identified by
interviewing the local partner, several seasoned representatives of other foreign contractors, bankers
and the very well-connected commercial attaché of Finland, and responded to. The technical
construction methods often contained unidentified risks that occurred with negative consequences.
Field studies turned out to be the best way to identify the country and force majeure risks. The risks
inherent in the contracts, the partnerships, and the staff were common, which suggests that there
were problems in identifying them. Therefore, the seasoned construction project “exporter” should
also become competent in the management of contract techniques and project staff.
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Table 5.1-1a. RM during the five projects of LOY in Africa and Middle East between the years of
                      1976 and 1984. (Data source: Palojärvi, 1986.)
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Table 5.1-1b. RM during the five projects of LOY in Africa and Middle East between the years of
                      1976 and 1984. (Data source: Palojärvi, 1986.)
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Table 5.1-1c. RM during the five projects of LOY in Africa and Middle East between the years of
                      1976 and 1984. (Data source: Palojärvi, 1986.)
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Table 5.1-1d. RM during the five projects of LOY in Africa and Middle East between the years of
                      1976 and 1984. (Data source: Palojärvi, 1986.)
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5.1.4 Business-level versus project-level RM in Case 1
The strategic objectives of LOY reflected its desire to enter the international market. The first
and second sub-projects in Nigeria (1974-1978) and Iraq (1976-1980) were won by relying on a
local partner, while the expatriates performed the PM. The major business-level risks feared and
studied before the first contracts were related to political changes and/or the consequent financial
disturbances. The competencies regarding partnerships or cross-cultural issues, e.g. the FIDIC types
of contractual arrangements, were addressed only at the project level. The possible consequences
had  to  be  dealt  with  as  best  as  one  could.  In  Nigeria,  the  problems of  the  contractual  partnership
resulted in a disaster. In Iraq, the contractual relationship with the partner Makzoumi and,
consequently, with the client as well worked out much better and the result was good.
The third and fourth sub-projects in Liberia (1978-1980) and Kenya (1980-1985) displayed the
second finding. The project-level managers, with experience from Nigeria, considered that the
Nigerian problems arose from the partnership which was created by LOY’s top management at the
business level. They wanted to use the competencies they had gained and to open up the Liberian
market with a great amount of motivation. No Liberian partner was there to interfere with the
conduct of the focal business. The key project-level managers built and exploited solid
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competencies for the Liberian conditions. The reliable project financers, e.g. Citibank, the World
Bank, the African Development Bank, and the US Navy, also guaranteed LOY’s long and
successful stay. Moreover, the core managerial cadre for LOY’s future large foreign project
business was built /3/. In the Kenyan project, all the PM competencies, including the ones on the
FIDIC contracts, were available. The complicated technical issues of asphalt-making spoiled the
result of this first road project because their solution was far too costly as a result of the time that
elapsed during the contract period. Most probably, the technical problems could have been
identified and even solved earlier at the business level. However, this entry was worthwhile as a
strategic step to the East African road construction market funded by the World Bank and the
African Regional Development Bank, and later even to the tiny but profitable contracts in the
Finnish development aid market.
The fifth sub-project in Liberia (1982-1984) shows how good results can be achieved: (i) the
difficult entry phase can be passed; (ii) all the most vital competencies, i.e. regarding cross-cultural
and contractual issues, are in place, and (iii) the motivation is high. Besides, the possibly disastrous
risk inherent in the complex technical solution in the underwater conditions was already well
identified and responded to at the business level. In part, this was understood in time because of the
very recent negative incident in the fourth sub-project in Kenya.
5.1.5 Managing major risks inherent in cross-cultural and contractual competencies in
Case 1
In the first and second sub-projects, the crucial choices on the local partnerships differed entirely.
In Nigeria, the  local  partner  came  to  Finland  to  look  for  a  partner.  This  unknown  African  party
was, however, accepted by LOY’s management because the spirit and the drive to enter oil-rich
Nigeria  were  high.  The  lack  of  experience  and  skills  at  the  business  level  to  assess  foreign
characters and their motives, and further to draft the respective contracts, resulted in the decision
being made quickly and its consequences could no longer be rectified at the project level. There
may not have been any other way (these lessons cannot be learned from the literature). However,
LOY’s management could have listened more carefully to their first young expatriates dispatched to
Nigeria and have assessed the early experiences with the partner. The JV agreement could have
been redrafted. Again, the first contract might never have been obtained. In Iraq, a number of the
Finnish key managers and the local partner knew each other well and they had developed a personal
respect and liking. That resulted in a sound partnership contract and also a carefully prepared first
contract with the client (the Iraqi Government). The third and fourth sub-projects displayed
competencies regarding African cross-cultural issues to a fair extent, as well as the personal pride
and motivation of the key managers. But they also displayed the emerging internal competition at
the business level within LOY. In Liberia, the internal rivalry between the asphalt and African
business divisions did not matter because of the relative smaller size and lack of complexity. The
internal cooperation was not of the utmost importance for the project-level managers. In Kenya, the
core process was to be supplied internally by LOY’s Pavement Division, which was involved in a
large foreign operation for the first time. The solving of the unidentified risks that occurred took too
much  time  and  expense  at  the  project  level.  The  road  was  a  loss  project.  In  turn, the fifth sub-
project in Liberia displayed the value of the vital competences regarding cross-cultural and
contractual issues, including the significance of the motivation of the key managers.
In the managerial competency assessment of all the five sub-projects, the group of LOY’s six
key managers received a total competency score of 3.79 on average (see Tables 6-5a, b, p. 145)
regarding cross-cultural issues and a score of 3.80 on average  regarding contractual issues. At that
time, these scores were relevant in order to succeed with the very complex task ahead, i.e. to
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achieve the international growth of LOY by carrying out projects mainly in the cross-culturally and
contractually challenging conditions of Nigeria, Iraq, Liberia, and Kenya from the mid-1980s
onwards. The average scores over the entire period of one full decade are clearly higher than if the
scoring had been given over the period of the first one or two projects only.
5.1.6 Conclusions on Case 1
It is here assessed that LOY’s success rates and financial results varied between very high and
very low in the five sub-projects carried out between the years 1976 and 1984. Overall, LOY
attained its main goal of becoming an international contractor through these five contracts and the
other concurrent ones. The five sub-projects reflected the current managerial thinking and processes
during this first decade of LOY’s internationalization. All the project objectives included a hefty
profit. The business-level RM plans, if any, were not shared with the project management. The
actual responses mitigated many country, project, and force majeure risks. The business-level
measures included e.g. the isolating of the project from the parent firm and the arrangement of the
local financing. At the project level, the risk considerations were a standard issue when finalizing
the bids. The business-level managers raised the question “What if something goes wrong?” and
either the replies included satisfactory responses or some additional cost and/or time allowances
were added to the bids, besides the contractual qualifications in the cover letters. The project
management  faced  the  risks  that  occurred  and  dealt  with  these  risks  in  the  best  ways  they  could.
However, the major risks that occurred were inherent in the contractually abiding partnerships or
the (key expatriate) staff. These were proactively identified and mitigated only at the project level,
or  not  at  all.  In  the  first  sub-project,  all  the  capital  committed  locally  in  Nigeria  was  lost  –
fortunately, the value of this capital was low compared with the total volume of LOY’s business.
Case 1 conforms with varying degrees (between very high and low rate of support) to
Hypothesis 1, i.e. the project RM approach was also applied at the business level in limited, viable
ways. Case 1 also supports Hypothesis 2, i.e. the major risks were inherent in the contractual
partnerships with the local partners and/or the clients. The cross-cultural risks were embedded
within the (expatriate) staff.
The three ex post observations are as follows.
Ex post observation 1: Unfortunately, the next project, the Conference Palace in
Baghdad, was tendered for and won in a great rush by a JV of Palmberg (of
Lemminkäinen), Polar, and Teräsbetoni. This huge turnkey contract nearly resulted in a
financial catastrophe. It was conducted without the Iraqi partner and the experienced Finns
(of the prior Dorah project). At the same time, two small contracts were completed in
Qatar, and monitoring and futile efforts to enter Saudi Arabia and some other areas of the
Middle East were going on, but not with great interest.
Ex post observation 2: Had LOY not been able to enter the international market, its
image and competitiveness would have become very different. Its later growth within
Europe and Russia could have been sacrificed. Besides, LOY attracted high-quality
younger entrants from the universities and elsewhere. Among them, the label of being
international has always been a positive factor. Consequently, many managers of LOY’s
major foreign operations have reached the top management level. Moreover, LOY, YIT,
and Hartela Oy were the three pioneering Finnish contractors abroad in the 1970s (YIT in
the 1960s). In 2009, all three of them are still strong and independent. However, many
other major contractors (e.g. Haka, Polar, Puolimatka, and Ruola) – that went abroad later
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and independently in the 1980s – have either been taken over or ceased to exist. Thus, it
seems that entrants can improve their competitiveness in international construction
business provided they invest on their competitiveness. If not, they will loose even their
domestic market position.
Ex post observation 3: The most fatal consequences of the other Finnish projects, e.g.
the Diyala Bridge (1968-1974), Perusyhtymä (1984) and LOY leaving Nigeria (1978), and
the Conference Palace in Iraq (1978-1984) could not be analyzed because of the great
difficulty in obtaining the relevant data and information. For example, the only
relevant magazine, Rakennuslehti, published very little information on those contracts
(1966-1985), and usually only positive news until the outbreak of the Iraq/Iran war forced
the business leaders and the magazine itself to make statements about the serious problems
of the ongoing works and the threatened future in those markets. Moreover, the tenders
lost because of too-cautious risk allowances could not be studied for the same reason – a
lack of reliable data and information. The unstructured pieces of information on the very
unsuccessful  projects  of  that  time,  however,  support  the  opinion  that  systematic  RM
containing at least a process of risk identification, consequence assessment, and the
appropriate response could have improved the situations.
The key published references on Case 1 are as follows (in Finnish, if not stated otherwise):
/C1-1/ Palojärvi, L. (1986) How to manage risks in construction exports. Licentiate thesis.
Construction Economy and Management Publication No. 76. TKK Helsinki University of
Technology. Espoo. (also in English). Primary data for case description.
/C1-2/ Tuuri, A. (2008) K. H. Pentti – A Finn. Helsinki. Background data to analyze the start-up.
/C1-3/ Mantere, M. and Tervilä, K. (2005) Overseas construction project exports from the 1970s
onwards. In Brax, J., ed., Internationalization of the Finnish construction industry. Report No. RIL
228-2005. Association of Finnish Civil Engineers (RIL). Helsinki. pp. 22-30.Contains assessments,,
on the key success factors.
/C1-4/ Kauppila, V. (2005) History of the Finnish construction exports. In Brax, J., ed.,
Internationalization of the Finnish construction industry. Report No. RIL 228-2005. Association of
Finnish Civil Engineers (RIL). Helsinki. pp. 6-14. Background data for LOY´s objectives.
/C1-5/ Rakennuslehti. A large number of issues of the magazine between 1966 and 1985. General
background data for the ex-post observations.
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5.2 International growth of Partek’s precast concrete business in South-East Asia
and Western Europe between the years 1984 and 1991 (Case 2)
Map 5.2. Map of focal areas in Case 2.
5.2.1 Introduction to Case 2 (Figure 5.2-1)
Case 2 encompasses the RM – uncommon in Finland at that time – of the international growth of
the  Partek  Corporation’s  (Partek)  precast  concrete  business between 1984 and 1991. The
Partek Concrete (PC) Division was the leading supplier in Finland. The main purpose is: (a) to
analyze retrospectively PC’s international growth as a huge growth project that contained unusually
high degrees of uncertainty and complexity, as well as major risks and their management with
varying success; (b) to give the background and business-level frame for the subsequent
implementation of Cases 3-5 as part of PC’s international growth, and (c) to enable the longitudinal
observations to be made throughout all of Cases 3-5 (Figure 5.2-1). This insider action researcher
was assigned to the three roles of Regional Manager of Partek in Kuala Lumpur (1984-1986),
Strategic Advisor related to the acquisition and integration of CBR firms in the Benelux countries
and France (1987-1989), and Executive Vice-President of PC assigned to manage the acquisition
and integration of VBI into PC on the spot in the Netherlands (1989-1990), and further.
Description
Eastern Partek in SE Asia - start-up and turnaround
88 8984 85 86 87 90
CBR precast companies in Benelux and France - acquisition and integration
VBI companies - acquisition and integration
Figure 5.2-1. Timeline schedule of the growth Cases 3-5 of Partek’s precast concrete business
                            in South-East Asia and Western Europe between the years 1984 and 1991.
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5.2.2 Business brief and Partek’s objectives in Case 2
In the late 1970s and the early ’80s, Partek became engaged with internationalization at the
corporate level. Partek decided to invest in the international growth of precast concrete technology,
with notable results. The machinery technology, e.g. Elematic, was acquired, too. Risky foreign
start-ups were participated in as a minority shareholder, e.g. in Saudi Arabia (Mabco). Significant
technology contracts were also secured in Iraq. The unit of Construction Materials International
(CMI) was established as the spearhead to which many external and internal experts were assigned
to cover the sub-areas. Following their archrival the Lohja Corporation’s (Lohja) example, Partek’s
management later gave the business sectors, e.g. concrete and project exports, the responsibility of
carrying their internationalization further. In the early 1980s, the leaders of the Finnish construction
business no longer considered the Middle East to be a very attractive market (Rakennuslehti 1981-
1984).
During the 1980s, Partek set the objectives for the international growth of its precast concrete
business as shown below (Table 5.2.-1). Accordingly, Partek established Eastern Partek (EP) in
Singapore (Case 3) with a local top-class partner in 1983 in order to secure a large order for
concrete machines and equipment and to gain the reputation of being permanently established in the
potential market in South-East Asia. By the summer of 1984, EP’s new floor slab factory was
standing idle without any orders. Finally, EP was able to secure several orders for the Government
but at prices that were far too low, as was soon discovered. Partek’s management determinedly
accepted the forthcoming loss of EP and, along with their partner, restructured EP as a turnaround.
Thereafter, EP started to expand in Singapore and also in Malaysia. The later profits more than
covered the losses of the start-up.
Table 5.2-1. Partek’s strategic objectives for the internationalization of the precast concrete business
                     in South-East Asia and Western Europe between the years 1984 and 1991.
1984
-
Financial business objectives were not set formally - EP was rather a project to secure
a large technology order in SE Asia and then a permanent and successful establishment
1987 - To safeguard the position in concrete technology internationally
>> EP to become a viable bridgehead
>> the takeover of CBR’s firms and then the doubling of their capacity
1990 - Business objectives were set directly to the respective divisions for the growth, i.e.:
>> To create the mutual organization structure of PCI & VBI, and, in the meantime,
a coordinated approach inside Germany
>>Joint R&D in Norway
>> EP to grow further
1991 - Need for cash and profitability (i.e. to fight the recession)
- Relative size (i.e. to be big enough)
- Internal development
By 1984, PC had only decided to develop its precast concrete and mineral wool technology sales on
a project export basis /1/. After starting to carry the responsibility itself, PC started to plan its
internationalization systematically. In 1986, PC received an invitation to buy CBR’s precast
concrete firms in the Benelux countries and France (Case 4). With its conditional acceptance,
Partek’s management considered this an “opportunity in its major strength area, i.e. concrete, while
the only realistic alternative … is to stay in Finland” /2/. The main objectives were “the major
expansion opportunities”, although several risks were identified as well /2/. In May 1987, to justify
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the attractive CBR opportunity, new and fairly cautious business objectives were  set  for  the
internationalization (Table 5.2-1). PC wanted to safeguard its position in concrete technology
internationally /1/. “EP could be a viable bridgehead to analyze further development in South-East
Asia” /1/. Within this frame, the Board approved the CBR option /2/. At the end of 1987, PC’s new
strategy and organization were confirmed and the internationalization became the priority /3/. The
main objective was the well-managed takeover of CBR firms and the doubling of the turnover /3/.
PC’s organization was strengthened. The Project Export unit was dissolved. Partek Concrete
International (PCI) was established for the “Central” European markets. The ample presence of
PC’s CEO was considered mandatory. The local managers were in charge of the business
operations /4/, /5/. In this way, the high cross-cultural risks inherent between the Finnish-Swedish,
Finnish, Belgium, Dutch, and French cultures were managed /4/.
In May 1988, the main objective for PCI was “first consolidation and then expansion”. PC
internationalized itself fast. In November 1988, an opportunity for major expansion emerged when
the owner of the Dutch VBI, the European leader in the precast concrete slab business, indicated the
desire to sell his lifetime’s creation. The opportunity was exploited and the acquisition of VBI
Group (Case 5) was closed in due course in September 1989. PC became a truly international
player and the leader in its industry in Europe through the integration of VBI in 1990 and a large
acquisition in Norway. The next objectives for the continued international growth were set in
December 1990 /6/. PC’s main corporate objectives included profitability and effective, fast
reactions. Close co-operation between PC’s business units was emphasized as the main tool /6/. The
cost efficiency of PCI was emphasized and, besides that, “a mutual organization structure between
PCI and VBI will be created to encourage synergy…” /6/. In the case of VBI, no hint of “a mutual
organization” appeared in its strategy document /6/. Instead, several other risks are identified. For
Germany, a somewhat unstructured plan was presented. It called for co-ordinated approaches
between  VBI  (which  already  had  a  large  plant  near  Hamburg)  and  PCI  that  “will  start  to  study
selling  system  solutions”.  In  Norway,  the  emphasis  was  on  the  joint  R&D.  EP’s  objectives  were
profitable growth and a bright future.
PC’s German venture was organized in a confusing way. The partner candidate was Imbau, the
leading precast concrete supplier in Germany. Imbau became confused by witnessing the poorly co-
ordinated discussions initiated by VBI and PCI. Imbau had wished for the establishment of a strong
joint venture company with PC in order to participate in the vast rebuilding task of the ex-GDR, to
buy from Treuhand the huge ailing precast concrete capacity of the leading construction
conglomerate IHG, and then to re-engineer it. This was truly “a golden opportunity”. In turn,
Partek’s 10%-associate company, the leading Finnish building firm Polar, interfered by badly
miscalculating its bid for the whole of IHG. Soon Polar had to cancel its unrealistic bid. Finally, the
enraged management of Imbau concluded that Partek had not been open and ended all further
discussions on the joint venture.
At the PC Management Conference in 1991, the first big losses in the Nordic market as a result
of the recession were noted. Partek’s corporate call was to extend its operations outside
Scandinavia, particularly into Western Europe (as PC had already done) /7/. Partek’s CEO did not
put forward any clear objectives for PC except the need for cash and profitability, along with the
qualitative objectives of relative size and continuous internal development. The recession years
implied the merger and restructuring of Partek’s and Metra’s plant engineering and
contracting subsidiaries (Case 6). With the downturn of the Nordic markets, the idea of entering
the Russian market and e.g. participating in the Military Village Program near St. Petersburg
(Case 7) was proposed, too /7/. In turn, PC could not repeat its past successful acquisitions, at least
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in the near future. As things went on, the building production capacity was soon greatly downsized
in Finland, e.g. 50% in the case of concrete. PC could not develop new structures on a significant
scale. The South-East Asian operations were divested in the mid-1990s and Partek’s entire precast
concrete business a little later, when the owners decided to focus on metal-based businesses.
5.2.3 Business-level versus project-level RM measures during Case 2
Overall,  the  start-up,  growth,  and  end  (as  the  pure  Partek  company)  were  the  phases  of  the
internationalization of PC between the early 1980s and the late 1990s. The related RM measures are
compiled in Table 5.2-2. At the project level, the needs for the new competencies were recognized
in order to keep up with the clients, who expected a larger variety of PC products, including the new
floor slabs, to be delivered on a subcontracting basis, not just as products supplied.
During the start-up phase in South-East Asia, no major risks were identified at the business level
related to the finding of a first-class partner and the establishment of EP with Partek’s minority
position, except the general economic growth in the region. However, the market in Singapore
was misjudged, i.e. the local contractors of the residential sector were not willing to become the
“guinea pigs”, i.e. the first users of the prestressed slabs. These risks were identified and also
handled at the JV project level with great pain (Case 3). The risk taken on the uncertain future paid
off  for  EP  itself  as  a  company.  EP  provided  PC  with  a  badly-needed  successful  reference  on
sufficient management competency in a remote area. Thus, the personal quest of the business-level
management for a highly internationalized PC was able to continue.
In the growth phase of PC in Western Europe in 1987-1991, the  risks  of  the  acquisitions  and
integrations (Cases 4 and 5) were identified well and early by the experts at the business level.
Many of these risks were also managed well. In the case of VBI, the experts suggested keeping the
Dutch and Belgium operational structures separate in order to manage the ethnic cross-cultural risk.
PC  decided  to  co-ordinate  the  units  first  and  then  merge  them  with  PCI  as  the  Belgian  manager
lobbied strongly for this with his own candidacy for PCI’s top position. Likewise, the industrial
cross-cultural risk was related to the competencies needed to manage PCI’s costly expansion into
the high-class architectural business, which had to be entirely stopped later on. When the Dutch
operations  were  merged  under  the  Belgian  boss,  a  major  cross-cultural  risk  was  taken  at  the
business level and it was not sufficiently well managed. However, the main negative outcome of
this cross-cultural risk was the lost opportunities in the particularly attractive floor business in
Germany and France. At the operational level, VBI was still able to stay quite profitable thanks to
its superior competence in its own business. However, PCI was not able to improve its performance
at all.
During the end phase after 1991, Partek  did  not  invest  in  PC and  the  precast  concrete  business
any more. The Nordic recession was just over. The respective General Managers of PCI and VBI
had suddenly died, for visibly stress-related reasons. Partek’s owners did not wish to take further
risks and sold the precast concrete business.
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Table 5.2-2. RM during the phases of the international growth of Partek’s precast
         concrete business between the years 1984 and 1991.
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5.2.4 Managing major risks inherent in cross-cultural and contractual competencies in
Case 2
PC’s major business operations (including Cases 3-5) were much more complex cross-culturally
than contractually. Before 1988, no cross-cultural issues were addressed as part of managing PC’s
internationalization. Those issues were simply to be managed by relying on the local key managers.
Unfortunately, this response measure created consecutive major risks focused within the
competencies of the local “Mr. Partek” and the operational management, besides the business
fundamentals. The top management of Partek and PC also had difficulties in managing the multi-
cross-cultural business operations after the successful integration of the three PCI firms and VBI,
as well as after the concurrent positive outcomes of the turnaround of PC’s operations in Singapore
and  Malaysia.  Only  interpretative  reasoning  can  be  presented  here,  as  follows.  (i)  Prior  to  the
acquisition of PCI, Partek’s management had gained very little experience of such a multi-cross-
cultural operation, which is more complex than one or two cultures only. All the previous cases had
taken place on the axis of Finland and a target country, such as Finland-Singapore, Finland-Sweden,
and Finland-Saudi Arabia. Those cases had been simpler to manage. For example, the Finnish
business manager located in Finland usually had another Finn down as the prime “subling” and the
key Finn on the spot usually had additional Finnish expatriates at the next level. (ii) During the first
years, the linguistic capacity of PC’s management was not good enough to conduct the
complicated business negotiations, not to mention mastering the history and cultures of various
business environments and numerous partners. Therefore, the Finnish managers went along the easy
style of “hands off – let locals run the business”. This is the right style in established “business as
usual” conditions, but it is the wrong one when making major changes. For the Finnish managers,
this “hands-off” style rendered it difficult to “know your people”, which, in the Finnish
management style, is a necessary prerequisite for good management. Some clear misunderstandings
occurred vis-à-vis the basic facts, besides many inevitable counter-incidents with their nuances and
details. In part, these shortcomings left room for (iii) internal lobbying and politics, which, in
turn, prevented any new improvements in the results.
Contractually, the establishment of EP (Case 3) was a straightforward deal without any particular
complications. The business-level partnership agreement of EP was also formally standard. The
deadlock of a 50/50 position was avoided. The success of the EP turnaround project was, however,
more  an  indication  of  trust  –  created  between the  partners  when the  business  was  in  bad  shape  –
than of a smart partnership agreement. EP went into a new subcontractor role which required
additional contractual competencies to be secured. In turn, the CBR and VBI acquisition deals
(Cases 4-5) were contractually also without any complications at the business level. For Partek, the
price performance clause and the selling party’s minority position during the transition period gave
additional safety. However, the project-level outcomes were different in each case. The reason was
partly the different cross-cultural setup and partly the different contractual roles assumed by the
firms that were acquired. Specifically, the newly structured CBR group assumed a new contractual
role  as  the  “system  supplier”  without  sufficient  competencies.  This  led  to  large  and  complex
projects with large deficits, particularly in the Belgian and French firms. However, VBI continued
with the same contractual role as before the acquisition, including heavy involvement in the design
and erection of the slabs.
In the managerial competency assessment, the group of PC’s six key managers received a total
competency score of 3.98 on average (see Tables 6-5a, b, p. 145) regarding cross-cultural issues and
a score of 3.55 on average regarding contractual issues over the years 1984-1991. These scores
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were also relevant to the very complex task ahead, i.e. to achieve the international growth of PC
from the early 1990s onwards.
5.2.5 Conclusions on Case 2
The success rate of the overall outcomes of the RM of the internationalization of Partek’s
precast concrete business between 1987 and 1990 is assessed to be medium. While the earliest
objectives related to EP had been achieved, the main objective of growing big enough in the main
markets, Germany and/or France, had not been met, partly because of the Nordic recession and the
disappearance of the Soviet market, which had both taken most business managers and “experts” by
surprise. The base objectives were achieved, yes, but the opportunities were not grasped, to put it
briefly. The respective top management of Partek and PC converted uncertainty to risks and set the
business objectives on the planned measures, the foreign investments, in order to implement the
international growth strategy (only as a tiny part of the corporate strategy during the start-up years).
The strategy of 1987 called for international growth because economies of scale brought along
with them many advantages within an industrial business such as the one based on precast concrete.
Therefore, the only alternative (to stay in Finland only) was considered too risky. The ways used to
manage the cross-cultural and contractual issues varied depending on the business environment,
the market segment, and even the moment in time. The project RM technique was applied to reach
growth via many projects, i.e. the objectives were set and the emerging major risks were identified
at the business level and responded to at the project level, sometimes on a fairly broad scale.
PC’s business objectives for international growth were attained during 1984-1990.
Additionally,  the  objectives  of  the  development  of  the  hollow core  slab  technology were  attained
soon  thereafter.  As  the  result  of  the  growth  attainment,  PC’s  position  within  the  international
markets strengthened and its technology base was considerably enlarged. On the contrary, some
major negative outcomes occurred, too, such as losing the post-acquisition opportunities to
penetrate the French and particularly German precast concrete markets after 1990. This was due to
the shortcomings in the competencies of PC’s management to run a multi-cross-cultural operation,
although the contractual (and technology) issues were viably managed.
Overall, Case 2 conforms well to Hypothesis 1, i.e. the project RM approach could be applied at
the business level. Case 2 also conforms well to Hypothesis 2, i.e. the key managers’ competencies
to manage the cross-cultural issues were the key prerequisites for success. In addition, it is
concluded that PC’s Finnish managers proved to be capable of learning about multi-cultural
issues sufficiently well, albeit slowly, in 1987-1990. In comparison, the contractual role or
arrangements  were  important  but  were  not  quite  as  significant  issues  as  the  cross-cultural  ones
were. In Case 5, VBI assumed no new business role, while in Cases 3-4 the required competencies
were relatively rapidly acquired.
The two ex post observations are as follows.
Ex post observation 1: Imbau rapidly implemented its plan successfully without PC in
the early 1990s. For PC, the missed opportunity in the huge unified German market was at
least  one  of  the  events  that  very  probably  caused  PC  to  lose  its  leading  position  within
Partek. Later, the owners of Partek decided to disinvest the entire concrete business in the
mid-1990s.
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Ex post observation 2:  On the basis of this Case 2,  it  would certainly be worthwhile to
study the management of PC, and its followers (after restructurings) Addtek Oy and
Consolis Oy, during the subsequent years 1993-2008 as part of the future research efforts.
The key confidential documents and the issues of Rakennuslehti Magazine related to Case 2 are
as follows (in English, if not stated otherwise):
/C2-1/ Meltti, M. (1987) Strategic guidelines of PC (“Sector P”) for 1988-1990. Internal
memorandum. Helsinki. (in Finnish). Contains the business objectives for early international
growth, and EP and CBR in particular.
/C2-2/ Partek Board’s documents on CBR-Partek. Executive summary. 30 April 1987. Parainen.
Contains the business objectives and identified main risks of CBR option.
/C2-3/ Summary of PC’s strategies for 1988-1990. Internal memorandum. 23 November 1987.
Helsinki. Contains (strategic) business objectives of PC , including CBR takeover, and respective
key measures.
/C2-4/ Palojärvi, L. (1987) CBR/Partek. Organization and management. Internal memorandum. 26
November 1987.Contains the analysis of the major risks and planned response alternatives.
/C2-5/ Summary of PC’s strategy for 1988-1990. Internal memorandum. 6 January 1988. Helsinki.
(in Finnish).Contains the revised business objectives, upon the rapid development, and main
response to identified major risks, primarily by organizational action.
/C2-6/ PC Strategy 1990. 20 December 1990. Helsinki. Contains analysis of the past performance,
and the new structure (including VBI as well), main business objective “Partek Concrete
International”, major threats and opportunities (i.e. risks) and response to them .A hint of organizing
VBI under PCI is given here,. but not in VBI´s own strategy document although it identified VBI´ s
main risks..
/C2-7/ PC Management Conference. Oslo 1991. Conference documents. Contains the business
objectives for the new structure, including the Norwegian division as well. No further growth
targets  but  internal  efficiency  to  be  improved  –  the  recession  is  well  recognized.  No  formal  risk
identification appears in this document.
/C2-8/ Rakennuslehti (1981-1990) Weekly issues of the magazine (in Finnish). Contains general
information  to  verify  some  of  the  issues  left  open  within  the  internal  communication  of  PC,  and
data for ex-post observations.
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5.3 Establishment and turnaround of Eastern Partek in the precast concrete
business in Singapore during the years 1984-1986 (Case 3)
Map 5.3. Map of focal areas in Case 3.
5.3.1 Introduction to Case 3 (Figure 5.3-1)
Case 3 encompasses the RM of the establishment and turnaround of Eastern Partek (EP)
between 1984 and 1986. The focal actor, Partek Corporation (Partek), established its hollow core
slab business in the Singaporean building market via the joint venture EP, acting as its minority
shareholder. The purpose is to analyze retrospectively Partek’s market entry as a localization
project. During the establishment of EP, this insider action researcher was  assigned  to  be
Regional Manager of Partek in ASEAN countries (1984-1986).
Figure 5.3-1. General time plan for Eastern Partek’s establishment in the precast concrete
                               business in Singapore for the years 1981-1992.
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5.3.2 Business and project brief of Case 3
Partek’s precast concrete business and its related technology were developed most actively in
comparison with the other business groups of construction materials, building products, and
projects. The assumed new contractual role for PC and the local supply of precast concrete parts in
the overseas environment involved significant risks for Partek. The Mabco case resulted in the
humiliating pull-out of Partek from Saudi Arabia in the early ’80s.
Partek’s business objective “of entering the growing Singaporean building market” /2/ was set
in the early 1980s. EP was established in 1982 and Partek took up a share of 45% /1 p. 149/. Its first
General Manager was a local Singaporean whose subordinates included the three Finnish managers
running the technical, design, and marketing departments (Figure 5.3-2). The Finns had relatively
limited experience of cross-cultural operations and the precast concrete business abroad. Partek´s
Regional Manager also resided in Singapore. He, too, had limited experience of contracting.
NatSteel provided all the local support that EP’s managers requested.
In 1983, Partek decided to co-invest USD 10 million in a state-of-the-art hollow core slab factory
/  1/.  During  the  feasibility  study,  a  governmental  agency  (CIDB)  had  welcomed  the  new  idea  of
prestressed hollow core slabs /2/. By the autumn of 1984, EP had not, however, received any
orders. High-rise residential buildings, with their short spans, were not suitable for the Finnish slab
technology, which was geared for much longer spans. The symptoms of the crisis were visible. EP
turned its attention to low-rise school buildings for the Public Works Department (PWD). EP’s
marketing department submitted several tenders to various contractors. It turned out that 17 schools
were to be built by such local contractors which had based their tenders on EP’s proposals to
design, manufacture, and erect the precast concrete parts, i.e. the structural columns and beams.
Thus, the extra money and months were used to build the necessary supply capacity for the columns
and beams. Partek appointed a new Regional Manager at the same time. He scrutinized the tenders,
which totaled up to about USD 15 million. The new estimate indicated an expected loss of about
USD 12 million (including the investments). The CEO of Partek decided that the contracts would be
signed and that Partek would aim at staying in the ASEAN region. Had Partek refused, it would
have lost at least USD 10 million in share capital and cash expenses incurred, while NatSteel would
also  have  suffered  an  enormous  loss  of  face.  The  board  of  EP  felt  inclined  to  sign  the  highly
unprofitable contracts.
Partek  was  committed  to  staying  in  Singapore  for  a  minimum  of  two  years  before  any  radical
change of course would even be considered. It was highly uncertain when and whether at all the EP
business would become profitable for Partek. This resulted in the re-setting of the objectives in the
autumn of 1984 as  follows:  (a)  to  fulfill  the  first  contracts  in  some effective  ways;  (b)  to  invest
USD 4 million in the additional precast concrete capacity for the supply of the structural elements
as part of the first contracts; (c) to reinforce the organization, respectively, including EP’s Finnish
key staff, and (d) to prepare an effective strategy and an action plan for EP to achieve more
profitable business in the future. Accordingly, the preparations were launched. The 4-million-dollar
investment was started. The extra financing was obtained. A new technical manager had to be
recruited at once (the first one had already left). Nobody among EP’s key managers had ever cast
prestressed hollow core slabs, except the test runs in 1983 (Figure 5.3-2).
The cumulative loss amounted to about USD 7 million in 1983-1984. The fulfillment of the school
contracts was challenging. Luckily, the slab production went on smoothly. The partners adopted a
hands-on supervision style and even appointed an operative “Executive Committee”. EP’s Board
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met rarely. In 1985, the loss was as predicted, about USD 7 million, with a turnover of about USD
14 million. Because the loss was as predicted, the partners decided to prepare a new strategy for EP.
By the autumn of 1985, the  new  plan  was  completed  /4/.  Singapore’s  building  market  was
anticipated to remain depressed for a few years. EP’s organization was evaluated as being
technically capable of producing the slabs. On the other hand, it was less capable of producing the
structural elements (Figure 5.3-3). All the staff functions had many shortcomings. Additional
strengths would be required for the contracting, the controllership, and the marketing, while the
factory engineering staff was to be trimmed down. The troublesome site operations were to be
subcontracted. The financial plan aimed at cutting the heavy losses and becoming profitable in
1987. An additional USD 6.5 million in cash would be needed. The organizational plan emphasized
“customer service, control functions, and rationalization”. In EP’s history, the cross-cultural
differences were formally noted for the first time in the form of the diplomatic expression that “the
staff should be managed so that corporate efforts are beneficially channeled into various aspects of
the operation through improved teamwork” /4/.
Figure 5.3-2. EP´s organizational structure in September 1984.
Board of Directors
- Chairman (MD of
NatSteel)
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Figure 5.3-3. EP´s organizational structure in February 1985.
5.3.3 Conversion of uncertainty to risk during Case 3
Initially, Partek offered its old, proven prestressed hollow core products to the new Singaporean
market. After the unsuccessful tendering of the slabs only, EP also offered the new beams and
columns with the related design and erection services. The competencies of EP’s key staff were not
sufficient, which resulted in e.g. many mistakes in the cost estimation and the technical
performance. For Partek, an unidentified competency risk materialized and its direct consequence
was  a  10-million-USD  loss.  Thus,  EP’s  new  strategy  was  prepared.  Ex  post, the  major  risk
breakdown structure prevailing in this fairly complex business environment in  the  summer  of
1985 could be extracted from within this strategy /4/ as follows (Table 5.3-1).
(1) EP’s performance in the PWD school contracts: the experience with structural parts and
erection  works  was  limited.  After  a  few  months  only,  there  was  no  certainty  as  to  how
well the Finns and the Singaporeans would work together. The key managers’
competencies were improving, along with progress being made with the contracts.
(2) EP’s cash needs: the losses would require cash injections in 1986 as well.
(3) The most important medium- and long-term risk: EP would need local, formal acceptance
for the use of hollow core slabs in high-rise buildings /2/. Without this acceptance, the
future business of EP would be on a limited scale only.
(4) The partners’ mutual trust: if this trust broke apart, Partek could do nothing in Singapore
any more.
At the JV level, (1) the general uncertainty regarding EP’s future was converted to RM by
setting challenging, attainable objectives for EP. The school building contracts had the budgets and
schedules. The bank lending was synchronized with them. Neither the support of some state
officials nor EP’s offer to lend a high-caliber Finnish expert on structural engineering for six
months could remove the uncertainty inherent in the acceptance of the slabs. However, the
Board of Directors
- Chairman(MD of NatSteel)
- Partek rep´s ( incl. MD of
PC and Regional Manager )
(- Executive Committee of
- Natsteel and Partek rep´s
- GM and Ass GM)
Assistant General Manager
(in charge of all deliveries)
Finance and Administration Marketing & Sales
General Manager (local)
Assistant General Manager (Finnish)
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experience gained from the PWD schools did clear away this uncertainty. Next, the operative plans
and budgets were built up on a set of expectations about slab prices that turned out to be realistic
for and beyond 1987.
Table 5.3-1. Major risk breakdown structure of Eastern Partek in the year 1985.
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At the business level, Partek turned the uncertainty about the acceptance of the slabs (3) to a
risk connected to the slab pricing in EP’s new strategy during 1985. The manufacturing of the
slabs ran smoothly and the product quality was kept high /4/. The strengthening of EP’s
organization and the other measures were parts of managing this price risk. Besides, the risk on (4)
whether the Singaporean-Finnish cross-cultural co-operation would work or not, if managed
well, was already being monitored continuously, resulting in several managers being replaced. The
dedicated fighting through of the school programs had proven that this co-operation functioned at
all the organizational levels, including those of both partners.
5.3.4 Business-level versus project-level RM measures during Case 3
At the business level, the joint preparation of EP’s new strategy indicated that both partners shared
the same basic views about EP’s future, including the good long-term growth prospects of
Singapore and neighboring areas. During 1986, the responsibility on EP was transferred from
Partek’s corporate level to the business line management. EP’s performance needed to be managed
to an acceptable level before any further international growth steps of PC were allowed (see Case
2). At the project level, EP faced two tasks, i.e. how to penetrate the market with the slabs and to
turn the company around. EP had lost all its initial capital while standing idle the first full year.
Complexity was reduced by focusing on one single market and inside on the first school contracts
rather than marketing heavily for new jobs. With its new more competent organization, EP was
capable of pulling itself through, despite the recession in Singapore in the late 1980s.
5.3.5 Managing major risks inherent in cross-cultural and contractual competencies in
Case 3
Among the identified major risks, (1) EP’s performance in the school building contracts was
directly related to the key managers’ competencies regarding cross-cultural and contractual issues.
The organizational reinforcement was the main tool to increase the competency levels. The big
project-focused efforts resulted in reasonably satisfied clients and the avoidance of major
contractual disputes, by local standards. After the handing-over, the school building contracts
served as a vital reference on EP’s performance, even in future difficult conditions. Besides, the key
Finns acquired a reputation as men worthy of trust. (2)Cash liquidity was secured through a local
branch of Finnish major bank without the counter guarantee of the owners. (3) The acceptance of
hollow core slabs in residential (high-rise) buildings was the main risk for the future profitability
of EP and directly inherent in its cross-cultural competencies, in addition to the general managerial
competencies. Contractually, the competencies on the design and erection services had to be
covered as well.  Local contractors were wary of being “guinea pigs” for the new slabs and rather
waited for someone else to take that risk. Finally, EP secured a visible reference for the high-rise
housing sector: a major Japanese contractor was persuaded to buy the slabs. Other local and foreign
contractors followed suit. (4) The trust between the partners was an issue directly inherent in
cross-cultural competencies at  several  levels  of  EP.  Clear  evidence  of  the  trust  gained  was
obtained when it became clear in 1986 that EP’s local General Manager (GM) or “Mr. Partek”,
appointed in 1983, could not create the required confidence among potential clients. The same
applies to the key local and Finnish managers, because they had no prior competencies in this type
of business. In addition, the first GM was not competent to fight through the necessary changes. He
had to be replaced in 1986 with a Finnish Assistant General Manager with the relevant experience
in the Middle East and, by now, 18 months’ experience of working in Singapore. He paid a lot of
attention  to  the  local  clients’  perceptions  of  good  service  ideas  and  cross-cultural  differences  /1/.
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Thus, all the mandatory competencies needed for EP’s survival were finally in place. The earlier
business-level decision to rely on the local GM had to be corrected with the JV-level decision. All
this required solid cross-cultural and general managerial competencies.
In the managerial competency assessment, the group of EP’s six key managers received a total
competency score of 3.66 on average (see Tables 6-5a, b, p. 145) regarding cross-cultural issues and
a score of 3.56 on average regarding contractual issues as a cross-sectional measure during the year
1985. The same group had a considerably lower score in 1984 and a slightly better one in 1987. The
scores for 1985 were relevant to the task ahead, i.e. to turn around the crisis company EP under the
conditions of the contracting economy in Singapore.
5.3.6 Conclusions on Case 3
The overall success rate of the RM regarding the outcomes of the establishment and turnaround of
EP between 1984 and 1986 is assessed to be medium. The early business objective “of entering the
growing Singaporean building market”, set in the early 1980s, was met. The new objectives of
1984, i.e. to fulfill the first contracts in some effective ways, to reinforce the organization, including
the  Finnish  key  staff,  and  to  prepare  an  effective  strategy  and  an  action  plan  for  more  profitable
business in the future had been met, but with the pain of a big loss on the first contracts.
Case 3 conforms well to Hypothesis 1, i.e. it certainly would have been more efficient to launch
the  RM on the  major  risks  already  at  Partek’s  business  level  than  to  wait  until  they  emerged  and
handle them primarily at the JV or project level. At the JV level, EP assumed the contractual role
of providing the design and erection services, which was new to Partek. The first school building
contracts were obtained on the basis of severe errors in calculations. This is evidence of a lack of
the required competencies on the part of the key managers. Partek had to sign those contracts. The
risk of a big loss could not be eliminated – only mitigated to some extent. NatSteel could not back
off either. At the business level, the early uncertainties inherent in Singapore’s growth potential,
liquidity, political stability, and corruption index were removed. Nevertheless, Partek’s original
objective of entering Singapore’s residential hollow core slab market was not attained in any viable
ways. Instead, the deliveries and the works of the school contracts might have been messed up so
badly  that  Partek’s  presence  in  the  region  would  have  to  be  aborted  (threat).  The  CEO of  Partek
decided to struggle through and to look for better business in the future (opportunity). To grasp
this opportunity and to try to mitigate the threat, the first mandatory measure was (1) to find the
capacity and the competence to deliver those contracts. Only then would it be viable (2) to improve
EP’s entire process of supplying hollow core slabs. Thus, the RM began upon the establishment of
the relevant business objectives in these two (standard) fields of operation, respectively. Finally, the
school building contracts were fulfilled with the requested quality and acceptable delays, but with
the predicted huge loss.
Case 3 also supports Hypotheses 2a-b. This case supports the hypotheses that the competencies
on managing both the business fundamentals and the local conditions, particularly the cross-cultural
issues, are a prerequisite for success. The main competency-related risks were identified and
managed reasonably well. Mutual trust between the partners was created and this remained true.
According  to  the  new  strategic  plan,  EP’s  organization  was  reinforced  and  the  local  GM  was
replaced by a Finn. Several other Finns were recruited on either short- or long-term contracts. The
consequent appreciation of each other’s cultures and competencies allowed EP’s cross-cultural
organization to work well and to develop Partek´s knowledge of the precast concrete business even
further towards Asian quality and customer service concepts /1/.
The ex post observations are as follows:
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Ex post observation 1: The partners adopted a hands-on supervision style and even
appointed an operative “Executive Committee” in early- 1985, which can be perceived as
a typical crisis management measure.
Ex post observation 2: The assessed RM (1984-1986) later allowed EP to pay back the
initial investment and even more to each of the two partners. The well-managed risk-
taking paid off in positive financial and competitive terms after the critical penetration
phase. After 1987, the further development of EP’s business was quite good. EP grew and
broadened its operations into Malaysia and even other areas. Finally, EP was entirely
taken over by NatSteel in the mid-1990s, slightly before Partek decided to give up its
construction-related business altogether.
The key references and the confidential documents on Case 3 are as follows (in English):
/C3-1/ Karvinen, K. (2002) Developing and implementing a process of integrating internal and
external customers and technology. Doctoral thesis. University of South Australia, Adelaide.
Contains data for the start-up of EP and its first factory.
/C3-2/ Hämäläinen, J. and Koivunen, K. (1981) Feasibility study. Contains the recommendation to
proceed with project, business objectives, a detailed investment plan and some notes on risks, plus a
financial sensitivity analysis.
/C3-3/ RT Confederation of the Finnish Construction Industries (2004-2007) Statistics.
/C3-4/ EP (1985-6) Strategic plans for 1987 and beyond. Internal memo of the Executive
Committee. Contains business objectives, major risks and some planned response  to them.
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5.4 Acquisition of CBR’s firms in Belgium, the Netherlands, and France and their
integration into Partek’s precast concrete business between the years 1987 and
1990 (Case 4)
Map 5.4. Map of focal areas in Case 4.
5.4.1 Introduction to Case 4 (Figure 5.4-1)
Case 4 encompasses the RM of the multicultural acquisition of CBR’s firms in Belgium, the
Netherlands, and France between 1987 and 1990. The focal actor, Partek Concrete (PC), one of
the Partek Corporation’s (Partek) business groups, entered the precast concrete product markets
in the three countries via this acquisition. The purpose is to analyze PC’s market entry
retrospectively as an acquisition project. This insider action researcher was assigned to the expert
group in the spring of 1987 to prepare the feasibility study, to seek the Board of Directors’ approval
for an option to buy, and later to carry out the extended due diligence and integration measures. The
researcher worked as Executive Vice-President of the new Partek Concrete International (PCI)
Division to ensure the integration between February 1988 and early 1989.
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Figure 5.4-1. Partek’s general time plan for the acquisition and integration of CBR firms
                                between the years 1987 and 1990.
5.4.2 Brief and Partek’s business objectives in Case 4
In 1986, CBR (owned by the stock-listed Société Générale), the Belgian cement giant, decided to
divest its precast concrete firms, which were chronic money losers. The six plants were managed
under three subsidiaries, i.e. CBR Beton N.V. (“CBRB”) in Belgium, Schokbeton N.V (SB) in the
Netherlands, and IB Morin S.A. (IB) in France. The total turnover was about EUR 60 million.
CBRB had good results, SB was at the break-even level, and IB had poor results. At the turn of
1986/1987, CBR invited the likeliest potential candidates, e.g. Partek and Lohja (of Finland) and
Strängbetong (of Sweden), to buy its precast concrete business. Partek had organized its businesses
into three fairly independent business groups. In Finland, Western European integration was already
being monitored. PC decided to participate in this market and responded to CBR’s offer to discuss
the  deal.  PC’s  business  objectives  were:  (i)  volume  growth;  (ii)  a  strong  position  within  the
European Community (EC), and (iii) the enlargement of its existing (Finnish) technology base.
These could now be approached via the eventual acquisition /1/.
By 1987, PC had managed the turnaround of its first foreign establishment in Singapore
successfully and it was “permitted” to consider further international growth. The turnover of PC
was about EUR 160 million, mainly in Finland. PC was reasonably profitable. PC was also
involved in a JV in Singapore and had a minority share in a large precast concrete operation in
Saudi Arabia. The precast concrete technology sales, including the large project deliveries in Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, Germany, and Singapore, added to PC’s foreign experience. PC’s management had
international experience in contracting and a strong desire to grow fast internationally. The Lohja
Corporation, its archrival, had a concrete business with an almost identical but smaller profile.
The major issues in the business environment involved the future integration of Finland with the
EC.  Although it was “not allowed” to discuss Finland’s membership, the firms considered its future
impacts. It was anticipated that: (i) the integration would accelerate economic growth. The
industrialization of the construction processes was expected to continue slowly but steadily; (ii) the
advanced Finnish precast concrete technology could be quite competitive and even further
reinforced with the emerging Nokia-driven applications of IT technology. Clients were building
Lauri Palojärvi (2009) RM in the international growth business of Finnish construction firms
85
firms which considered that (iii) precast concrete building parts are more competitive than cast in
situ solutions. The rapid economic growth led to a demand for very sophisticated and expensive
concrete façades in wealthy urban areas, e.g. London, Frankfurt, Brussels, and Paris. It was
anticipated that their viability would require a highly automated manufacturing processes.
As early as in 1986, the acquisition of the three subsidiaries was agreed upon confidentially
between CRB and Partek. It seems that this was so, although no formal document was available. In
May 1987, the formal option to buy was agreed upon within Partek /1/. Because of the due
diligence process (D/D),  an option period of six months was set  aside.  The end result  of the D/D
was more or less preset for the eventual discussion of “big negative surprises” only. A small expert
team of PC was assigned to study the business outlooks and the three firms. The team had expertise
in general management, international business, strategic planning, financial administration, and
precast concrete technology. The General Manager (GM) of CBRB – a Flemish Belgian national –
was assigned to act as the coordinator and the local link. He  saw  this  as  a  personal  platform  to
become the local leader of Partek’s entire business in Western Europe, despite the fact that he had
gained his prior experience in consumer sales only. He loudly advocated the new “vision” of highly
automated architectural and other concrete “system deliveries”. During the option period, the
market outlooks and the performance of target firms were confirmed as meeting the expectations.
The local key managers were assessed person by person. The opportunities arising from well-
planned technology investments were confirmed. In turn, the risks of the ambitious domestic and
export projects that had been launched were also identified /2/.
In the spring of 1988, PC decided to acquire the three firms “as going concerns” (Figure 5.4-2).
The integration began swiftly. A holding company, Partek Concrete International (PCI), was
established and the boards of the acquired firms were changed accordingly. PC’s small expert group
was  assigned  to  PCI  as  “Group  Staff”.  The  acquired  firms  were  supported  in  their  business  and
investment planning but their daily operations were left to the three firms themselves. By 1989, the
administrative routines, including the financial reporting, had been established. The market
outlooks, the investment opportunities, and the local management competencies were assessed.
Within PC, the only disagreement was about the local management’s competencies. PC took a risk
and deemed the competencies satisfactory, despite the shortcomings that had been discovered (see
the scores in 6.5). PC was “eager” to execute the acquisition with its major risk. By early 1989, the
post-merger integration was finalized and the acquisition was considered a “fait accompli” /2/. PCI
went for “business as usual”.
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Figure 5.4-2. PCI group –Organizational Scheme for the integration (2). January, 1988
5.4.3 Conversion of uncertainty to risk during Case 4
In May 1987, Partek expected a considerable improvement in results and return on capital in
the target firms when the “option to buy” was approved. At the business level, more detailed targets
were set and planned, e.g. for consolidating and meeting the financial targets first, and doubling the
capacity later. The restructuring and the HRD, as well as the slab and facade technology
investments, were to be the chief means to reach those targets. The initial “risk summary”
included: (i) management continuity in Belgium and France; (ii) the Dutch results, and (iii) the
demand for and applicability of hollow core slabs in France as potential risks, but not with
disastrous consequences /1/. Thereafter, the key managers’ competencies and the viability of the
sophisticated façade business were identified. The risks related to the individual technology
investments or the demanding export projects were not considered to be major, although they had a
notable impact on the firms’ future results. Some visible examples of the new “solution supplier’s”
role, strongly envisioned by the management of CBR Beton and PC, already existed. The risks
linked to the balance sheet or the currency were not considered major either. The uncertainty about
European integration was turned into an opportunity for additional growth if the integration
materialized, as it did. The uncertainty about the applicability of the Finnish technology was first
reduced by site and plant visits during the option period and then confirmed by the investment
planning during the integration. The key managers’ competencies were now correctly understood,
person by person. The uncertainty was turned into risk-taking, for example, by not making the
Dutch manager report to the Belgian-Flemish manager (Figure 5.4-2), which was not recommended
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by any expert. Ultimately, Partek’s management felt that it was fairly easy to decide upon the
acquisition and the consequent integration.
The complexity of the acquisition and integration phases was reduced by carrying out the
acquisition in the form of buying the shares of the three separate going concerns, which all did
reasonable business in their own market areas. They had their own management and only some
overlapping operations. Partek was very experienced in this “cleaning”. It was now much more
complex to position PC in the competition in Western Europe. The taking of an active role meant
definitely taking risks but also becoming the front runner in the European precast concrete industry,
which was expected to be restructured (see also Case 5). During the integration phase, the market
development, the adaptability of the Finnish technology, and the local management quality were
identified as the major risks, as before (Table 5.4-1).
5.4.4 Business-level versus project-level RM measures during Case 4
At the business level, PC’s expert team was sent out to re-identify the major risks of the acquisition
proposal at the beginning of the option period. All the careful decisions on the key appointments
and the major investment were also carried at the business level during the integration period. The
only  serious  difference  of  opinion  on  the  new  structure’s  management  was  settled  when  PC’s
management took a high risk. With PC’s active presence, the careful treatment of the national key
managers and careful, sound investments in technology, the target firms only maintained their
previous satisfactory performance level. Overall, PC had achieved the position of the major global
player in its industry. That was more important than the early financial results. Besides, the firms
were to adopt some new business approaches: “system deliveries” and the supply of architectural
concrete façades were brave concepts to add value to the traditional products and were in line with
the basic philosophy. However, big losses occurred particularly in certain export projects (e.g.
London), the main reason for which was the new contractual role as a “subcontractor”, including
the erection and the extremely difficult mould-working to match the design.
At the acquisition project level, no major risks with particularly negative consequences occurred
during the integration phase. The sufficient investment planning and control were executed by PC’s
expert team as part of the RM. The losses of some export projects, however, were due to a lack of
the appropriate respective competencies on the part of the local managers of those businesses.
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Table 5.4-1. Major risk breakdown structure of the acquisition and integration of PCI.
Causative events Source of main
risk








Management: 1) To monitor
2) Timing of capacity investments
3) Market restructuring











Adaptability of Finnish technology
Management: 1) To monitor
2) Joint R&D
3) Timing of investments











Management: 1) Monitor carefully
2) Provide sufficient Partek management
capacity to back up "top performers"
3) Disconnect "personal" competitors
4) For local managers, attractive
remuneration policy
Financial result











PC's ability to exploit multicultural
organization
Management: 1) Leaning on locals
2) Active PC presence
Synergy and scale effect
>>>>> Financial result
5.4.5 Managing major risks inherent in cross-cultural and contractual competencies in
Case 4
Each of the three CBR firms had its own national- and market-specific cultures. They were now to
be managed as one group instead of their earlier setup as fairly independent subsidiaries of a huge
cement group. This re-organization of four crossing ethnic and industrial cultures was
identified as a major risk that had to be managed in some effective ways. When the integration
was  closed  at  the  end  of  1989,  the  GM of  CBR Beton  was  appointed  to  be  the  leader  of  the  PCI
Group, thanks to his loyalty and visible strengths as an extremely skilled salesman, despite his
obvious shortcomings (he died in 1995) /2/. In addition, his Belgian-Flemish nationality made it
impossible for the Dutch managers to approve his management style. Indeed, the financial success
rate of the CBR acquisition might have remained at a medium level as a result of the risks inherent
in the multi-cross-cultural issues in managing the three national firms. Moreover, those risks were
amplified by the British contractual peculiarities in the big architectural façade supply deals in
London.
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These events gave, in part, a reason to change the tune a little within the business-level strategies vs.
the management of the multi-cultural business group: to fortify the buyer’s (PC’s) presence on the
spot. Appropriately competent managers (also cross-culturally) were assigned to this task.
In the managerial competency assessment, the group of PCI’s initial six key managers received a
total competency score of 3.81 on average (see Tables 6-5a, b, p. 145) regarding cross-cultural
issues and a score of 3.54 on average regarding contractual issues as a cross-sectional measure
during the year 1988. These scores were relevant to the task ahead, i.e. to perform the multi-cross-
cultural acquisition and post-merger integration of CBR’s firms in the conditions of the growing
economy during the years 1989-1992.
5.4.6 Conclusions on Case 4
The overall success rate of the outcomes of the RM of the acquisition and integration of CBR’s
firms in Belgium, the Netherlands, and France between the years 1987 and 1990 is assessed to be
medium. PC’s business objectives, i.e. volume growth and a strong position within the European
Community (EC), were met. However, the third main objective, i.e. the enlargement of the existing
(Finnish) technology base, was not met because the CBR Group had only a minor position in the
slabs and the façade business was only in an embryonic phase. Besides, the financial results did not
improve as expected.
Case 4 conforms fairly well to Hypothesis 1, i.e. the project RM approach was applied at the
business  level.  The  objectives  were  set  and  most  of  the  major  risks  identified  and  responded  to,
albeit often by dealing with the consequences only. The experts had already identified some
significant risks at the business level. The same risks were re-identified at the project level, but they
were ignored to such an extent that the financial results of the acquired firms did not improve. Case
4 conforms to a high degree to Hypothesis 2a, i.e. PC’s initial competencies regarding multi-
cross-cultural issues were somewhat limited but they improved along with the process. However,
the cross-cultural risk was taken by appointing key managers whose competencies crossed too
many industrial and several ethnic cultures. Case 4 conforms to a medium degree to Hypothesis
2b as well. Contractually, the acquired firms adopted the role of a specialized subcontractor, which
resulted in some loss projects. No rivalling major risk occurred.
The three ex post observations are as follows:
Ex post observation 1: There is valid evidence to state that the divided structure, i.e.
keeping the Dutch business separate from the French-Belgian one, was better off. In
reality, the cross-cultural competence of PC to run a multi-cross-cultural operation, also
including new contractual procedures as part of the business, was obviously not sufficient.
Ex post observation 2: During the integration period of the three CBR firms, a new
opportunity,  Case  5  (VBI),  emerged.  If  the  risk  had  not  been  taken  and  the  CBR  firms
bought, this second opportunity would never have materialized. PC’s competitiveness
improved to allow for significant expansion within the EU very much when PC was able
to manage Case 4 “well enough”. Later, Case 5 turned out to be the real success. Ex post
observation 3: A different RM approach at the business level could have enabled PC to
grasp later business opportunities in France and, in particular, in Germany.
The key confidential documents on Case 4 are as follows (in English, if not stated otherwise):
/C4-1/ Executive summary of the proposal to Partek’s Board of Directors. 30 April 1987. (as C2-2)
/C4-2/ Summary of PC´s strategy 1988-1990. 6 January 1988 (in Finnish). (as C2 – 5)
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5.5 Acquisition of VBI Group (of the Netherlands) and its integration into
Partek’s precast concrete business between the years 1988 and 1990 (Case 5)
Map 5.5. Map of focal areas in Case 5.
5.5.1 Introduction to Case 5  (Figure 5.5-1)
Case 5 encompasses the RM of the cross-cultural acquisition and integration of the leading
Dutch building product supplier, the VBI Group, between 1988 and 1990. VBI operated in the
Dutch (and German) markets. The focal actor was Partek Concrete (PC). The purpose is to
analyze retrospectively its market penetration project. This insider action researcher was assigned
to be Executive Vice-President of PC and to manage the VBI acquisition, e.g. to prepare the formal
proposal in late 1988 and the subsequent negotiations. The focal parties met in December 1988 and
entered formal negotiations. After the deal was closed in September 1989, the researcher was
assigned to VBI’s office to co-ordinate its formal integration into PC, due to be completed in May
1990.
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Figure 5.5-1. General time plan of Partek for the acquisition of the VBI Group
                                        between the years 1988 and 1991.
5.5.2 Brief and Partek’s business objectives in Case 5
For 1989, PC’s forecast turnover was about EUR 300 million, with reasonable financial results /1/.
The newly incorporated PCI Division of PC was ready to expand in Western Europe /2/, although
the performance was not improving as planned (see Case 4). PC’s flagship product, the hollow core
floor  slab,  was  a  minor  product  in  PCI’s  mix.  In  turn,  the  Lohja  Corporation,  the  firm’s  Finnish
archrival, was struggling with its concrete business operations in North America. PC assured its
owners, the Partek Corporation (Partek),  that  it  was  viable  to  continue  the  internationalization
process. Eastern Partek (EP) was already expanding (see Cases 2 and 3), and the floor slab business
was bearing fruit after a few years’ struggle. In November 1988, the GM of Partek Ergon received
a confidential letter from a Dutch consultant trying to find a buyer for VBI, the leading European
floor slab producer. Ergon’s GM expressed only minimal interest, while this researcher, realizing
the strategic value of such a floor capacity to PC, formally proposed to PC’s management that the
opportunity should be grasped.  PC’s management decided to proceed accordingly. The consultant
was asked to organize a meeting with the owners of VBI. The meeting was fruitful. The consultant
and the researcher were assigned to prepare for further steps. In August 1989, PC acquired 90% of
VBI’s shares. PC’s march towards the leading position in Europe continued. The big, profitable
VBI was about to be integrated into PC, adding to the core competence of PC, i.e. the prestressed
hollow core slab business. At the same time, the cultural mix of PC in Western Europe changed. For
PC, the Dutch business was now more important than the one in Belgium.
PC did not change the early business-level goals (of 1987): volume growth, a strong position in
Europe, and the enlargement of the technology base remained the chief objectives. However, the
operational plan of the PCI firms (Case 4) was revised. The pace of expansion was slowed down
because of the new opportunity, i.e. PC acquiring VBI. This was a major expansion challenge. The
objectives of the acquisition of VBI were as follows: (a) to secure a strong position in the “well-
developed precast concrete market”; (b) to enlarge PC’s own hollow core technology base; (c) to
expand (“double the volume”) in the business environment “which in the forms of culture, market
behavior, and language is the easiest one to master in comparison with other Western European
countries”, and (d) to secure “a first foothold in the German market”, where VBI already had one
factory.
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The seller, Theo Clerkx, a self-made Dutchman, had built the floor slab group over a period of
nearly 30 years. It was supplying about 5 million sq m of floor slabs per year, which were almost
entirely used in the Dutch market. VBI was No. 1 in Europe and exploited the slipform technology.
It had taken over Leenstra, a supplier of VBI slipformers, to guard the secrets of the machine
technology. Clerkx wanted to cash in and see his lifetime’s creation continue in professional hands.
In November 1988, he made it publicly known /3/ that he expected that the restructuring of the
hollow core industry would soon begin.
The negotiations went relatively smoothly. The many similar characteristics of the Dutch and
Finnish cultures helped. Besides, both parties had core competencies within the hollow core
business and the technical experts respected each other. The financing of the investment plan
“promised” by PC helped as well. In September 1989, the signing of the deal took place and the
integration begun swiftly. The administrative and other management routines were installed and the
investment planning for the “world’s largest hollow core plant” was immediately started. In May
1990, the formal integration was completed as planned, which VBI’s management was very proud
of. In 1990, VBI’s results were already about the best within PC, and that was to continue.
5.5.3 RM measures during Case 5
Serious uncertainty remained concerning Dutch housing developments. An eventual German
position  and  the  benefits  of  the  slipform technology were  seen  as  the  opportunities  present  in  the
acquisition. The high level of complexity of the multi-cross-cultural situation was simplified by
keeping VBI, to start with, separate from PCI. Similarly, no change in VBI’s supplier role was
planned. During the evaluation of VBI at the business level, the main risks were considered to be:
(i)  PC’s  ability  to  manage  the  group;  (ii)  the  development  of  the  residential  sector  in  the
Netherlands /5 p. 6/; (iii) too high a price, the reliability of due diligence, and the consecutive
investment requirements /6/, and (iv) the integration of VBI and the management of the local people
/7/ (Table 5.5-1).
The planned main RM measures were integration by concentrating on the “people issues” and
respecting VBI’s Dutch management culture, tying the price to performance (in the short term),
holding the seller in a minority position, and launching the strong joint technology development of
the “rivaling” slab technologies, which also enabled relatively large capacity investments to be
made. The most difficult step, however, was the coordination with PCI. For example, the
exploiting of the German opportunity via VBI was blocked by PCI’s management. The (authentic)
official scheme of the Boards of VBI and PCI at the beginning of the integration illustrates its
complexity (Figure 5.5-2).
5.5.4 Business-level versus project-level RM during Case 5
PC’s business management asked an expert team already based in Belgium to evaluate the intended
acquisition after both parties had decided in February 1989 to enter serious discussions on the
eventual  deal.  The  fresh  experience  of  the  acquisition  of  the  CBR  firms  made  it  possible  to
complete this task relatively quickly and accurately, including the identification of the risks and the
opportunities. The major risk-taking on the market development and the local management was
carefully decided on the basis of the expert’s advice at the business level. The independence of VBI
was maintained until the end of the integration by a business-level decision, too. After February
1989,  no  new  major  risks  emerged.  The  measures  were  launched,  carried  out,  and  monitored
carefully.
Lauri Palojärvi (2009) RM in the international growth business of Finnish construction firms
93
Table 5.5-1. Major risk breakdown structure at the beginning of the evaluation of
                                    the acquisition of VBI /7/.
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Figure 5.5-2. Boards of VBI and PCI in December 1989. Redone from the original one.
5.5.5 Managing major risks inherent in cross-cultural and contractual competencies in
Case 5
The evaluation  of  VBI,  the  conduct  of  the  negotiations,  the  eventual  closing  of  the  deal,  and  the
integration of VBI into PC may sound like a complex deal. However, many dealings were simpler:
only one culture (the Dutch VBI), one core technology, and one real decision maker (Clerkx).
Nevertheless, the degree of complexity was increased by the tension over who would be the overall
leader in continental Europe, PCI or VBI. The Dutch Clerkx clearly opposed any interference from
Belgium with VBI’s operations. The integration of VBI via the “people issues” was considered
to  be  the  major  risk, particularly because of the strong Dutch character in general and added to
VBI’s  strong  identity  in  particular.  This  risk  was  more  complex  because  of  the  ambitions  of  the
nearby multi-cross-cultural PCI. Fortunately, PC’s fresh experience of how to manage multi-cross-
cultural operations did help (Table 5.5-1). PCI’s Belgian-Flemish management style was not
appreciated by VBI’s Dutch managers. As an RM measure, no organizational connection between
VBI and PCI was established, at  least  not  until  the  integration  of  VBI  was  completed.  The
integration  was  to  be  based  on  PC’s  high  level  of  respect  for  the  Dutch  VBI  culture.  This  made
possible the further “positive internal competition” between the technologies of PC and VBI, which
added an enormous bonus to the acquisition /8/.
Contractually, VBI kept the same role as before, i.e. designing, manufacturing, storing,
transporting, and erecting slabs if and when needed. After the investments, VBI’s financial results
improved from a good level to an excellent one.
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In the managerial competency assessment, the key management organization of the VBI Group,
in its 1989 form, received an average competency score of (see Tables 6-5a, b p. 145 ) 4.15
regarding cross-cultural issues and 3.81 regarding contractual issues. These scores were relevant to
the task ahead, i.e. to execute the cross-cultural acquisition and post-merger integration of VBI
under the conditions of an uncertain economy and a complex multi-cross-cultural management task.
5.5.6 Conclusions on Case 5
The overall success rate of the outcomes of the RM of the acquisition and integration of the VBI
Group between the years 1988 and 1990 is assessed to be high. The objectives were met. These
objectives were to secure a strong position in the “well-developed precast concrete market”, to
enlarge PC’s own hollow core technology base, to expand (“double the volume”) in the business
environment “which in the forms of the culture, the market behavior, and the language is the easiest
one to master in comparison with the other Western European countries”, and to secure “a first
foothold in the German market”. Unfortunately, no additional opportunity, e.g. market expansion in
Germany, was grasped. The forthcoming reorganization of VBI into PCI was prevented for the time
being and the financial outcome of the deal was excellent.
Case 5 conforms well to Hypothesis 1, i.e. that the project RM approach could be applied at the
business level. The project RM technique was applied at the business level, i.e. the objectives were
set and all the major risks were identified. The major risks were reasonably managed and PC’s
short-term objectives for the acquisition project were attained during 1988-1990. As a result of the
acquisition, PC’s position within the market increased and its technology base was considerably
enlarged. At the acquisition project level, PC’s management converted the uncertainties to risks.
The project RM technique was applied during the integration, i.e. the risks were responded to as
planned for. After the careful evaluation of VBI, including the identification of the major risks, the
financial transaction became a straightforward operation. VBI’s results turned out to be the best
within PC.
Case 5 conforms well to Hypothesis 2a, i.e. the key managers’ competences, apart from managing
business fundamentals and the local conditions, were a prerequisite for success, in particular in
managing the cross-cultural issues. The initial integration of VBI was fairly simple and based on
mutual respect. VBI’s managers were very experienced and seasoned in the context of the Dutch
markets.
However, Case 5 supports Hypothesis 2b only indirectly, i.e. the contractual role of VBI never
became a risky issue because it was not subject to any change. No change in the contractual role
was necessary, because VBI already provided the complete services that clients required.
Lauri Palojärvi (2009) RM in the international growth business of Finnish construction firms
96
The three ex post observations are as follows:
Ex post observation 1: The business-level management initially ignored the identified
major risks, which could have resulted in the abortion of the deal as a result of e.g. local
management or coordination problems or Belgian-Dutch cross-cultural issues at the
acquisition project level.
Ex post observation 2: The very  complex,  long-term risk  that  was  identified  was PC’s
ability to run such a multicultural, multi-market operation. In reality, the acquisition
and integration went quite well. Thereafter, VBI was made a part of PCI’s organization,
which involved high, causally related risk. The consequent tension slowed down the
positive development of both PCI and VBI. There were “lost opportunities” in the French
and German hollow core markets, including the lost case for a lucrative joint precast
concrete business with the Philip Holzmann Group in Germany (see Case 2). The
business-level management problems and the shortcomings in the related competencies
aborted this opportunity.
Ex post observation 3: PC’s long-term business objectives regarding hollow core slab
technology development were attained during 1995 and onwards.
The key confidential documents and one reference in Case 5 (in English, if not otherwise stated):
/C5-1/ Partek Concrete Strategy 1990. 20 December 1990 (in Finnish). Same as C2-5. For this case,
it contains the analysis of the past performance, and the new structure (including VBI as well), main
business objectives, major threats and opportunities (i.e. risks) and response to them, within the
main units of PC, including PCI and VBI .Ao, a hint of organizing VBI under PCI is given here, but
not in VBI´s own division strategy document .
/C5-2/ Palojärvi, L. Memorandum on VBI integration. 2 October 1989. Contains integration targets
and describes the organizational structure, including Finnish staff  reinforcements.
/C5-3/ Translation of a press interview with Theo Clerkx. 29 November 1988.Contains the foresight
towards the restructuring of the precast industry.
/C5-4/ PCI strategy proposal. 11 September 1989. Contains PCI´s objectives for consolidation and
profit improvement.
/C5-5/ Palojärvi, L. Memorandum on VBI opportunity. 16 January 1989.Contains foresight,
detailed opportunity analysis and acquisition price considerations.
/C5-6/ Palojärvi, L. Memorandum on Essence of VBI acquisition. 2 May 1989.Contains the starting
position, benefits and major risks.
/C5-7/ Partek Board’s documents. 9 May 1989.Contains ao. business objectives, benefits and risks
including proposals on response.
/C5-8/ Cannice, M., Chen, R., and Daniels, J. (2003) Managing international technology transfer
 risk. Journal of High Technology Management Research. Vol. 14, pp. 171-187. A detailed note on
managing international technology transfer risk..
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5.6 Partek Concrete Engineering – Merger and restructuring of Partek’s Elematic
Engineering and Metra’s Lohja Parma Engineering between the years 1992
and 1995 (Case 6)
Map 5.6. Map of focal areas in Case 6.
5.6.1 Introduction to Case 6 (Figure 5.6-1)
Case 6 encompasses the RM of the merger and restructuring of Partek’s Elematic Engineering
(EE) and Metra’s Lohja Parma Engineering (LPE) between 1992 and 1995. The focal actor is a
new subsidiary of the Partek Corporation, Partek Concrete Engineering (PCE). The purpose is to
analyze  retrospectively  the  business-level  RM  of  this  merger  and  restructuring  project  and  to
introduce the frame for Case 7 and its longitudinal project level analysis. This insider action
researcher acted as Executive Vice-President and Director of Engineering Units at PC when he
was assigned in early 1992 to manage the restructuring of Partek’s and Metra’s concrete
engineering businesses under PCE (Figure 5.6-2). He had no prior knowledge of the intentions to
combine these units. Later, the researcher acted as Managing Director and Member of the Board of
PCE (1992-1995).
Figure 5.6-1. Complex structure of the merger into Partek Concrete Engineering.
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Figure 5.6-2. General timeline schedule of the merger of Partek’s and Lohja’s concrete engineering
                       businesses between the years 1992 and 1997.
5.6.2 Brief and Partek’s objectives for the merger in Case 6
The main reason for the merger was the deep Nordic recession from the end of 1990 onwards.
Partek and Metra (ex-Lohja), the two Finnish construction product and material giants, decided to
restructure their cement, ready-mix concrete, and precast concrete businesses, including EE and
LPE, the concrete technology firms. They had suffered a severe volume drop and layoffs seemed
unavoidable.  Profitability  was  poor.  A  few  years  earlier  EE  had  acquired  a  remote  subsidiary  in
Canada, which only worsened the situation. Upon the restructuring, Partek was clearly the leader in
the precast concrete business in Europe. It wanted to maintain its competitive edge in the
technology. Therefore, it became the sole owner of PCE, while Metra, now entirely out of the
construction business, focused successfully on other businesses. PCE became a global niche
technology market player. PCE was given the following business objectives /1/, /2/: (a) to restore
profitability; (b) to intensify its marketing; (c) to reinforce its technology base, and (d) to clarify the
objective “not to sell technology to the competitors of Partek’s own precast concrete plants”. At the
beginning, (i) the turnover of PCE was to be doubled and (ii) its net loss over the past three years
was to be improved drastically, despite the Nordic recession.
The merger parties were  Partek’s  EE  and  LPE  with  their  metal  workshops  and  subsidiaries  in
Finland, Germany, and Canada (Figure 5.6-3). The product range varied from turnkey factories to
individual machines and equipment and spare parts. The staff included about 200 highly qualified
experts and three “in-house” metal workshops to manufacture the above products (at a past level of
about FIM 200 million in the late 1980s). The market involved the global concrete industry. The
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clients  were  the  industrial  producers  of  hollow  core  slabs,  structural  elements,  facades,  roofs,
railway sleepers, piles, etc. in more than 90 countries. Besides the external clients, there was a large
in-house market very close by inside Partek. In 1992, Partek had 37 of its own or associated plants
in 9 countries, i.e. Finland, Norway, Russia, Singapore, Malaysia, Belgium, the Netherlands,
France, and Germany. Those factories did not wish to have additional competitors with the world’s
top technology on “their” territory. Direct competitors – apart from alternative concrete
technologies such as cast-in-situ and reinforced concrete technologies – were usually small and
independent suppliers and engineering firms. The competitors were not delivering entire plants but
parts or individual production lines only. Maintenance, i.e. a continuous supply of spare parts, was
the most profitable business. It seemed that turnkey factory deliveries would be the most attractive
business in the future. This, however, required appropriate competences, e.g. PM skills, besides the
ordinary machine- and equipment-supplying skills.
Figure 5.6-3. PCE’s organization in the year 1992.
In 1992, Partek as a whole struggled to stay liquid. PCE’s cash flow and short-term profitability
were emphasized as the only primary goals. That was not a favorable situation to really develop the
firm. Instead, PCE’s management had to find new cash flows and profits quickly or else. This
situation can be described as the crisis phase of PCE. By the end of 1993, PCE’s profitability had
been restored to an acceptable level /4/. Most of the announced layoffs were canceled /5/ when the
well-priced Sertolovo mega-contract (Case 7) was signed for about DEM 75 million. It led to the
rapid and profitable tripling of the turnover. Besides, other fairly sizeable turnkey factory contracts
were secured in South Korea. The key staff did not leave the firm. On the contrary, PCE had taken
the first step successfully and got out of its crisis. In mid-1994, the business’ first objectives were
met  and  new ones  were  set  /6/  by  Partek:  (i)  to  achieve  a  high  cash  flow and  (ii)  to  postpone  all
investments. PCE’s net result of 10% was proportionally one of the best of Partek, with the turnover
doubling to about FIM 250 million in 1995. PCE was expected to continue to earn a good profit and
a strong cash flow, with no new acquisitions.
Board of Directors
- Chairman (MD of PC)
and members incl.  MD
of PCE
Managing Director
Financial Manager Marketing & Sales
Manager
Technical Manager
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5.6.3 RM measures during Case 6
As a result of the crisis upon the start-up in 1992, (1) the eventual resignations of key personnel
or the loss of their competencies was the immediate major risk. It was dealt with by open
communication and trust. Extensive layoffs (about 40% of the staff) seemed to be necessary /2/. (2)
The Sertolovo project that was being monitored might bring relief, but it was quite uncertain /2/.
The  project  itself  was  considered  as  a  very  risky  one  in  which  one  half  of  PCE’s  marketing  and
design capacity would be tied up with no certain positive result. The remaining half was directed (3)
to Asia. The rest of the Russian market was abandoned /3/. Additionally, (4) PC’s local subsidiaries
did not want PCE to sell its high technology to their competitors /2/. A strong and competent
Sertolovo project organization was established (see Case 7) and PCE’s organization was
streamlined accordingly. All the competencies required to attain these goals were in place. An
initial list of the major risks in December 1992 is shown in Table 5.6-1. An updated list of the
major risks is shown in Table 5.6-2. In 1995, (1) the Sertolovo project proceeded very well. (2)
PCE’s  internal  efficiency  improved.  Even  the  sizable  contribution  to  Partek  was  paid  for  /7/.  (4)
None of the planned growth options by means of acquisitions could proceed because some owners
of Partek were already planning to divest the entire precast concrete business, including PCE. All
major growth steps were abandoned efficiently.
5.6.4 Business-level versus project-level RM during Case 6
No RM plans were pre-prepared. After the merger of EE and LPE was decided at the business
level, PCE was soon at the post-merger level in the crisis phase as  a  result  of  the  drop  in  the
volume of business. The new PCE management handled this crisis in the ways at hand. The
uncertain development of the Sertolovo project was a positive but vague opportunity. General
uncertainty diminished and was turned into PCE’s realistic objectives at the end of 1992. The key to
meeting those objectives was PCE’s management team and Board, whose competencies were much
stronger  than  those  of  EE  and  LPE. The merger-level measures to manage the start-up crisis
included the creation of trust among the experts by open communication.
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Table 5.6-1. Major risk breakdown structure of PCE merger and restructuring in December 1992.
Causative events Source of major
risk
Identified major risks Project objectives
and/or consequences
Shrinking market Merger Key personnel leave (1)
Management: 1) open
communication and trust create
loyalty;
2) Sertolovo as "good future";
3) disconnect "personal
competitors";
4) for managers, an active bonus
policy.
Technology base deteriorates,
which may lead to a disaster.
Limited resources





Management: 1) to definitely win
the Sertolovo order;
2) to lay off too early rather than
too late;
3) open communication;
4) careful market analysis.
PCE result does not improve








Wrong market selection (3)
Management: 1) careful analysis
and determined selection of role
towards “solution supplier”;
2) open communication;
3) conflict of interest with Partek’s
factories is to be avoided.
Marketing will not be









PC's local management abort




2) to respect own factories’ interest
and save efforts;
3) to find "free" markets – in
Russia, most of Asia and USA.
De-motivation and waste of
scarce marketing resources.
Also  vital  was PCE’s new contractual role, i.e. a solution supplier rather than a hardware and
equipment supplier. PCE’s experts felt good about this role statement, which allowed the building
of the new organizational competencies to supply projects instead of machines and equipment that
had  to  be  competed  hard  for.  The  traditional  cash  cow,  the  prestressed  slab  technology,  was  also
further reinforced with the acquired Dutch slipform technology and the consequent joint R&D with
PCE’s experts, already decided at Partek’s level. After the successful restructuring, PCE was in a
new crisis, on the “way up”! PCE’s Board was not willing, or able, to manage that opportunity or to
gain a more independent role for PCE inside Partek.
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Table 5.6-2. Major risk breakdown structure of PCE merger and restructuring in the year 1994.








Management: 1) to manage the
project well;
2) to maintain the right structure of
the consortium;
3) to watch early signals
PCE result
Market demand "Solutions" culture
versus hardware
Internal efficiency (2)









Finding sizeable new orders (3)
Management: 1) careful analysis and
determined market selection;
2) open communication;
3) conflict of interest with Partek’s




PCE board's interest Growth (4) through acquisitions










PC's local companies abort sales




2) to respect PC factories’  interests
and save efforts;
3) Find "free" markets in Russia,
most of Asia, and USA
Motivation level
5.6.5 Managing major risks inherent in cross-cultural and contractual competencies in
Case 6
At the start-up, PCE’s management group was selected from the managers of EE and LPE. The
somewhat similar company cultures were sufficiently merged. The emerging crisis was managed by
open and honest communication and trust. What was most important for the survival was the
securing of the Sertolovo contract on the basis of the competencies in precast concrete technology
on one hand and the competencies regarding cross-cultural (i.e. across the Finnish, German, and
Russian cultures) and contractual issues on the other. Without those competencies, already acquired
at Partek’s level, it would not have been possible to efficiently manage Sertolovo’s emerging major
risks (see Case 7) at the project level any more. As a supportive argument, on a minor scale, PCE’s
further sizable contracts e.g. in Asia displayed a similar combination of competencies regarding
both cross-cultural and contractual issues, in addition to general management issues and product
issues.
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In the managerial competency assessment, the key management organization of PCE, in the form
it was in at the end of 1992, received a total competency score of 4.26 (463) (the maximum was
4.26 (463) in Case 6) regarding cross-cultural issues and a score of 3.69 (302) (the maximum was
4.02 (390) in Case 7) regarding contractual issues. These scores were relevant to the task ahead, i.e.
to manage the merger and start-up crisis of PCE under the conditions of an uncertain economy in
general and the mega-project opportunity in the struggling “new” Russia in particular. It is notable
that the additional cross-cultural and contractual competencies were acquired by relying on the
in-house experts from Partek.
5.6.6 Conclusions on Case 6
The overall success rate of  the  outcomes  of  the  RM  of  the  merger  and  restructuring  of  the
engineering and technology businesses into PCE between the years 1992 and 1995 is assessed to be
high.  All  the  formal  main  objectives  were  met.  These  objectives  were  to  restore  profitability,  to
intensify marketing, to reinforce the technology base, and to clarify the objective “not to sell
technology to the competitors of Partek’s own precast concrete plants”. Additionally, the new
objectives, i.e. to achieve a high cash flow and to postpone all investments, were met as well. No
additional opportunities, however, were grasped and exploited.
Case 6 conforms well in part to Hypothesis 1. At Partek’s or the business level, there was not
sufficient time for the well-prepared RM of the merger project as part of the bigger struggle for
survival. At the merger project level, the outcome of the risk and even that of the crisis was
positive by the end. The creation of trust and confidence among the managers and the experts was a
vital crisis management tool. PCE’s management, supported by the Board, was competent in
managing the crisis, the cross-cultural merger, and the complex turnkey projects, as well as the
basic concrete technology business issues. A failure in any of those areas could have led to a
disaster for PCE. The uncertainty about PCE’s future was converted to a risk by retaining a large
group of experts and betting heavily on one single project. The RM in the merger and restructuring
project was applied at this level only, i.e. the objectives were set, the major risks were identified,
and they were also responded to.
Case 6 conforms well to Hypothesis 2a, i.e. the “all-on-one-card” policy in the Sertolovo project
required wide competencies regarding cross-cultural and contractual issues to improve the odds of
winning the project. Case 6 conforms well to Hypothesis 2b,  too,  i.e.  the  selection  of  the
contractual role, in turn, was crucial for PCE in general and for the RM of the Sertolovo project in
particular.
The three ex post observations are as follows:
Ex post observation 1. The start-up phase could have gone wrong as well. The
appropriate competencies had already been secured at Partek’s level. In turn, these
competencies made it possible to manage the prevailing crisis and, consequently, to win
the Sertolovo project. If this project had been lost, this would probably have led to the
closing of PCE. In addition, Haka’s bankruptcy caused a crisis for the Sertolovo project as
a whole. This could have led to the cancellation of the contract with Suba (and GWU) as
well if another Finnish contractor had not been quickly assigned. The other external risk,
political turmoil, could have occurred in Russia, too. That might have aborted the
Sertolovo project and PCE’s fate would again have been quite uncertain.
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Ex post observation 2: For reasons beyond PCE’s own control,  it  could not exploit  the
opportunity for further rapid growth in its business during the period of this analysis. The
decision of Partek’s owners to divest the entire construction-related business might have
been the main reason for their passive attitude, i.e. PCE was allowed to continue only with
modest, well-managed growth. In 1997, the benefits of this development were harvested
by external parties.
Ex-post observation 3: It can be noted that the new owners of Partek’s precast concrete
business, from 1997 onwards, allowed PCE to grow by acquisitions as well. In 2005,
institutional venture capital firms acquired the double-sized PCE and changed its name to
Elematic.
The key confidential documents on Case 6 (in Finnish, if not stated otherwise):
/C6-1/ Palojärvi, L., PCE strategy. 25 September 1992.Contains the business goals and key
measures to attain them. Competences, to handle very large and complex projects, emphasized.
/C6-2/ Minutes of PCE Board meeting. 9 December 1992. Monitors the strategy implementation.
Reduction on employees discussed.
/C6-3/ Minutes of PCE Board meeting. 12 January 1993. Identifies the tender opportunity
“Sertolovo” and sets a high profit target on it. Staff incentives discussed.
/C6-4/ Minutes of PCE Board meeting. 13 December 1993.Notes the Sertolovo –position, profit
goal and some identified major risks. Staff incentives confirmed.
/C6-5/ PCE Management’s “Letter of Response” to PCE employees. 12 March 1993.Reflects the
positive implications of an eventual Sertolovo-order.
/C6-6/ PCE strategy, as presented in Brussels. 16 June 1994. (in English). Foresight, business goals,
key measures and risks (in form of threats and opportunities) discussed for 1995-1997.
/C6-7/ Minutes of PCE Board meeting. 20 December 1994. Strategic issues discussed, including the
risk of Sertolovo general time schedule. Contribution to parent Partek decided. Incentives to
employees discussed.
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5.7 Sertolovo project of Partek Concrete Engineering between the years 1990 and 1997
(Case 7)
Map 5.7. Map of focal areas in Case 7.
5.7.1 Introduction to Case 7 (Figure 5.7-1)
Case 7 encompasses the RM of the huge Sertolovo project delivery of Partek Concrete
Engineering (PCE) between 1990 and 1997. The purpose is to analyze retrospectively this project
that PCE as the concrete technology supplier carried out under post-Soviet conditions in Sertolovo,
near St. Petersburg in Russia. This insider action researcher worked as Executive Vice-President
of Partek Concrete (PC) when he was assigned to monitor the identified Sertolovo project in late
1990. Later, he acted as Managing Director of PCE (1992-1995).
5.7.2 Brief and PCE’s objectives in Case 7 (Figure 5.7-2)
The  two  competing  clients  were  Wayss  &  Freytag  (of  Germany)  and  the  GWU  Consortium  of
German small and medium-sized contractors led by Suba. Besides PCE, its co-suppliers involved
Haka (of Finland) for the building works and Hebel (of Germany) for the gas concrete plant. After
Haka’s bankruptcy, YIT (of Finland) assumed the remaining tasks of the builder. PCE’s business
objectives for the Sertolovo project were set at the turn of 1992/1993 as follows (Table 5.7-1).
· The early (strategic) objective was to raise PCE to the position of No.1 precast concrete
technology supplier in Europe.
· To  avoid  the  emerging  crisis  of  the  entire  company  PCE  (see  Case.6),  to  make  a
considerable profit on the large single Sertolovo project. Its size was DEM 75 million or 2
x PCE’s turnover, while the domestic market was in recession in Finland.
· Concurrently, the aim was neither to commit all PCE’s resources to the Sertolovo mega-
project, nor to abandon PCE’s other activities.
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Figure 5.7-1. Stakeholders in the Russian Military Village Program and its Sertolovo project in
                            the years 1990-1997 (the original version in Finnish, translated into English).
Figure 5.7-2. General timeline schedule of PCE Sertolovo Project in St. Petersburg, Russia,
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Table 5.7-1. Brief of PCE Sertolovo Project during the tendering phase in the years 1992-1994.
Client Two competing clients: (1) Wayss & Freytag (Germany) and (2) GWU
Consortium of German SME contractors led by Suba GmbH
Key co-suppliers Haka Oy (Finland) for the building works (after their bankruptcy, YIT) and
Hebel (Germany) for the gas concrete plant
Ultimate owner Russian Army/Ministry of Defense
German financier Kreditanstalt für Wiederbau (KfW), Germany
Project location Sertolovo. It is located about 12 km from St. Petersburg, Russia
Strategic
background
For the newly (in June 1992) established PCE, this was by far the fastest




To deliver a fully working, big plant to produce precast concrete products
as a turnkey project. Only the building works were excluded.
Tender object as a
whole (from
client’s view)
To design, manufacture, purchase, erect, and commission a “combinate” of
precast concrete and dry mix concrete plants including the necessary
reinforcement steel and insulation sheet factories. PCE worked in close co-
operation with the builder, the other main direct contract party with the
client. The process contract price was about DEM 75 million. The builder’s




PCE started to monitor a possible project in 1990, when Germany and
Russia agreed upon the implementation of the 8-billion DEM Military
Village Program, including the Sertolovo project, during 1991-1994. PCE
submitted its tender in 1993. The site works commenced in June 1994. The
plant was commissioned for use at the turn of 1996/1997.
5.7.3 Conversion of uncertainty to risks, RM, and crisis management during Case 7
In 1990, the Partek Corporation (Partek) monitored the project and perceived its high level of
uncertainty, i.e. ‘What on earth will happen in post-Soviet Russia’? /1/, /2/. By December 1991, the
first construction projects of the program had been awarded to Finnish contractors but political
pressure in Germany forced the remaining projects to be awarded to German firms. This resulted in
a pre-agreement between Partek and Wayss & Freitag. In early 1992, the 200-million DEM turnkey
tender was obtained. In June 1992, the engineering units of Partek and Lohja were merged into
PCE as a result of the deep recession in Finland. (1) The selection of the right German firm
involved the first major risk. PCE suddenly had one pre-agreement with Wayss & Freitag and a
second one through LPE with the German-led GWU Consortium (including the ailing Haka as their
building partner) /3/. PCE decided to honor both pre-agreements. It declared its intention of
submitting two commercially neutral tenders, one for each client. This contractual arrangement was
accepted  by  the  two  German  client  candidates.  Half  of  PCE’s  design  capacity  was  assigned  to
preparing this single huge tendering task. In May 1993, PCE submitted the two tenders. The
identified risks in the tender phase /4/ were as follows (Table 5.7-2):
(1) losing the tender competition primarily as a result of the wrong German partner;
(2-3)  winning the tender and the consequent abortion of the project;
(4) PCE’s own performance as a result of the exceptional scope and size of the project;
(5) the scope of the project as a result of the turnkey contract form, and
(6) currency depreciation in which the ailing Finnish Mark, the strong German Mark, and the
highly unstable Russian Rouble were involved /6/.
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Table 5.7-2. Major risk breakdown structure in the tendering phase of the PCE Sertolovo Project
                       in May 1993.










=> (1) Losing the
tender
PCE’s profit does not
improve. This implies
layoffs.
1 To find a potential
German partner
2 To eliminate the
competitor
3 To serve two or more
competing German clients





=> (2a) Project is
aborted
Fighting over claims 1 Claims management
2 Big advance payment




=> (2b) Project is
delayed
Overheads increase 1 Claims management

























Huge losses 1 To reinforce
management
2 To combine own
resources and LPE’s
3 To stick to technology











1 To prepare the detailed
tender






=> (6) Currency, FIM
is depreciated
Lower profit for PCE 1 To terminate the
contract currency, i.e. to
fix the DEM/FIM rate
The lower bidder was Suba with Haka and PCE, with a tender price of DEM 252 million /5/. In
December 2003, the owner signed the main contract with Suba. The implementation was able to
begin and PCE’s Sertolovo project was organized (Figure 5.7-3). PCE kept the Russian owner’s
representatives at close range to gain their support, if needed, vis-à-vis the German Suba.
The identified risks in the implementation phase are compiled in Table 5.7-3. (1a) The ignorance
of  Russian  politics  was  still  identified  as  the  main  source  of  risk.  In  a  worst  case  scenario,  the
abortion of the project was possible but not very probable. In addition, (1b) many limited delays
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were considered probable, resulting in the likelihood of claims being submitted. Intelligence on the
future of politics in St. Petersburg was maintained and the taking of any political side was avoided.
(2) Suba itself had no prior experience in Russia or the Soviet Union. PCE’s management identified
this set-up as the major performance risk, e.g. /6/, /8/. In the autumn of 1993, Haka was heading
towards insolvency and it could not sign the contract with Suba for the building works. In March
1994,  Haka  went  formally  bankrupt.  The  main  contractor,  Suba,  was  now  without  a  building
partner. The entire project was in a crisis until PCE’s management diplomatically suggested two
other Finnish options. Soon Suba assigned YIT and the site works were finally able to start in June
1994.  (3)  The  construction  works  were  delayed  by  conflicts  between  Suba  and  YIT  which
postponed the master schedule. The key managers of Suba and those of YIT had visible cross-
cultural clashes when trying to cope with the consequences /10/. However, PCE was able to proceed
without particular problems, except design delays. (4) The final scope of the process technology and
the plant was the only remaining big risk that PCE’s management had to manage. Many quality
deviations occurred, PCE invoiced, and Suba paid for them. (5) The termination of the currency risk
/7/ resulted in extra profit, because the DEM in fact gained against the FIM during the project. The
imperative of not speculating in currencies was strictly adhered to during the project stages.
5.7.4 Business-level versus project-level RM during Case 7
At the business level, PC started the monitoring and made a pre-agreement with Wayss & Freitag.
Thus, PC took a major risk on the likely winner at the business level. At the project level, the
complexity of the Sertolovo project became obvious at  the same time. Fortified with the required
new competencies, PCE bet to “succeed or perish” on Sertolovo.
5.7.5 Managing major risks inherent in cross-cultural and contractual competencies in
Case 7
During the tender phase, PC’s management understood well that the Sertolovo project – which
was  deemed  to  be  the  only  way  to  avoid  the  emerging  crisis  of  PCE  –  required  far  more
competencies than Elematic Engineering (see Case 6) had in terms of the business, the technology,
and the conditions between and inside Germany and Russia (Figure 5.7-1). Those competencies
were partly secured with the takeover of the rival LPE’s business and experts (e.g. the German
culture), partly by internal assignments within Partek (e.g. the Russian culture, contractual issues).
PCE realized early on that only the German main contractor could be the winner and this resulted
inevitably in a complex consortium structure. Nevertheless, it was mandatory to keep many
options open as long as possible and (3) not to take a risk by selecting the wrong partner
(pushed forward by the Germans or Russian stakeholders or both) too early. Naturally, this line of
thinking required a lot of intelligence and cross-cultural knowledge. It is known from situations
where technology and/or process are the prime object, rather than building works. The contractual
role as the subcontractor, resulting in the decision to submit the two bids, to stick to the technology
only, to make direct, fair and viable contract with the German main contractor, and to prepare
extremely carefully for the technical specification and claim preparation, all in German, turned out
to be  viable.
During the implementation, the main risk was the structure of the Suba Consortium /9/. The
handling of the multi-cross-cultural issues, e.g. obtaining reliable intelligence on Haka’s severe
trouble, as well as negotiating and maneuvering between the Germans and Russians, different and
conflicting demands etc. required high competencies on the part of the key managers. In part these
competencies had to be built for the project (Figure 5.7-3), in part they were already secured when
PCE was established.
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Table 5.7-3. Major risk breakdown structure during the implementation phase of PCE Sertolovo
                        Project during the years 1993-1997.
Causative
events










(1a) Project  aborted
Fighting over claims 1 Claims management
2 Big advance payment





Overheads increase 1 Claims management











1 To manage claims well
2 Big advance payment
3 To use  PCE’s expertise
for monitoring and
interference
4 To make a contingency
plan for building works
=> (2b) Project
delayed
Overheads increase 1 To manage claims well
2 Big advance payment
3 To use PCE’s expertise
for monitoring and
interference
4 To make a contingency





=> (3) Performance is
poor and delayed
Project is delayed. 1 To make a direct con-
tract with the client
2 To manage claims well





=> (4) Process scope is





1 To prepare the detailed
tender
2 To pre-visit the client
and owner
3 To make a direct con-




=> (5) DEM  is
depreciated against
FIM
Lower profit for PCE 1 To terminate the part of
the contract sum which
was not in DEM





=> (6) Suba had no
contingency plan
[=> PCE only gave its
helpful advice to Suba]
Project delay/abortion
and a huge loss in the
building works if no
competent builder is
available for Suba
1 To make two separate
contracts for the process
and the building works
2 To monitor Haka’s status
3 To contact other Finnish
contractors for rescue plan
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Figure 5.7-3. Organizational chart of PCE Sertolovo Project in January 1994, translated from
                              German to English. (Experts were added to the authentic chart in 2009.)
By the end of 1994, the remaining list of the major implementation risks had been considerably
shortened (Table 5.7-3) /9/. Then Haka, the builder, went bankrupt and caused a crisis because
Suba had no contingency plan. Suba’s proposals to PCE to assume responsibility for the building
works were determinedly turned down because of its lack of the required competencies. The correct
contractual  role  of  PCE  –  separate  from  the  builder  –  was  crucial  to  success.  It  allowed  PCE  –
knowing the Finnish contractors well – also to diplomatically suggest some alternative firms to
Suba. YIT eagerly took Haka’s share and the crisis was over. The second main risk was the scope
of the process in the turnkey project. Many changes and improvements were requested by the
Russian side, which did not have to worry about financing. PCE’s cross-cultural and contractual
competencies were necessary to manage this issue with very detailed tender specifications, the
spending of ample negotiating time, even at the highest level, and its own process design resources.
The researcher considers that the consortium structure and other contractual arrangements were
correctly built because all PCE´ s invoices, including large additional claim invoices, were fully
paid for, although some claims only after app. two years of negotiations for settlement.
In the managerial competency assessment, the key management organization of the Sertolovo
project, in the form it was in at the end of 1993, received an average competency score of 3.94  (see
the Tables 6-5a, b, p. 145) regarding cross-cultural issues and a score of 4.02 regarding contractual
issues. These scores were relevant to the task ahead, i.e. to execute a multi-cross-cultural mega-
project  as  a  turnkey  contract  in  the  conditions  of  the  struggling  “new”  Russia  in  particular.  It  is
notable that the additional cross-cultural and contractual expert competencies were acquired by
relying on in-house experts from Partek, who strengthened the respective competencies. Secondly,
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the relatively high score on the contractual issues probably compensates for the lower score on the
cross-cultural issues.
5.7.6 Conclusions on Case 7
The overall success rate of the outcomes of the RM of PCE Sertolovo Project between the years
1990 and 1997 is assessed to be very high. The main objectives were all met. These objectives
were  to  raise  PCE to  the  position  of  the  No.1  precast  concrete  technology supplier  in  Europe,  to
avoid the emerging crisis, to make a considerable profit on the large single Sertolovo project, and,
yet, not to abandon PCE’s other activities. Additionally, the two additional crises of the project
were both managed with PCE coming out of them stronger than it was before them.
The overall success rate of  the  outcomes  of  the  RM  of  the  PCE  Sertolovo  Project  between  the
years 1990 and 1997 is assessed to be very high. In 1997, the end result of the Sertolovo project
was  good,  after  all  the  payments  were  settled  and  received.  This  allowed PCE to  continue  as  the
No.1 concrete technology supplier in Europe, with a seasoned staff for the future needs of the
industry.
Case 7 conforms well to Hypothesis 1. After it became relatively certain that the project would be
implemented, PCE applied the RM approach well both at the business level (the tendering phase)
and the project level (the implementation phase), i.e. the business objectives were set, the major
risks were identified, and a response was launched. The expertise on Russian culture of Partek’s
internal expert staff helped out. The Sertolovo project was the only way to attain the objective of
increasing PCE’s profits substantially (/11 p. 5/ and Case 6) and fast enough to avoid the emerging
crisis within PCE. If this growth objective of PCE had not been met, this failure would have caused
the laying-off of at least half of its 600 employees. A crisis would certainly have followed. This also
explains the keen involvement of PCE’s entire management team. The risk of betting on the right
winner was taken at the business level, i.e. the issue of “two potential clients” was determinedly
managed so that PCE would at any price be in the winning team. The business-level decision to
focus  solely  on  the  Sertolovo  project  was  highly  risky.  It  was  correct  in  the  given  circumstances.
Besides,  the early identification of the other risks,  i.e.  the currency or the abortion or delay of the
project, contributed to the efficient project-level management of their eventual consequences. None
of these risks could have been dealt with any more during the tendering or implementation phases –
the only option left was to deal with the consequences.
Case 7 conforms well to Hypothesis 2a, i.e. the key managers’ competencies to manage the cross-
cultural issues. The uncertainty and complexity of the project were both reduced. Dealing with
many of the most severe risks called for the solid cross-cultural or contractual competences, or both,
of the key managers. Those competencies had to be secured well at the business level – PCE’s
management did not wait until the implementation phase. The potential crisis – an angry German
loser threatening the result of the tender – did not materialize. Case 7 also conforms well to
Hypothesis 2b, i.e. the key managers’ competencies to manage the contractual issues may cause
severe risks if these competencies are not at the required level. It is often believed that a turnkey
structure is complex and it adds risk. In Case 7, the major risk regarding the builder’s performance
was dealt with contractually at the project level – PCE assumed no responsibility whatsoever. The
risk on the scope was managed at the project level as well. PCE’s management team showed
excellent performance in defining the technical performance of the plant and PCE had no reason to
compromise with the process quality. This attitude paid off well.
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The two ex post observations are as follows:
Ex post observation 1: The additional causes of the very successful outcome could not be
found. Even the distant possibility of secret cooperation between Russian military officers
in St. Petersburg and leading European precast concrete firms can be excluded because far
too many human beings had to be involved to pull that plot through – a leakage of
information would have been noticed and made public either in Germany or Finland, or in
both of them. Instead, the cooperation of the Russian stakeholders and the Finnish
construction firms was known and carefully monitored by Partek through the entire
program.
Ex post observation 2: PCE’s key management (and Board) turned out to be competent to
handle the risky tasks ahead beyond the year 1997.
The key confidential documents on Case 7 (in Finnish, if not stated otherwise):
/C7-1/ Taivalkoski, R., Partek’s letter to Sokolov. Meeting of Directors. 2 April 4 1991 (in Russian
also). Early “marketing of Partek Corp.” to perceived Russian key characters.)
/C7-2/  Auvinen,  E.,  PM  to  Partek’s  CEO  on  the  key  organizations  and  persons  of  the  Military
Village Program. 20 May 1991. Early “marketing of Partek Corp.” to perceived Russian key
characters.)
/C7-3/ Palojärvi, L., PM on the tender situation. PCE’s Board of Management. 30 December 1992.
Outlines the Sertolovo tender position, with two potential customer candidates, should either of the
win their bid..
/C7-4/ Palojärvi, L., PM on the Sertolovo tender and risks. PCE’s Board of Management. 8 April
1993. Self-explanatory.
/C7-5/ Palojärvi, L., PM on the opened bids for PCE’s Board of Management and Partek’s CEO. 15
May 1993. (Extremely confidential). Contains the tender results, and “game strategy” of PCE to
secure the contract.
/C7-6/ Åström, A-C., Decision proposal to Partek’s Board. 1 June 1993. (in Swedish) Self-
explanatory. Gives the permission to obtain the required guarantees and bonds.
/C7-7/ Virtanen, E., PM on the currency risk. 21 April 1993. Self-explanatory.
/C7-8/ Generalkonsulat von Finnland, Berlin, Pressemitteilung. 6 July 1993. (in German). Press-
information to confirm the likely winner of the main contract.
/C7-9/ Palojärvi, L., PM on the Sertolovo - position, invoicing, and risks. 24 October 1994. Outlines
PCE ´s  entire RM process for Sertolovo, at the beginning of the physical implementation on site.
/C7-10/ Palojärvi, L., PM on the cross-cultural conflicts between Suba and YIT. 1 December 1994.
Explains an important detail of managing the cross-cultural risk in the project, having  the main
consequences on the GWU-YIT axis.
/C7-11/ Partek’s corporate budget 1995. 9 December 1994. (in Swedish). Confirms the good result
expectation , which was achieved, of PCE for 1995.
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5.8 Wood product-based growth business of Finnforest in the international
building markets during the years 2002-2006 (Case 8)
Map 5.8. Map of focal areas in Case 8.
5.8.1 Introduction to Case 8 (Figure 5.8-1)
Case 8 encompasses the RM of the wood product-based growth business of Finnforest (FF) in
the international building markets between 2002 and 2006. FF was a subsidiary of Metsäliitto.
The purpose is to analyze retrospectively the business-level RM of the implementation of FF’s
adding value to wood products strategy project in Western European conditions and to introduce the
frame for Case 9 and its longitudinal project-level analysis. This insider action researcher worked
as Senior Vice-President of Building & Construction in charge of FF’s statement projects between
2000 and 2006 (Phase 1). The key parts of FF’s organization for the implementation of the strategy
that was contemplated were the Engineered Wood (EW) Division (2000-2004) and thereafter the
new Strategic Business Area of Building & Construction (2004-2006).
5.8.2 Background and brief of Case 8 (Figure 5.8-2)
In the 1990s, the national campaign to promote “building with wood” inside and outside
Finland did not change the industry’s culture (big bulk product suppliers), despite a large number
of programmes and pilots /1/. The firms did not invest. Only small government-funded programs
were carried out. The share of wood even decreased in the structures, the main campaign area, but it
increased in the façades /2/, /7/. The campaign focused on the production technology (“upstream”)
rather than the market (“downstream”) /3 p. 41/, because most goods were delivered to clients via
independent distributors. The most vital driver – client needs – was thus missing from the industry’s
business process. The pilot status of the campaign projects allowed for the exclusion of other
competing materials. The solutions with wood did not have to compete against any solutions using
other materials /4/. Nevertheless, the need to add value to the process was already envisioned /5/.
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Figure 5.8-1. Finnforest’s value-adding strategy in building with wood /14/.
Figure 5.8-2. General timeline plan for the implementation of Finnforest’s added value strategy
                             between the years 2000 and 2006.
By 2000, Metsäliitto (ML) had incorporated FF to  improve  the  performance  of  its  mechanical
wood business,  which was the core for the owners.  All  of them were forest  owners who received
Description 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
         (Finnforest incorporated)
I phase: EW to spearhead
         EW start-up 1-12/2000
         Business objectives est'd
         Production capacity investments
         Statement projects, Stadium, Silva
         Power supplies to residential areas
         Power supplies to residential, Ylästö
         FMO (CD 9/2005) Office building
II phase: Entering the Residental housing business
         Moelven acquired
         (Friisilä pilot)
         Factory investment & business obj's
         Hartola modular factory start-up
         First projects searched and tendered for Hartola
         New SBA Building & Construction
                    , strategy preparations
                    , assuming developer's role
         Closing the housing business
Punkaharju              Lohja           Punkaharju
Savonl Sali 6/02           Churches,airport halls,
Friisilä





(      2005
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most of their income by selling logs, which is the only raw material from wood products used for
construction. Further, FF, with UPM and StoraEnso, had incorporated Woodfocus (WF) for the
joint development work.
In 2001, WF noted that wood products should be “competitive” for construction /6/. This
called for moves “downstream” as the main strategy when supplying the construction industry with
building parts. The campaign produced good results in low-storey residential housing /7/. FF’s
position was suddenly strengthened by the acquisition of Moelven (of Norway), the leading
prefabricated housing module supplier in Scandinavia. FF was now aiming at by far the most
important market for wooden building parts, i.e. low-storey housing. The key question was whether
Moelven’s technology could be used in Finland and other markets, e.g. the UK and Russia.
In Phase 1, FF’s corporate strategy called for a “change of paradigm” in the area of “moving from
a raw material supplier’s role towards “integrated system solutions” /8/. This meant building parts,
i.e. products with added services /9/. Some competitors, e.g. the precast concrete firms, had already
made the respective change in the 1980s. FF’s strategic growth task was vested in EW. It was the
only division with any experience of “project deliveries”, i.e. services added onto products for the
construction of buildings. EW focused on the development of services /9/. From 2000 onwards,
many visible projects were implemented without any major problems. No significant investments in
new competences were made. Thus, the business, although quite profitable, grew slowly because of
the scarcity of development funds. Nevertheless, FF’s brand strengthened well because of the
statement projects.
In Phase 2, encouraged by the Finnish pilots, the success of Moelven and the market forecast, FF
decided in the spring of 2003 to enter the prefab business in Finland and invest in high value-added
spatial modules (similar to those of Moelven). The planned annual plant capacity was relatively big,
i.e. modules for 100,000 sq m of buildings in comparison with their competitors. However, this
capacity corresponded to only 3% of all the new housing and 6% of the low-storey housing in
Finland. Unfortunately, the key business managers had experience in the consumer business only
and all the first projects of the new unit were financially disastrous. In the autumn of 2004,  a
radical formal change in FF’s organization took place and Building Systems (BS) of EW was
replaced with Building and Construction (B&C) as  the  Strategic  Business  Area  (SBA)  was
launched as the permanent business unit instead of ad hoc projects. Its business idea was to supply
the  residential  and  non-residential  market  segments  directly  /11/.  The  CEO  of  FF  decided  to
manage the new business by himself, in addition to his main duty. A Management Board for B&C
was  established.  The  first  task  of  this  Board  was  to  prepare  an  SBA  strategy.  However,  the
weakening position of the CEO prevented FF from taking any steps towards real growth in this
business. The objectives of the new strategy were not established. In the autumn of 2005, the CEO
of FF left the firm.
5.8.3 Finnforest’s objectives of profitable international growth business in Case 8
In Phase 1, the business objective was to grow rapidly. The turnover of EUR 20 million was to be
increased to the level of EUR 50 million within one year with a decent ROC. FF vested the task in
EW /9/  and  its  BS.  The  main  markets  were  the  UK and Germany. In Phase 2, (i) the low-storey
housing business looked attractive for wood. (ii) FF acquired the large Scandinavian leader
Moelven and (iii) FF successfully executed residential pilot projects (Friisilä, Ylästö) and non-
residential ones (e.g. the Savonlinna Hall and the Finnforest Modular Office (FMO) in Tapiola). FF
set a new business objective for residential housing and invested in low-storey housing modules in
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2003. The objective was to “grow fast”, i.e. to reach a sales volume of modules for housing with a
floor area of 50,000 sq m during the three years /15/. The main risks identified were the market
potential, the competitors, urban planning, the start-up from scratch, and the demand around St.
Petersburg /15/.
5.8.4 RM measures during Case 8
The new business role as a building parts supplier was considered to be rather complex /14/. The
attitude of FF’s management reflected the prevailing uncertainty of the benefits of the new business
that aimed to add value to the old bulk products. Therefore, only small, extremely careful
investments were made in the new competencies regarding project management, marketing, and the
sales forces. The new modest resources included some client support staff and software /9/. The
threats to FF’s competitiveness were stated by EW to be the limited knowledge of services,
project skills, the limited contacts with contractors, a lack of competent people, conflicts of interest
inside FF, and an insufficient service attitude /10/. The delivery projects were managed by
outsourcing some of the services to secure the necessary competencies required by the professional
customers, e.g. the contractors.
In Phase 1, these threats were taken as the identified sources of the major risks inherent in the
implementation of the new strategy. The perceived consequences included e.g. slow growth and no
responses at FF’s level (Table 5.8-1). Only limited staff recruitment was allowed (2).  Instead,
external consultants were assigned to the expert tasks. Ad hoc task forces were established for each
of the more demanding projects. Thus, “the keys to change project success”/12/ were not there.
Table 5.8-1. Major risk management of Finnforest during Phase 1.
Causative events Sources of  risks Identified main risks and management Business obj's/con's
Limited past
experience









Lack of project skills Project performance or
(2) costly recruitments




















(4) Poor management culture
(5) Ind'l motivation & perf.
Mgt: No real response on B/L;
(on P/L to be absolutely avoided) till
2005
Contractual defaults;
Crisis and end of
business
Corporate culture Lack of service
attitude
Project performance




Corporate culture Conflict in FF Poor general management culture
(6) Scarce development resources
Mgt: Continuous reorganizing
Slow growth
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FF’s role as a material and product supplier continued, except for a few projects. This attitude
jeopardized the business-level objective, rapid growth, but the attitude did not cause much risk at
the project level.  It  was not possible to manage the risk of FF’s poor general  management culture
(4) at the lower level (EW); no formal notes were available. All this weakened individual
motivation and the performance (5).  No direct  risk was taken on (6) R&D either.  In order to save
cash, the R&D was outsourced to Woodfocus, understandably with no major results.
In Phase 2, FF decided in 2003 to invest in its first modular element factory for the housing
business, due for start-up in 2004. The factory building was leased from the local municipality. The
initial investment and the need for cash were that much lower while, in turn, many risks, including
those inherent in the complex contractual role selection /14/ and the start-up, were either ignored or
not identified (Table 5.8-2). The market (1) and the low-storey urban planning schemes (3)
developed better than the “traditional” experts expected. Nevertheless, a lack of the competency
needed to handle business-to-business contracts led to bad big deals and finally to a crisis in the
business (7, 8).
At last, the efforts of FF’s management to extend FF’s role to that of a residential developer were
stopped by FF’s Board (7). It stopped this business entirely less than one year after its start-up.
The primary sources of the fatal risks were as follows. (i) A lack of industrially cross-cultural
competency on the urban housing business with its industrial-scale builders and developers, i.e.
steps sufficient to fit FF contractually for that market were not taken. Instead, the modular business
management had experience of individual house buyers only (7). The first orders of the large
developers turned out to be financial losses (8). (ii) The inability to exploit Moelven’s thorough
experience in that field because of FF’s lack of competency in building a cross-cultural bridge with
Moelven (5, 7) and FF’s ignorance of the importance of this competency in the culturally different
urban residential housing business. Further problems emerged when no large distributor took on FF
modules for their individual – not professional – customers. Business line management,
understandably feeling quite insecure in trying to serve big professional urban residential house
builders, decided to supply individual customers in the role of a developer. Risks that were
arising with regard to competences, contractual roles, financing etc., risks which the FF line
management intended to take. The desperate effort to serve individual customers on a turnkey basis
and or as a developer contributed finally to the consequent resignation of the CEO of FF and the
abortion of the entire FF modular business.
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Table 5.8-2. Major risk management of Finnforest during Phase 2.
Causative events Sources of identified
main risks





share of low storey
housing
(1) Market potential in Finland
Mgt: 1) Limited investment
2) Monitoring demand
3) Alternative market segments
Demand level
Industry culture Lack of knowledge on
end-customers










(3) Development of urban
planning of low-storey housing












(4) Market potential and
partnerships in ST P'burg






Lack of knowledge about
urban low-storey housing












(7) Assuming business role
correctly
If wrong then no deals or
big losses
Ditto Ditto (8) Managing the start-up and
first projects
Slow start >> bad forced
deals >> huge losses >
crisis
5.8.5 Business-level versus project-level RM during Case 8
In Phase 1, the sources of the major risks were identified well and avoided by EW at the business
level. EW’s profitability was guarded very effectively, within FF’s culture as bulk product
suppliers, and the strategic growth objective was sacrificed, partly because of the risk-taking
attitude at the business level, partly because FF’s top management was not able to mobilize the
necessary funding for the targeted growth pace. The RM strategy of EW was thus risk avoidance
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and no permanent organization with new competencies was established. At the project level, the
most demanding projects had varying results because of the extremely limited number of
competent project managers. They dealt with the emerging risks, which were mainly inherent in the
design, erection, and contractual issues, in the ways they were used to. However, the very few loss
projects did not change the overall profitability.
In  Phase  2, the contractual business roles of FF were determined at  the  business  level with the
support of FF’s top management. Officially, the targeted clients were professional house builders
and their large projects. However, the competencies of the key business managers were limited only
to the household market. The experts had readily identified the major competency-related risks, but
the respective managers ignored them and the consequences of the missing competencies could no
longer be sufficiently managed at the project level. This development resulted in big losses.
Ultimately, the Board of FF had to intervene and to stop the non-viable business.
5.8.6 Managing major risks inherent in cross-cultural and contractual competencies in
Case 8
In  Phase  1, the major risk that occurred, slow business-level growth, was inherent in the risk-
avoiding corporate culture, geared to bulk production as its prime source. This culture abandoned
any business-level investments in cross-culturally and contractually competent staff to enable the
planned faster growth to happen. The reaching of the critical volumes in the business of value-
added building with wood was necessary to fulfill the strategic business objective financially, i.e.
the leading brand of FF. The limited number of competent managers forced FF to stick to projects
with a low business volume in order to avoid the project-level risks. In this way, the complex
contractual roles could be handled by the competent managers. In  Phase  2, the business-level
management was not competent to recognize the major risks inherent in the new contractual role.
Nno solutions were planned for the foreseeable problems, possibly with Moelven’s expertise. The
emerging risks and their mounting (negative) consequences could no longer be viably managed at
the project level.
In the managerial competency assessment, the assessed levels of the combined managerial
competencies and the actual project organization in the spring of 2004 received an average
competency score of 3.42 (see Tables 6-5a, b, p. 145) regarding cross-cultural issues and a score of
3.36 regarding contractual issues. These scores were relevant to the task ahead, i.e. to implement the
multi-cross-cultural, complex growth strategy for at least some of the Western European markets. It
is notable that some additional cross-cultural and contractual expert competencies were acquired for
Phase 1 (too little for the rapid growth) and almost none for Phase 2. A few experts on project and
construction management could not sufficiently strengthen FF’s respective competencies.
5.8.7 Conclusions on Case 8
The overall success rate of the outcomes of the RM of the wood product-based international
growth business of FF between the years 2002 and 2006 is assessed to be low.
Case 8 conforms fairly well to Hypothesis 1. In Phase 1, the major risks were identified at the
business level. For ML as a whole, major investments and high levels of risk-taking were not
possible because of the net corporate losses. Thus, the risks were avoided, but this prevented FF
from achieving business growth. However, the success rate at the project level was medium or even
high. EW’s profit was spent to cover FF’s other losses. The visible and successful statement
projects could not mobilize the fast growth despite the loud “official orders” of FF’s top
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management, with the exception that the increasing market demand was satisfied with well-timed
capacity investments. The growth of EW was not fast enough to save the rest of FF’s wood product
business. Referring to Bowman’s paradox, Andersen /13/ has empirical evidence of a negative risk-
return connection. “FF’s low risk-taking led to a good result” i.e. FF´s brand was strengthened,
which offered a future opportunity, but a chance to demonstrate the environmental edge of wood
was not quite reached. In Phase 2, a well-applied project RM approach at the business level could
have enabled the risk of the lack of competencies of the key managers to be identified, provided that
the respective business management had been competent to identify this. At the project level, it
was no longer possible to deal with the consequences of such major risks and the performance was
very low. The last effort to assume the housing developer’s role led to a disaster. The change from
the originally declared role – accumulated with the heavy losses of the first large projects for
developers – was too much. FF’s Board decided to stop and divest its modular business. The Board
also accepted the resignation of the CEO of FF. The events of Phase 2 also confirm that it is better
to build new competences proactively at the business level – to act then at the project level only is
far too late.
Case 8 also conforms well to Hypotheses 2a-b, i.e. the cross-cultural and contractual issues were
managed well in Phase 1, but ignored in Phase 2. Indeed, the RM was like the mirror image of
Phase  1. Unidentified risks in the form of the lack of competencies on the culturally and
contractually new business occurred, i.e. they led to a crisis which escalated into a disaster for the
entire module business. (i) In the urban housing business, the culture was very different from the
one of delivering individual houses to mostly non-professional buyers. (ii) The contractual
arrangement was quite different as well. (iii) Additionally, the business management failed to build
cross-cultural bridges to exploit Moelven’s competencies, which were mainly built for the serving
of  industrial  clients.  When  the  start-up  risks  begun  to  materialize  (e.g.  in  the  form  of  a  lack  of
orders), the business management turned its attention to individual house buyers while assuming
(iv)  the  contractual  role  of  a  developer.  Such  a  role  was  even  more  complex  than  to  supply  the
modules only. The consequent business-level crisis was mismanaged and worsened rapidly.
The two ex post observations are as follows:
Ex post observation 1: One can state that more risk should have been taken in Phase 1,
e.g. to invest considerably more in competent staff to attain the growth that was aimed at.
This point is proven e.g. by the earlier precast concrete business of Partek and the rapid
development of Rautaruukki (of Finland) based on construction solutions and investments
in the development of competence for faster growth. In Phase 2, the key failure factor was
the lack of the competencies for the new contractual role, i.e. to serve professional urban
residential housing customers. For some reason, Moelven’s competence was ignored
and/or contractually not available for exploitation. Whether the individual pride of the
module business managers (and/or their superiors) created any mental blocks – which
would have prevented them from using quite obvious solutions – has not been analyzed
here.
Ex post observation 2: FF’s module business was sold to Finndomo, a very experienced
Finnish low-storey house supplier. The Hartola module factory has continued in its hands.
Ex post observation 3: After the merger of FF into ML, the non-residential business of
the building systems, “solutions” have continued as before, with good results and
moderate growth.
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Ex post observation 4: Moelven had very good results in 2006. It was sold in 2007 for
the cash needed to cover the continuously huge losses of MReal, the paper arm of ML.
The key confidential documents and the published references on Case 8 are as follows (in
English, if not stated otherwise):
/C8-1/ Ijäs, T. et al. (2005) Promoting wood in construction. Working Group Report. ARA.
Helsinki. (in Finnish). Explains the strategic opportunity for Finnish wood product business.
Suggests a large selection of nation-wide key measures, including the need of cultural
change, which is considered mandatory to exploit the opportunity primarily towards building sector.
/C8-2/ VTT Statistics (2007) Building material shares in Finland 1985-2006. Espoo. Monitoring the
market position of wooden structures and facades in Finland.
/C8-3/ Ollonqvist, P. (2007) Chapter 4 of METLA’s Report No. 49 on the wood product industry’s
future and opportunities for building with wood. Joensuu. (in Finnish). Self-explanatory. Contains
an important note on the "towards production technology - orientation" of the campaigns, which the
reference considers as a mistake.
/C8-4/ Sarlin, E. (1928) Quote. Reference of Partek’s concrete strategy in 1988. (in Swedish).
Explains the key role of the competition when a company aims to improve its competiveness,
as stated already in 1928 by the that-time CEO of Partek Corp.
/C8-5/ Peura, P. (1999) Article in TEKES’ Magazine “Technology Views” No. 4. (in Finnish).
Important notes on the strategic opportunity for Finnish wood product business, and some measures
to exploit that, including the need to add value.No major risk identification.
/C8-6/ Woodfocus (2001) Action plan towards construction. Helsinki.(in Finnish). Contains
measures to exploit the opportunity as industry´s joint effort. The need for competitiveness is
recognized. Market orientation is proposed as the main strategy. Very ambitious business goal is
expressed but no major risks are  identified.
/C8-7/ VTT Statistics (2003) Building materials’ market shares in residential segments in 2002.
Espoo. (in Finnish). Self-explanatory. Supports the idea of focusing on the low-storey residential
buildings.
/C8-8/ FF Management Board documents (2000) “Pyramid” illustration. Espoo.Describes FF´s
vision towards the new role, and some measures to cope with the cultural change are presented
/C8-9/ FF Management Board documents (2001). EW division strategy documentation. Building
systems. 11-12 July 2001. Espoo. See below.
/C8-10/ FF Management Board documents (2001) EW division:  Competitive assessment. 11-12
July 2001. Espoo.
/C9,10) explain that, in the Phase 1, a new system supplier role is to be assumed by EW as a
strategic goal. Major threats to competitiveness within that role, i.e. risks, are identified, and
respective measures launched.
/C8-11/ FF Building and Construction Management Board documents (2005) Minutes of Meeting.
31 May 2005. Explains the business idea and Management Board of the new strategic unit, to
exploit the built new competitiveness abroad. Residential and non-residential segments are
identified. No opportunity or risk analysis.
/C8-12/ Salminen, A. (2000) Implementing organizational and operational change. Doctoral thesis.
Acta Polytechnica Scandinavica. TKK Helsinki University of Technology. Espoo. Explains the
importance of permanent and competent managerial staff , instead of ad hoc task forces, as "keys to
change project success".
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/C8-13/ Andersen, T. J., Denrell, J., and Bettis, R. A. (2007) Strategic responsiveness and
Bowman’s risk-return paradox. Strategic Management Journal. Vol. 28, pp. 407-429. Explains the
negative risk-return  -connection, with empirical evidence, applicable to Phase 1, where the
business volumes were (relatively) low.
/C8-14/ Ihamuotila, M. (2005) Finnforest B&C business future focus. Espoo. Illustrates the very
complex contractual role , which could not be assumed by FF with the culture of a large bulk
producer, within the Phase 2.
/C8-15/ Hämäläinen, M. (2003) Objectives for proposed modular production. Internal
Memorandum. 16 April 2003. Espoo. Business objectives and identified main risks, for the Phase 2.
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5.9 FMO Tapiola Project (Figure 5.9-1) of Finnforest between the years 2001 and
2005 (Case 9)
Map 5.9. Map of focal areas in Case 9.
Figure 5.9-1. Wood-structured Finnforest Modular Office (FMO) in Tapiola, Finland.
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5.9.1 Introduction to Case 9
Case 9 encompasses the RM of the development of the Finnforest Modular Office (FMO)
project between 2002 and 2005. The purpose is to analyze retrospectively this large and very
complex development project that Finnforest (FF) carried out in Tapiola,  in the City of Espoo in
Finland. This was FF´s first full-scale non-residential project to implement the newly created
growth strategy (see Case 8) for the international system delivery business, based on wood
products. To reduce the complexity and to better manage the involved risks, the project was
conducted in the Finnish business environment while the main market of FF was UK. This insider
action researcher worked as Senior VP of FF and a member of FF’s Management Board when he
was assigned to run the project from the idea until the implementation during 2001-2003. The first
task involved the arrangements for an international architectural design competition /4/ with a jury
chaired by a Representative of the City of Espoo. Thereafter, he acted as Chairman of the Board of
the real estate company until the completion and the handing-over (2004-2006). Additionally, the
researcher acted as the direct superior of the Project Manager.
5.9.2 Brief of Case 9
Since 1990, FF had – along with the other wood product suppliers – campaigned for wood in
construction /1/. In the early 2000s, FF supplied the modules for many 1- to 2-storey wood-
structured buildings, e.g. the Sibelius Hall, Savonlinna Hall, Friisilä residential development, and
Silva Football Stadium. FF has also acted as the developer of some of those projects. FF´s technical
competencies definitely improved. However, the Sibelius Hall resulted in a big loss for the building
contractor. In turn, the self-developed Silva Stadium with its attached football teams (“Atlantis” and
further “Allianssi”) caused FF a heavy financial burden until 2007.
FF’s old main office was located in Tapiola, in the City of Espoo. It was a 5-storey concrete block
from the 1960s (“GDR type”).
In 2002, FF perceived that this office should be replaced with a new one in order to truly support
the marketing of its wood products. The new office would become FF’s visible statement project
and “the tallest office made of wood in Europe” with wooden structures and facades, i.e. a 4- or 5-
storey and 8000-sq-m office building with a 5000-sq-m underground garage, costing about EUR 20
million.In September 2002, FF launched an international design competition because uncertainty
about the viability of the idea was prevailing /3/, /4/. The construction works were initially to be
commenced in early 2004 (Figure 5.9-2). The completion date was set for mid-2005. No fixed
capital was committed. The business objectives were built into the competition program in a timely
manner. In this phase, it was already apparent that FF’s management cadres, with a mechanical
wood  industry  culture,  did  not  have  all  the  required  competencies  to  manage  the  complex
development project, and external resources were assigned to the project (Figure 5.9-3).
In September 2003, the architect Pekka Helin (of Finland) was declared the winner of the design
competition /4/. Highly positive publicity for the competition was secured by announcing the results
on the 50th Anniversary  of  Tapiola,  a  well-known place  to  most  architects  around the  world.  The
design work was commenced swiftly and used to lash the building cost to be within the acceptable
range. This was mandatory for the preliminary agreement with the major Finnish insurance group
which had committed to buy the FMO building upon its completion. The total budget was to
remain within the frame of “EUR 23-25 million”.
The competitive milestones of the timeline schedule (Figure 5.9-2) called for completion by the
autumn of 2005. The targeted master schedule caused many practical problems throughout the
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construction phase. The CEO’s hasty announcement of the completion date at the design
competition ceremony even caused additional “regret” risk /9/. An early 6-week delay in the
foundation works – resulting from the contractor’s poor performance – was never really caught up
with. The delay was prolonged still further during the concreting of the intermediate floors.
However, increased control meetings, an official push vis-à-vis the contractor, and the allowed time
reserve enabled the FMO Tapiola Building to be inaugurated on the targeted date of Tapiola’s
52nd Anniversary, i.e. 4 September 2005. The handing-over to the final owner took place at the
turn of 2006/2007.
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Figure 5.9-2. Preliminary timeline schedule of FMO Tapiola Project for the years 2002-2005. (The
title is translated from the original Finnish language)
5.9.3 Finnforest’s business objectives converted to FMO Tapiola Project objectives
in Case 9
In 2002, FF’s early business objective was “to strengthen FF’s reputation as an overall pioneer of
building with wood” and also “to enhance the internal cohesion of FF’s business units” /3/, /4/. The
architectural competition was launched /3/. The multiplication of this building concept in
Scandinavia was envisioned /2/. In December 2003, FF’s Board approved the scheme with the
objectives on the cost budget, the financing (based on the future sale of the building), and the time
schedule /5/. In addition, a real estate company was to be incorporated to carry out the entire
project. The final project objective was that the FMO Building should be competitive in terms of
its quality, cost, and construction schedule (of 15 months).
5.9.4 From uncertainty awareness to RM during Case 9
In the appraisal phase, some uncertainties were converted to risks. By December 2003, the list of
identified major risks /5/ also included the possible non-performance of the wood structures (Table
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5.9-1). (1)  The  risk of too-high construction costs was identified in relation to FF’s limited
experience of managing building designs. In  particular,  excess  costs  of  any  significance  would
imply that the pre-committed insurance company would reject the acquisition and ownership of the
building. In fact, FF’s negative outcomes from some earlier projects, e.g. the small Silva Stadium,
indicated a lack of the required competencies regarding general and project management. There
were cost and time overruns. In addition, the stadium remained unsold for a long period of time. On
the other hand, the Friisilä Low-Storey Residential Project was carried out successfully with
competent contractual partners. The finished houses were also sold early. For the FMO, a strong
CM consultant was hired early enough. The special jury was established for the design competition,
chaired by the Deputy Mayor of the City of Espoo. FF’s specialists were working actively on the
wooden building part solutions to be incorporated within the competition program.
Figure 5.9-3. Project organization in the FMO Tapiola Project.
(2) The risk of the process consisting of the land acquisition and the urban planning being
prolonged or stopped was managed by FF’s early co-operation with the key officials of the City of
Espoo. (3) The risk of a project crisis with severe control defaults, caused by one or many
intervening outsiders, was discovered during the architectural design competition. Namely, the
highly visible project might become a "target" of interventions by strong outsiders. How can such a
risk of similar interventions be managed in the future? FF’s business management understood that
the FMO Tapiola Project must be made immune against any inappropriate interventions taking
place during the implementation phase.
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Table 5.9-1. Major risk breakdown structure of the FMO Tapiola Project from the developer’s point
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The  resultant  risk  of  a  crisis  could  not  be  taken,  however,  because  a  gut  feeling  had  warned  of
possible serious consequences, i.e. a crisis that might even lead to a catastrophe. The only response
was to avert such a risk in some absolute terms. Consequently, the FMO Tapiola Project was
planned to be incorporated entirely, with the consent of the pre-committed future owner, while the
architectural design competition was still going on. (4) The risk of the weak performance of the
pioneering wooden structures and products was identified because of their high level of
technical complexity – i.e. the tallest wood-structured office building in Europe. FF assumed
unusual multiple roles as the developer, as well as the supplier and the erector of the building frame
and the facades. The product development tasks also included the fire safety issues.
During the early implementation in the autumn of 2003, cost uncertainty was turned into a risk
/7/. The budget frame was not to be exceeded. The real estate company was established in 2003 as
the main tool to manage the project. That step created a strong “buffer” between the project
management, the designers, and the contractors vis-à-vis any dangerous future intervention. The
project proceeded as the competent key managers saw fit, without having to wait for the approvals
of FF’s Board or additional demands from various stakeholders such as the future acquirer (the
insurance company), FF, and/or ML. In February 2004, the FMO Board finally decided to start the
actual construction work on the basis of a more reliable budget and secured project financing. Soon
after, a budget overrun of nearly 15% was envisaged in the spring of 2004. Determined steering
involved a change of the room layout and a minor reduction in the standard to get the budget back
within the frame. The contractual form of the divided contracts allowed for this.
The CM approach selected, with tens of divided contract packages, also added to the complexity.
Thus, it was ensured that the multi-competent Board of the real estate company had  skills  in
general and project management, cross-cultural (i.e. product supplier vs. specialist contractor) and
contractual issues, and wooden products. In turn, the organization of the FMO Project was
strengthened by hiring many external experts. The remaining mandatory competences were secured
through trade contracts (Figure 5.9-3). The evident risk of the non-performance of the wooden
products, including their erection, was managed by retaining it contractually within FF’s own units
that  were  in  the  best  position  to  control  such  a  risk.  The  further  the  design  team  proceeded,  the
better the complexity of the FMO Project came to the surface. There were many components,
including FF’s multiple roles as the developer, the supplier, and the erector, the lack of experience
of complex projects within FF’s corporate culture, the impulsive CEO, the building contractor’s
inexperience  with  large  wooden  buildings,  etc.  The  CM  contract  form  selected  enabled  these
interdependent components to be managed successfully. The solid general and project managers
kept the sometimes conflicting wishes of the stakeholders at bay. Several  requests – which might
have resulted in a crisis if complied with – were put forth during the implementation phase, such as
”to change the CM consultant”, ”to accelerate the completion by 11 weeks”, or “to officially
condemn the building contractor’s work”. All these requests were able to be averted, thanks to the
buffer.
5.9.5 Business-level versus project-level RM measures during Case 9
Prior  to  the  FMO, the need to acquire higher PM competencies  had  become  evident  when  FF
faced problems when designing and supplying the wooden structures for challenging statement
projects,  e.g.  the  Silva  Stadium  and  Sibelius  Hall  projects.  In  the  minds  of  FF’s  corporate
management, the implementation of the FMO was uncertain as long as the buyer was not identified.
FF’s marketing unit, nevertheless, worked very hard to make use of the “virtual, not-a-real” project
as a new effective marketing tool. They prepared for “enhancing FF’s brand”.
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No business-level decision to acquire the required competencies was made until FF turned
uncertainty about cost into a risk by setting a budget of EUR 25 million. At the same time, the most
crucial RM action was launched and the incorporation of the FMO Project allowed the competent
project management to act with sufficient powers. The significant opportunity to promote the
environmental performance of wood was missed. No commitment resulted in a lack of specialists
and funding. This was in part caused by FF’s production-oriented corporate culture, which was not
geared to such new client-focused business innovations. At the project level, the time spent on the
design was sufficient to secure the additional external competencies in the project-level trade
contracts, along with the internal competencies organized as usual. The neglected environmental
opportunity could not be corrected at the project level.
5.9.6 Managing major risks inherent in cross-cultural and contractual competencies in
Case 9
In December 2003,  the  original  objective  of  strengthening  FF’s  brand  was  dominant.  The  FMO
Tapiola Project had to become a success, i.e. a “competitive” office building. The most important
proactive steps were presented to FF’s Board for approval /5/. With the financing settled, the most
vital issue was to engage competent key persons inside and outside FF and to provide them with
sufficient decision-making powers. The FMO Board, which signed all the contracts, and the project
organization had to possess sufficient combined competences regarding general and building
project management, the particularities of wood in high structures and interiors, and competing in
complex  building  projects  within  the  region.  This  contractual  arrangement  with  the  real  estate
company resulted in e.g. the subcontracting of the supply and erection of the wooden structures to
FF’s Engineered Wood Division, which had the best knowledge to manage the risk arising from the
performance of the new wooden structures and products erected. Moreover, the FMO Board was
able to manage the crossing business cultures of the specialist subcontractor and the ordinary big
product supplier of the wood products, as these were far away from each other.
The selection of the CM contract form was  right  vis-à-vis  the  project  management  with  a  tight
master schedule and the many anticipated design changes (in order to meet the budget). A leading
Finnish CM firm was assigned for the appraisal phase as early as in 2002 and it continued as the
CM consultant. The Project Manager and some individual consultants for the special assignments
(the environmental issues and the land acquisition) were hired from outside. The Project Manager
had recent experience of a successful wood-structured special building (the Savonlinna Hall).
In the managerial competency assessment, the assessed levels of the combined managerial
competencies within the Board of the FMO Tapiola real estate company and the actual project
organization in Spring 2004 received an average competency score of 3.81 (see tables 6-5a, b, p.
145) regarding cross-cultural issues and a score of 3.80 regarding contractual issues. These scores
were relevant to the task ahead, i.e. to execute a multi-cross-cultural, very complex development
project under the conditions of the impulsive FF management struggling for the replacement of their
old, already ailing business strategy with a new one.
5.9.7 Conclusions on Case 9
The overall success rate of the outcomes of the RM of the development of the FMO Tapiola
Project between the years 2001 and 2009 is assessed to be medium. The project-level objectives
were attained to a high degree. However, the most important business-level objectives were attained
only to a medium degree.
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Case 9 conforms well to Hypothesis 1, i.e. the RM measures were taken successfully at the
business and project levels. The competencies and the contractual form were determined at the
business level. Although FF’s brand was strengthened, the other great opportunities, e.g. to
demonstrate the environmental edge of wood, were not reached because the business-level
management did not commit itself to this. FF’s/ML’s management (or Boards) could not have pre-
identified the project-level risk of the building contractor’s incompetence by any available standard
means. At the project level, the RM measures that were adopted were about the maximum effort
possible to secure the attainment of the FMO project objectives. The four identified risks were
managed well. Effective RM was mandatory in order to ensure the required quality, the completion
date, and the acceptable costs to meet FF’s business objective, i.e. to enhance FF’s brand. The risk
of inappropriate interventions which might have caused a crisis or even a catastrophe was also
identified and deliberately avoided. Nevertheless, an unidentified major risk – the building
contractor’s performance – occurred, causing some delays. However, the remedial action, i.e.
“close” supervision on site prevented any knock-on consequences. The quality achieved, by
internal and external assessments (e.g. the RIL Award /6/), places the FMO Tapiola Building well
“above the average level”.
Case 9 also conforms well to Hypothesis 2, i.e. that the key managers’ competencies to manage
the contractual and cross-cultural issues in particular were a prerequisite for success. It is notable
that the additional cross-cultural and contractual expert competencies were acquired by partly
relying on external experts, such as project and construction management, to strengthen the
respective competencies of the internal Board of the FMO project. With these reinforcements and
their high motivation, a difficult task was accomplished with a high/medium degree of success.
However, the resultant levels of required managerial competencies varied to some extent. The
existing competencies met the required levels, in particular in the sub-areas of PM under the CM
contract form, the building design management, and the novelties and the innovations. On the other
hand, the available competencies were less in some areas, such as the other trades (contractor’s site
management) and parts of the general management (e.g. in the sub-areas such as challenging and
investing in R&D and exploiting the environmental opportunity where wood could have a great
opportunity.
The four ex post observations are as follows:
Ex post observation 1: It seems that other and stronger measures were already needed in
the early phases in order better to exploit FF’s strategic business objectives. The
opportunities such as the value-adding strategy and the environmental performance of
wood as a brand could have been better harvested for future benefits, if only the realized
business strategy (see Case 8) had been better geared toward this end.
Ex post observation 2: The incorporation of the FMO Project allowed the competent
project management to act with sufficient powers. To acquire those powers at the project
level only, eventually during a crisis, would have been impossible. Such powers to run the
project effectively would not have been available e.g. if FMO had been buried inside any
of FF’s business divisions or if this project had been carried out by staff functioning under
the CEO’s direct command.
Ex post observation 3: Without the buffer in the timeline schedule, at least a change of
the CM consultant or one of the building contractors might have occurred. In turn, such a
change could have resulted in a crisis and probably catastrophic results, because of the
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high number of interdependencies (e. g. between the buyer, the real estate company owned
by FF owned by ML, the contractors, and the City of Espoo as the land owner, etc).
Ex post observation 4: FF’s production-oriented corporate culture was not sufficiently
geared towards new client-focused business innovations. It seems that the same still
applies today to the Finnish forest-based business as a whole.
The key confidential documents and the public references on Case 9 are as follows (in Finnish,
if not stated otherwise):
/C9-1/ Country strategies 2000 as presented at FF Management Board Meetings in 2000-2001.
Explains the strategic opportunity for FF, the main actor of the European wood product business .
/C9-2/ Strategy for FF’s Engineered Wood Division. 11-12 July 2001. Lahti. As in Case 8 (/C8-
9,10/), this explains that, in the Phase 1,  a new system supplier role is to be assumed by EW as a
strategic goal. Major threats to competitiveness within that role, i.e. risks, are identified, and
respective measures launched.
/C9-3/ FF Board presentation. 10 September 2002. Espoo. Contains the business objectives within a
very broad time and  financial frame , and the main measures to reduce the uncertainty.
/C9-4/ FF Management Board presentation. 9 September 2003. Espoo.
/C9-5/ FF Board presentation. 16 December 2003. Espoo.
/4,5/ Contain a list of business objectives (both quantitative and qualitative), major
                       risk identification and respective response plan to all identified risks.
/C9-6/ RIL’s National Award as presented in September 2006. Helsinki. Serves as a public evidence
of the exceptional quality of the project.
/C9-7/ Flanagan, R. and Norman, G. (1993) Risk management and construction. Blackwell. Oxford.
Explains the theoretical and practical background of turning uncertainty into risk (which was the
method to seek the final Board approval for the project).
/C9-8/ Lofthus, M. (1997) Lecture. EPPW. UMIST. Manchester. Explains the "regret" risk, i.e.
when the perceived completion date was hastily announced in the winning ceremony of the
architectural competition, this "regret" risk occurred. The cause was FF CEO who anticipated his
own birthday party, much less than two years ahead, yet to be held at completed FMO.
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6. CROSS-CASE EVIDENCE AND ITS CONFORMITY TO THE TWO
HYPOTHESES
6.1 Use of the same relevant grouping of the nine cases
Case 1 is the compact summary (Group 0) of Lemminkäinen’s five sub-projects overseas between
the years 1973 and 1984. In turn, Cases 2-9 extend over the periods of 1984-1995 and 2000-2006.
Cases 2-9 have been further grouped under the two multi-business corporations and one single-
business firm to explore their longitudinal causalities (Table 6-1). Each group includes one case to
explain the respective actor’s strategic change for international growth and at least one operative,
project-level  case  to  implement  the  desired  strategy.  This  setting  makes  it  possible  to  clarify  the
novel idea of extending project-level RM to business-level RM. In Group 1, Case 2 contains
Partek’s strategy for international growth in the precast concrete business. Case 3 is a green field
operation as a JV partner with a local firm. Case 4 is the acquisition and post-merger integration of
three local firms, each in different national markets. Case 5 is the expansion of capacity and market
by acquisition and post-merger integration. In Group 2, Case 6 contains a merger as a measure
taken to save the firm and promote its international growth. Case 7 deals with the delivery of a very
complex and large project. In Group 3, Case 8 contains a business strategy case to add value and
grow in the international market. Case 9 is the development of a very complex large project.
Table 6-1. Four corporate groups (0-3) and their nine cases (1-9).
Group 0 (The Finnish pioneer contractors in Nigeria, Iraq, Liberia and Kenya…):
1 Case is the abstract of the findings of the author’s  licentiate thesis (Palojärvi, 1986) on
RM in the international construction projects of Lemminkäinen in 1974-1984:
 - Satellite Town in Lagos, Nigeria 1976-1978
 - Dorah Civil Infrastructure and Foundations in Baghdad, Iraq 1976-1980
 - Matadi Civil and Electrical in Monrovia, Liberia 1977-1980
 - Mau-Kisumu Road Works in Kenya, 1980-1984
 - Underwater foundations for Mano River Railway Bridge in Liberia, 1982-1984
2  Partek Concrete grows internationally (1984-1995) (B/L)
3 Eastern Partek in Singapore (1984-1987)(P/L)
4  Partek Concrete acquires CBR precast concrete business in Benelux (1987-1990) )(P/L)
5  Partek Concrete acquires VBI  in Netherlands and Germany (1989-1992) )(P/L)
6 Partek Concrete Engineering (PCE) is restructured for the global market (1992-1995) (B/L)
7 Partek Concrete Engineering (PCE) Sertolovo delivers a mega-project in Russia with
German financing (1991-1995) )(P/L)
8 Finnforest/ Metsäliitto´s value adding strategy for wood products (2000-2005) (B/L)
9 Finnforest’s  FMOTapiola delivery project (2002-2005) (P/L)
Group 2 (Technology contractor Partek Concrete Engineering (PCE) is established and
needs growth to survive at all…):
Group 1 (Building product supplier Partek Concrete grows to the position of the European leader…):
Group 3 (Metsäliitto/Finnforest adds value to wood products…):
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6.2 Questions for the examination of the cross-case evidence
Hypothesis 1 is that proven project RM methods can also be applied reliably at the business level
and, thus, the effectiveness of managing major international business risks can be improved
within the focal context. It was examined with the 4-view evidence on the actual applications of the
proven project RM methods to the risky growth situations at the business level across all the nine
cases, i.e. those of one building contractor, two building product suppliers, and one engineering
contractor. The four questions for this examination are as follows. (i) “Was the proven RM
process applied?” This is examined in terms of the three phases, i.e. whether objectives were set,
major risks identified, and appropriate response measures planned and launched. (ii) “If yes, at
what level(s) was the RM conducted?” This is an attempt to separate business-level decisions and
project-level decisions. The logic behind this 3-element decision-making chain of the project RM is
as follows. If objectives are not set, no relevant risks can be identified and, consequently, no
appropriate response measures can be planned or launched, other than mere reactions to the
consequences of a risk that has occurred.
(iii) “Did it work?” refers to the assessment of whether most, if not all, of the potential major risks
and those that occurred were identified and how efficient the response measures were, if any of
them was selected. (iv) “What else was interesting?” reveals possible findings for the discussion
“Was it, or could it have been, more efficient to identify and, further, already to manage major risks
at the business level instead of facing the risks that occurred at the project level” (in alignment with
Alvesson 2003). This cross-case evidence is summarized in Tables 6-2a, b, c.
Hypothesis 2 is that major risks related to the attainment of the targeted business objectives are
inherent within key managers’ competencies and their insufficiency in particular to manage (2a)
cross-cultural issues and (2b) contractual arrangements within the focal context. It was examined
simply by inquiring (i) “Was this particular risk identified?”, (ii) “Did it occur?”, and (iii) How
was this risk managed?” If  cross-cultural  or  contractual  risks  did  not  occur,  any  potential  ones
were still looked for. Thus, it is assumed that there is a likely causal relation between the identified
major risk types, the respective RM approach, and the overall success (or failure), provided that no
rivaling risk to explain this overall end result can be identified, even ex post. In turn, (iv) “What
else” reveals possible findings for the discussion “Could some other rivaling risk explain …” (again
in alignment with Alvesson 2003). The cross-case evidence is compiled in Tables 6-3a, b (p. 139)
and 6-4a, b (p. 142), respectively.
The results of the hypothesis-specific examination are summarized, together with the overall
success rates, in Table 6-5 (p. 145). The choice and use of the qualitative scales has already been
clarified in sub-chapter 4.6.
6.3 Cross-case evidence and its conformity to Hypothesis 1
It seems that the cross-case evidence conforms well to Hypothesis 1 (Table 6-2). In all the cases,
the business-level and project-level objectives were set as quite habitual in Finnish companies. In
most cases,  the major risks were identified,  at  least  by experts.  In many – but not all  – cases,  the
major risks were responded to at least reasonably well. Nevertheless, the risks were not always
efficiently responded to, either because of a failure to identify them, the ignoring of expert advice,
the retaining of a sometimes underestimated risk, or for some other reasons. (The eventually
inadequate measure e.g. in Case 4 on the identified major risk was not the fault of the RM method
itself, but rather one that happened despite the RM method.)
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What else was interesting?
   1 (a) Yes
(b) Yes
(c) Yes







at P/L only, and they
were difficult or im-
possible to deal with.
Learning took place by doing,
rather than by e.g. formal training.
RM at P/L was of primary
interest and thus emerging human-
embedded risks with long-term
impacts were not identified early.




















but not proactively, to
avoid or fight major
risks.
RM applications seemed to be
more efficient at B/L because the
longer time span for various
measures gives more options to
maneuver. Product suppliers plan
investments at least 5 years ahead,
while contractors, when planning
an entry, use shorter planning
spans.


















was not set in this
phase.
Determined risk-taking at P/L led
to anticipated losses, while the
market position (in SE Asia) as an
opportunity paid off later. Cross-
cultural competencies on creating
trust btw. Partners and selecting a
viable contractual role were vital
for success. More efficient RM at
B/L would probably have cut the
first project's losses significantly.
   4 (a) Yes
(b) No at B/L,




















at B/L and taken,
were dealt with at
P/L. Response only
ensured the main goal
– a strong position in
Western Europe.
B/L: The downside was well
managed but some upside
opportunities were missed because
of the problems in managing a
multi-cross-cultural venture. RM
at B/L could have been more
efficient with better competence
regarding cross-cultural (and
perhaps also contractual) issues.
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What else was interesting?
















Risks identified at B/L were
managed well, important
opportunities were grasped
(technology), and some missed
(French and German markets)
because of multi-cross-cultural
problems at B/L. (Ex post:
Particularly the German
opportunity, if taken, could have
kept PC intact (and the whole of
Partek) in a different shape, to
continue in the building product
business.)




(c) at BL and
P/L
Yes, in all phases
including the prepared
response to fight the
initial crisis of the
merger and later the
new crisis of the
Sertolovo project. The
third crisis – on the
way up – could not
have been fought by
PCE any more.
Phase 1: Well-managed risk-
taking at both levels paid off
because the best managers could
be selected from the two merging
firms. Competencies on general
management and contractual issues
were more important than the
cross-cultural ones as there were no
ethnic or industrial cultural
differences between the merging
parts.
Phase 2: Volume target was
achieved with tight RM at P/L with
the frame already given at B/L.






yes, at B/L in
part
(c) At P/L
yes, at B/L in
part
Yes, in all phases
including the events
of the crisis and the
potential disaster.
It would have been  hard to
advocate for the mobilization of so
many new competencies for one
single project unless the need had
been identified early enough, i.e. at
B/L. Quite surprising, one
unidentified risk was Haka’s
relatively fast collapse. The
reasons became fully clear only
years later.
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What else was interesting?





































that a great growth
opportunity was
missed because of the




management scared the business
management in Phase 1 into taking
“risk avoidance only” types of
measures. The growth
opportunity based on adding
value was missed because only a
tiny investment in competent
personnel was made in Phase 1.
The emerging big rush to grow in
Phase 2 spoiled the entire venture.
(Ex post: in 2009, it is quite late for
Metsäliitto to recourse, although
the structural business itself
continues.)
















Solid and rigorous RM already
at B/L was crucial for success
and to avoid the crisis in the
project.  Cross-cultural
competencies regarding industrial
vs. construction and the contractual
ones were both the sources of the
major risk and managed well at
both levels. The business growth
opportunity was missed because of
the business-level/corporate
mismanagement.
In the light of the cross-case evidence, it seems that particularly in order to manage the hypothetical
major risks (or their sources), it is more beneficial  to take measures proactively, i.e. already at
B/L rather than to wait until major risks occur. There is a logic behind this. (i) Early risk
identification provides the option of assessing whether it is better to deal with the sources or
consequences of a major risk (all cases). Simply waiting until a potential risk occurs leaves no such
option and one has to deal with the consequences, whatever they may be. Further, (ii) there are
more long-term options available when acting at the business level rather than at the project level
(this was evident in Cases 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 9). Additionally, it is (iii) viable to have ample
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calendar time available, e.g. when analyzing and comparing various contractual role alternatives
or when pondering and implementing the most feasible organizational structure or its key
appointments, rather than rushing into them (Cases 1, 2, 3, 9). Moreover, (iv) many long-term
commitments, e.g. choosing a foreign market area and segment, an entry mode, JV policies, and
partner selections may involve many stakeholders and these are difficult to change at the project
level ( Cases 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 9).
The other interesting cross-case observations are  as  follows.  It  seems  that uncertainty
management – before turning to formal risk RM – of both the upside and downside possibilities, as
based on the observations in e.g. Cases 6 and 9 and supported by e.g. Langlo et al.(2007), may be
well suited to e.g. long-term business development efforts with fuzzy objectives. Traditional RM,
focused on goal attainment as “positive outcomes”, needed clear objectives for any operative
business. Without the clear objectives, shared at least with the key managers, it was not possible to
even clearly identify and analyze the major risks, let alone launch the most viable response,
including tapping into the opportunities as well.
Formal risk identification was conducted in all the cases, although in business jargon, the word
“risk” usually meant “what can go wrong?” only. The building product suppliers, when
considering their investments in their targeted growth, recognized the opportunities as well, but
usually at the verbal level as an additional argument for the proposed investment, while the line
management did not want to give any specific value to that kind of opportunity. “The synergy
effect” was a typical “opportunity” of that nature.
6.4 Cross-case evidence and its conformity to Hypothesis 2a
It  seems  that  the  case-specific  evidence  conforms  well  to  Hypothesis  2a (Table 6-3). The
sufficiency of cross-cultural competencies was the mandatory prerequisite for the high or very high
success rate in Cases 1, 5, 6, 7, and 9. To build up such new competencies took time. Therefore, it
was vital to make the appropriate decisions at the business level. The evidence arising from the
cases is as follows. In all the cases, whether specifically identified or not at the time, the major
risks that occurred were inherent in the cross-cultural competencies and often also in the
contractual competencies at the same time. The “ranking”  between these  two hypothetical  risk
types, however, differed. It seems that the levels of the key managers’ competencies regarding
cross-cultural issues were a more common major risk (or its source) than their competencies
regarding the selected contractual role and other arrangements.
In Cases 1,  4,  5,  and 7 some other major risk types, or risk source types, were also identified,
and some also occurred. However, their appearance was rather sporadic. The much-feared
political risks, such as the uncertainty of European integration and military coups, occurred several
times, but their consequences were not significant at the project level since the respective actor had
remained politically neutral. Some technical risks also  occurred  in  Cases  1,  3,  4,  7,  and  8.
According to the traditional risk classification, they could be traced back to the differences between
the local and Finnish ways of doing construction business as their sources. Such risks were
managed by careful homework and the detailed tender specifications in the successful Case 1 (5th
sub-project) and Case 7, but only with very hard project work in the less successful Cases 1 (4th
sub-project), 3, and 8. Similarly, many country-specific and local construction culture-specific
clauses were new to the Finnish actors, at least to the “generalists”, despite the fact that they were
part of the common Western – British, German, Dutch, or French – contractual frames. The risks
that arose were managed – upon learning the lessons from the first contracts – by assigning local
legal and contractual experts, often supported by in-house experts in the respective fields.
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Table 6-3a. Examination of the case-specific evidence confirming to Hypothesis 2a.
           Cases 1-4.




How was this risk
managed?
What else?
   1 Mostly yes. Yes In the 1st and 2nd sub-
projects, by adding the







Major risks were first
anticipated to be inherent in a
host country’s political and
economic development, and in
contracts and local legislation.
Since these risks never caused
big losses, the attention was
turned towards Finnish managers
and other staff. The competencies
to deal with leadership and cross-
cultural issues were watched
mainly at P/L .
    2 Yes Yes By relying on locals,
as the main strategy.
Multi-cross-cultural issues
proved to be more difficult to
manage than anticipated, as a
result of the overall complexity
of the fragmented precast
concrete business in Europe.
    3 Yes Yes First by leaning on the
local GM (the successor






managers. After the local
GM was fired, he was
replaced by a Finnish GM.
The initial Finnish key staff had
little experience of the product,
and none of local issues, where
the partner was of very high
caliber. The key to success was
to gain  local acceptance for the
slab product and company - the
first big client was the Japanese
contractor. The big loss of the
1st project was recovered because
long-term growth was secured
thanks to the solid cooperation
with the partner and the local key
managers.
    4 Yes Yes By taking a major cross-
cultural risk on the local
manager, who had probably
initiated the deal, and by
dealing with the
consequences. Internal
politics at Partek prevented
a Finnish nomination –
which would have been a
more expectable step.
Partek had already learned to
manage dyadic cross-cultural
relations (e.g. Sino-Finnish). In
this case, where the initiative came
from the seller’s side, the situation
contained three foreign cultures –
Dutch, Belgian, and French. A
"multi-cross-cultural" set-up was
far more complex.
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Table 6-3b. Examination of the case-specific evidence conforming to Hypothesis 2a, Cases 5-9.




How was this risk
managed?
What else?
    5 Yes Yes By carefully analyzing
local managers before the
actual deal (which was not
carried out in 5.2.4) and
then trusting and relying on
them.
The dyadic cross-cultural
situation (i.e. Finnish- Dutch)
worked well. Later, to put the
acquired Dutch group under
Belgian command led to a
multi-cross-cultural operation
that was difficult to manage.
The business result suffered.













Integrating two firms into
one and by selecting the
best key managers out of





improved the business result
even in new and remote
markets, e.g. South Korea, the
USA, and Taiwan.












Yes By selecting key managers




Sound intelligence, based on
close contacts to Russia and
Germany, to stay ahead of
events and to react early was
mandatory in Phase 1 of the
project. Thereafter, the viable
contractual arrangement was an
important RM tool to deal with
the eventual big changes.






Yes By a few managerial
assignments, which were




The filling of the cross-cultural
gap required a much larger
investment in service capacity,
i.e. people. The actual one was
far too low to change the
culture to serve contractors &
developers, instead of
retailers.
    9 Yes Yes It was eliminated with




implementing the project as




guaranteed for this project in
order not to make any strategic
losses (brand, visibility).
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The multi-cross-cultural situations, e.g. the Dutch-Belgian-Finnish and German-Russian-Finnish
situations, were significantly more complex than the dyadic situations in Cases 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.
This was probably the most demanding task for the RM at those times. The learning of the lessons,
the respective risk-taking, and the reliance on the locals were not enough. Whether the
competencies finally reached the required levels cannot be verified in the old case data from
between the years 1974 and 1992. Ex post, it seems that the creation of the precast concrete
technology edge gave the Finnish managers the unquestioned status of being the “real managers” of
this business, By organizing the business into mainly dyadic cultural zones , the complexity was
reduced a lot.
In the tough conditions, the trust between the partners was also at stake in Cases 1, 3, 5, 7, and
9. The contractual arrangements were the consequence of the high degree of trust between the
partners, and not the other way around. Trust could not be "enforced" by the contracts – it had to be
built, which again was a complex task. Obviously, the cross-cultural sensitivity of the respective
managers was a great advantage in achieving that.
The identification of the major risks at the business level often led further to proactive
responses, instead of the consequences only being dealt with at the project level. This did not
automatically  also  result  in  an  improved  response  in  Cases  4  and  8.  The  comparison  of  the
international growth strategy cases with the consequent “operative” cases confirms that it did take
time to build the key managers’ new competencies regarding cross-cultural issues in Cases 1,
4, 5, 7, and 9). The external recruitments, in turn, with the necessary competencies to fill the
eventual gaps in the project of the focal company, may have had problems in adapting rapidly to the
new employers’ existing internal cultures, which naturally took time in Cases 1, 3, and 8.
6.5 Cross-case evidence and its conformity to Hypothesis 2b
It seems that the case-specific evidence conforms well to Hypothesis 2b (Table 6-4). In all the
cases, whether specifically identified or not at the time, the major risks that occurred were
inherent in the cross-cultural competencies and often also in the contractual competencies at
the same time. In some cases, there were some other major risks, or risk sources, as well but their
appearance was rather sporadic. The “ranking” between the two hypothetical risk types, however,
differed. It seems that the levels of the key managers’ competencies regarding contractual
arrangements were a less common major risk (or its source) than their competencies regarding
cross-cultural issues.
The most important decisions of the focal actors on the contractual arrangements were the
structure,  the  role,  and  the  partner  selections.  In  most  of  the  cases,  the  adoption  of  the  new
contractual structure and role turned out to be crucial. On the one hand, this led to the subsequent
other contractual arrangements and the respective competency requirements, which, at least at first,
were not sufficiently matched because of a lack of the respective competencies at the business level
and/or the project level in Cases 3,4, and 8. On the other hand, the selection of the right partner
required the mastering of the social and industrial cultures of the scene in Cases 1 (2nd sub-project),
3, 5, 6, 7, and 9. Eventually, the selection of the wrong partner could not be helped with the other
arrangements in Case 1a, while the selection of the right partner withstood even the very tough
conditions in Cases 1 (2nd sub-project), 3, 6, and 7. It goes without saying that trust must be created
and this went hand-in-hand with loyalty. The most striking example was a part of Case 7, i.e. the
selection technique which the focal contractor applied when it had to be loyal to the two competing
partners and it could not know who would be the winner.
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The contractual risk was identified
as being of a major type, right from
the beginning. All experience only
strengthened that opinion of the
professionals. However, it did not
appear as a strategic tool in B/L
management until the 1980s.
    2 No, in the first
implementation
case.




Varied Varied “System delivery” was defined as the
strategy “to add services to
products”. However, investing in the
necessary expertise varied from “one
man only” (CBR project export to
London) to entire departments (e.g.
VBI). In acquisitions, the contracted
price was tied to performance as the
standard method.
    3 Yes but at P/L
only.
Yes Investing in design
and erection.
The offering of “system delivery”
instead of “products only” was vital
in the local business culture, which
was prone to risk avoidance. Clients
were hesitant to accept new products to
be designed and erected without
“someone else” to take the
“responsibility” for the consequences.







though) in design and
erection services.
New contractual role & old products
proved difficult to manage for the
acquired firms in the multi-cross-
cultural conditions. The most difficult
combination was the delivery of the
Belgian-managed and very complex
(architectural) system from the Dutch
plant to top London real estate projects,
with the contract manager of Bovis of
USA and owned by N.Y. Jews, all this
supported and coordinated by Finnish
experts. The inevitable claim fight was
overwhelmingly won by Partek; thanks
to the efforts of the top Finnish
contractual (claim) expert, in the
British lower court, Bovis got no
permission to appeal.
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    5 No No Price/performance as
the general cover for
the acquisition price;
no change in the
contractual role of the
acquired company.
Contractual role was not changed >>
no major risk. Instead, more efforts
were made to develop the product
technology and the geographical market
coverage jointly with Partek’s other
units.
    6 Yes Yes The B/L decision to
invest in the PM
capacity for the wider
contractual role was
made to add value.
PCE’s contractual role was already
well clarified and readily established
for Sertolovo at B/L. This allowed a
management team with sufficient
competencies to be selected.
    7 Yes Yes By sticking to the
selected strategic
contractual role and
e.g. by turning down
the offered building
works.
The selection of the wrong role
selection would very probably have
resulted in severe contractual
problems. To solve them, in the
German (“pacta sum servantas”)
contractual culture, would have been
extremely painful, if not impossible.






Yes By few expert
appointments. This
was too tiny an effort
vs. the big change of
the contractual role.
The too-small investment in the role
change kept the business volume low.
This led finally to radical
consequences at the corporate level.





RM at P/L was more efficient than
RM at B/L, particularly in the new
contractual role – adding services to
products – throughout FF’s entire
mechanical wood business.
The identification of the major risks at the business level often led further to proactive
responses, instead of the consequences being dealt with at the project level only. This did not
always automatically also result in an improved response in Cases 4 and 8. The comparison of the
international growth strategy cases with the consequent “operative” cases confirms that it did take
time to build the key managers’ new competencies regarding the contractual arrangements.
The obvious advantage of the increased time was the fact that it was more viable to plan and
prepare for the preferred contractual roles and arrangements well before the actual signing of the
contract or deal. However, the external or internal contractual experts were able to provide
significant support to the key managers in Cases 4 and 5, and to some extent in Cases 7 and 9. This
is understandable because this is the common modus operandi among those experts.
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6.6 Total scoring of the key managers’ cross-cultural and contractual competencies in
the nine cases
6.6.1      Introduction
To study further the causal connection between the key managers´ competencies and overall
success rates, the individual key managers were evaluated by the action researcher. As explained in
Chapter 4, the results of the evaluation, i.e. the scorings,  have to be taken more as “other interesting
observation” and as leads for further research, due to several limitations of the evaluation. To
protect the intimacy of the selected key managers, the only indicative scorings has been reported for
the management team of each case as a group only. The individual scorings are available for
confidential research purposes only.
6.6.2 Total group- and case-specific scoring of the key managers’ competencies
The results of the managerial competency assessment among the nine case-specific, 6-manager
management groups are compiled in Tables 6-5a and 6-5b. The theoretical maximum group score
here is 5.00 which is the average of the six key managers´ individual scores regarding the
respective management issue. The individual score of each manager is the multiplification (to
better reflect the differences of individual key managers) of  his  (or  her)  three  evaluated
components of the respective competency i.e. education, relevant experience and motivation. As
explained in Ch. 4, the components have been evaluated on a Likert-scale from 1 to 5. A manager
may receive different scoring on his individual component depending on whether the evaluation is
conducted on cross-cultural or contractual issues, respectively.
On managing the cross-cultural issues, the two highest scores are 4.26 in Case 6 and 4.15 in Case
5. In turn, the two lowest scores are 3.42 in Case 8 and 3.66 in Case 3. These scores imply that these
competencies were assessed as clearly above a “Likert 3” in all the nine cases, but above a “Likert
4” only in two cases. On managing the contractual arrangements, it is assessed that the highest
score is 4.02 in Case 7 and the lowest one is 3.36 in Case 8. This implies that in all the nine cases,
these competencies were assessed as clearly above a “Likert 3” in terms of education, relevant
experience, and motivation. Only in one case was it assessed as above a “Likert 4”. The average
scoring level in this area is clearly lower than in the case of cross-cultural competencies. It suggests
that, instead of acquiring high individual competency on contractual issues, many key business
managers have usually preferred to “leave it to the legal  experts” i.e. lawyers. In all the nine cases,
it was the standard habit of the key managers to use additional contractual expertise, i.e. both
internal and external professionals to support the line management .
6.6.3 Comparison of the managers’ scores and the overall success rates
This reporting makes it possible to take a standpoint on whether the risks occurring of a lack (or
unavailability) of competencies in relation to the task ahead, i.e. perceived, required competencies,
caused in part or primarily the failures or the successes within Cases 1-9. This comparison is
arranged in Table 6-5b.  If the respective task ahead was particularly challenging, then a low score
in that competency component could have caused at least some alarm, leading to organizational
changes, reinforcements, and/or replacements for necessary additional competencies.
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Table 6-5a. Average scores of the individual competencies of each member of
                               the 6-manager teams to manage cross-cultural and contractual issues, in each
                               case. Key: The scale is 5 (very high) and 1 (very low).
to manage cross-cultural issues to manage contractual issues
1  3.79  3.80
2  3.98  3.55
3  3.66  3.56
4  3.81  3.54
5  4.15  3.81
6  4.26  3.69 (High success)
7  3.94  4.02 (Very high success)
8  3.42  3.36 (Very low success)
9  3.81  3.80
Case Average score (within the team of 6 key managers) on competencies
Table 6-5b. Average combined scores compared with the overall success rate, in each case.
The result indicates that the cross-cultural and contractual scoring of the respective 6-manager
groups  was  highest  at  the  same  time  when  the  overall  outcome  also  turned  out  to  be  best.  This
indirectly supports the relative importance of the key managers’ respective competencies to manage
cross-cultural and contractual issues, where major risks are presumed to be inherent. However, in
some cases the legal expertise, which is certainly a part of contractual competency, was outsourced
efficiently or the firm’s in-house expert was not within the key managers’ group. In such cases, the
score was less relevant to predicting the outcome.
Presumably, further research is required to clarify e.g. group dynamics in general. What other
dimensions of competence should be considered simultaneously? Should the crucial competency
actually be in the hands of 1 or 3 or all 6 members in order to be really put to use? And so forth. In
the future, it may become possible to connect success rates with key managers’ competencies, a
point of view which did not emerge within the reviewed literature.
Case Overall success rate
1 Various  3.79  3.80
2 Medium/High  3.98  3.55
3 Medium  3.66  3.56
4 Medium  3.81  3.54
5 High  4.15  3.81
6 High  4.26  3.69
7 Very high  3.94  4.02
8 Low  3.42  3.36
9 High  3.81  3.80
Average individual score on managing
cross-cultural issues          contractual   issues
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6.7 Summary of the cross-case examination of the two hypotheses
The cross-case evidence conforms well to both Hypotheses 1 and 2 (Table  6-6).  The
management of the two hypothetical major risk types took time in practice. Therefore, it was vital
already  to  launch  the  respective  RM  measures  at  the  business  level  and  to  gain  precious  time.  It
seems that the proven project RM methods and techniques, i.e. setting the objectives, the
identification of the risks, and the launching of the response measures, were highly applicable at the
business level as well. Further, many severe major risks were found to be inherent in the key
managers’ cross-cultural and contractual competencies and this is why it was highly efficient to
identify and manage them proactively and efficiently in all the contextual situations.
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7. CONTEXTUAL LITERATURE FINDINGS, THE CASE-BASED
EVIDENCE, AND THEIR COMFORMITY TO THE TWO
HYPOTHESES
The notions on the emerging applied theory on risk and enlarged RM are here put down, first in
sub-chapter 7.1 to lay the ground for the comparative investigation of the relations between the
contextual literature and the two hypotheses, and those between the case-based evidence and the
two hypotheses in sub-chapters 7.2-7.4. The results of this comparison are summarized in sub-
chapter 7.5.
7. 1 Contextual literature-based findings and case-based findings
The brief outcome of the literature review, in terms of its purpose (3.1) is as follows: The
reviewed  literature  (i)  remained  silent  on  first  hypothesis,  and  indirectly  (2a)  or  directly  (2b)
supported the relevance and significance of the second one, for choosing them for the examination
in this study; (ii) competing hypotheses were not found and the  success or failure factors were
connected to management issues only vaguely or not at all; (iii) the main new trends, within the
context and since the licentiate thesis (Palojärvi 1986), are the emerging two-way approach (i.e.
recognizing the opportunities as well), the general call for more proactiveness and the emerging
importance of culture-related issues and various concepts of relational contracting; (iv) relevant
insights into traditional and enlarged RM were gained (as explained in Ch. 3), and,  finally, (v)
readily available key concepts of targeted “better” RM methods were not found, although many
feasible elements of such concept were widely discussed in the reviewed literature, yet primarily on
the project level.
From within the contextual literature findings,  it  seems  that a fairly advanced and also
applicable theory on risk is emerging, as follows. Uncertainty is considered to be a source of risk.
Risk is the possibility that set expectations will not be met (e.g. Palojärvi 1986). For RM,
uncertainty is converted to risk by applying a probability to a risky event (e.g. Flanagan and
Norman 1993). The consequences of the risk depend both on its probability and its impact. From
the point of view of stakeholders, consequences can be favorable or unfavorable, i.e. “positive” or
“negative” (e.g. Lifson and Scheifer 1982). An RM process contains the identification of risks, the
assessment of consequences, and the launching of a response, at a minimum (e.g. Flanagan and
Norman  1993).  The  relevant  contextual  authors  are  in  unanimous  agreement,  i.e.  that  risk
identification is the cornerstone of any subsequent RM measures. In turn, there are many situation-
specific risk typologies (e.g. Walewski and Gibson 2003). Crises and disasters are the consequences
of  mismanaged  risks  (Loosemore  2000).  Project  complexity  is  a  characteristic  of  a  system.  It
depends on a number and variety of elements, as well as the interconnections among them (Shenhar
and Dvir 2004).
Moreover, the starting point of this study involved  the  enlargement  of  traditional  RM  to
encompass uncertainty, complexity, risk, crisis, and disaster. Complexity is perceived as having a
linear impact on risk. In the focal context of international construction, RM has traditionally
focused on avoiding losses, setbacks, and disasters as “negative surprises” rather than grasping
opportunities. In other words, it is not linked to opportunity-seeking, although enlarged RM is
neutral. The recent articles, however, indicate a transformation of RM into uncertainty management
or opportunity management and a (less obviously tracked) need for more proactive RM (Tables 3-6
and 3-7).  In  many other  contexts,  uncertainty  and  risk  are  considered  almost  synonymous,  e.g.  in
the literature on financing and venture capitalism (Ahonen 2007).
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The case-based findings (Chapters 4-6) have already revealed that the case firms were relying on a
“mainstream” RM process, similar to the contextual RM methods (reviewed in Chapter 3).
Therefore no novelties in the fundamentals of risk were found per se.
7.2 Relations between the findings and Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 is that proven project RM methods can also be applied reliably at the business level
and, thus, the effectiveness of managing major international business risks can be improved within
the focal context. The effectiveness of the RM method is here considered (4.1)  as the ability to (i)
clarify the set goals, (ii) identify at least most of the major risks, and (iii) launch viable response.
7.2.1 Contextual literature findings and their conformity to Hypothesis 1
The “traditional” RM literature deals only with the project level. Besides, the international
aspects are covered thinly or country-specifically (e.g. the country of origin versus the host country
of a project). The literature does not contain any analysis of project RM conducted early on at the
business level. Likewise, there are no references on the tools and methods developed to manage
project risk at the business level. However, some references suggest questionnaire-based lists for
risk identification, e.g. South Korean (Kim et al. 2008) and Indian (Jha and Devaya 2008)
contractors in a specific foreign (national) environment). Some other questionnaire-based surveys
have exposed a still widely used method to deal with the eventual consequences of identified risks,
i.e. to allow for an increase in costs when tendering (obviously, this method would be inaccurate at
the business level). Recently, positive outcomes have also been considered (e.g. Ward and
Chapman 2003), besides the negative ones.
One reason for a lack of references on RM at the level of international construction business
may be that the main actors in construction processes deliver building objects within relatively short
time frames. Thus, the focus is on meeting contractual objectives rather than on developing RM
processes. Risk is dealt with as and when it occurs, while less focus is put on how to mitigate it well
in advance. Moreover, it seems to be unusual to systematically prepare for and grasp opportunities,
in particular in international projects. In the context of the international oil and gas offshore
industry, Langlo et al. (2007) consider that opportunity management is actually the owners’ terrain,
while RM is the area of project management. Indeed, Ofori (2003) states that there is no suitable
framework for international construction, although he points to “managerial expertise” as the
most important success factor in overseas construction, with its many “problems and peculiarities”.
Concerning the business level, Huovinen (2003) found that no research tradition existed concerning
construction-related business management, on the basis of his extensive literature review. In
addition, some calls for better foresight and more proactive measures at the business level and
within an actor’s control have been made in the literature (e.g. Palojärvi et al. 2008b, Hamel and
Prahalad 1994).
To summarize, the emerging applied theory on risk and the proven RM methods indirectly
supports Hypothesis 1, e.g. early risk identification is considered to be the cornerstone of an RM
process in general. When frameworks to analyze international construction (business) are lacking,
any advancements and structured discussions on traditional and enlarged RM processes will meet
with difficulties. Admittedly, the literature on the RM of the international construction business is
scarce. Therefore, its weight to validate Hypothesis 1 is limited. However, there are no strong
statements against Hypothesis 1 either in the reviewed literature, e.g. suggestions that business-level
dealings  and  project-level  operations  should  be  kept  as  separate  processes  or  that  RM  at  the
Lauri Palojärvi (2009) RM in the international growth business of Finnish construction firms
150
business level should be limited to financial risk types only. Instead, the relevant books deal with
entire project-level RM processes, i.e. risk identification, analysis, and response. Many articles
focus on identifying, measuring, and rating various success and failure factors that are often found
by questionnaires sent to engineers and other experts of varying ranks, capacities, and experience.
Overall, it seems that the idea of the application of project RM techniques and tools to the business
level is missing within the reviewed literature.
7.2.2 Case-based evidence and its conformity to Hypothesis 1
The operative case descriptions dealt with various business transactions in international markets,
including delivery contracts and other types of business growth projects, such as the market entries,
the turnaround, the acquisitions, and the merger. Besides, the respective background strategy cases
(2, 6, and 8) of each of Groups 1-3 further clarified some important RM measures that had already
been introduced at the business level. In many cases, the novel idea of applying the project RM
tools and techniques early on at the business level proved to be feasible, i.e. defining the
objectives, identifying the major risks, and launching a response.
The early Cases 1 and 3 support Hypothesis 1 only indirectly (see Table 6-2). In Case 1, there
was no well-considered business strategy for the international growth. In the 1970s, the projects
were organized at the corporate level. The major risks were assessed and the response was launched
by the staff managers assigned to the sub-projects. In  Case  3, no international growth strategy
existed  either,  for  several  internal  reasons.  On  the  basis  of  the  risks  that  occurred  and  their
consequences in both cases, it is here assessed that the hypothetical major risks were identified
incorrectly, vaguely, or not at all at the business level. The early identification and management of
the actual major risks at the business level would most probably have (or at least it could have)
improved the financial results. In turn, Cases 4-7 and 9 support Hypothesis 1. The risk
identification  and  the  consecutive  RM were  carried  out  at  the  business  level  with  high  or  at  least
medium success rates. The launching of the RM only at the project level would probably have
reduced (and did reduce in Case 4) the impact of an efficient response considerably. Case 8 also
conforms to Hypothesis 1. In Case 8 (as in Case 4), the hypothetical major risks were identified by
the experts, but no RM at the business level was carried out or it was carried out inadequately. The
inevitable consequences were dealt with only at the project level. The two hypothetical major risk
types were identified, these risks occurred, and hence the success rates were very low or medium. A
more efficient response at the business level could have at least improved the outcome.
To summarize, the case evidence clearly conforms to Hypothesis 1. In many cases the RM was
launched at the business level, at least to the extent of formal risk identification. When the response
measures to the identified hypothetical major risks were launched at the business level, the success
rates were at least medium, and often high or even very high. When the hypothetical major risk was
not identified, or when the responses were launched only at the project level (e.g. Cases 3, 4, and 8),
the success rates were medium at best and even very low in one case.
7.2.3 Comparison of the literature-based and case-based conformities to Hypothesis 1
The case findings conform well to Hypothesis 1, while the literature findings conform only
indirectly or remain silent. Why do the degrees of conformity differ? The recent literature does
not really address the hypothetical method, i.e. also to apply the proven project RM tools and
techniques at the business level. In turn, the case evidence conforms well to Hypothesis 1.
However, this evidence has not yet been subjected to a severe critique, i.e. “Could some other
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factor, other than already launching the RM at the business level, have caused the fairly positive
outcomes?” and “Could some other factor, other than launching the RM at the project level only,
have caused the medium rate of the outcome?” Let us come back to this critique in Chapter 8.
The applied theory on risk as derived from uncertainty, i.e. to convert uncertain events to risk
events by giving them probabilities, worked well. To fully exploit e.g. Flanagan and Norman’s
(1993) RM method, clear business objectives have to be set before the implementation of projects in
order to be able to assess the probability (“risk”) of any deviation. In all of Cases 1-9, at least the
financial business objectives were always set because in the case firms and other Finnish major
companies, this has been the standard procedure both in business-level and project-level
management since the 1970s. Additional objectives, e.g. on market positions, quite apart from
“soft“ objectives such as reputations, brands, etc., became the standard in the Finnish construction
business only in the 1980s, along with “Porterian” attitudes to competitiveness (Porter, 1980).
Complexity management was not part of the core RM chain (objectives – risk identification –
response) in any of Cases 1-9. In this study, complexity is defined rather as a characteristic or a
condition of a project, a business, or its environment. A high rate of complexity increases the
potential severity of the consequences because of the possibility of a rapid escalation of a risk
and/or a consequent crisis within a complex system (e.g. Shenhar and Dvir 2004). It may render
response measures themselves more complicated because of (i) the high number of connected
elements and (ii) the intensity of those connections. Reducing complexity, by reducing the number
of elements and/or interconnections in a system, should therefore always be a goal when fighting
risks with potentially negative consequences (e.g. Case 1/Nigeria, Case 6, and Case 9). Moreover,
increased  complexity  renders  a  system,  i.e.  a  construction  project  or  a  business,  particularly
vulnerable to the rapid development of a mismanaged risk into a crisis. One event may lead rapidly
to many others via many interconnections, and further even into a disaster (Loosemore 2000). On
the other hand, positive development may be rapid as well (e.g. Cases 5 and 6).
The development of practical RM over the years was also reflected in the cases. In the 1970s,
the contractors added a “15% or so” as a “risk allowance” on their bid estimates against the
“something may go wrong” factor (Case 1). Along with Porter’s (1980) school on creating a
competitive edge, the more positive attitude of “something may go better than…” was emerging.
This led to (i) a better understanding of the development of competencies and, consequently, (ii)
where and (iii) when the conditions were right to exploit those competencies (Cases 4, 5, 7, and 9).
The predicting of the future conditions of external factors became the art behind strategy planning.
In Cases 4 and 5, Partek’s predictions were labeled as the “basic beliefs” of the background
strategy. At the same time, the question “What if…?” became a standard tool when pondering large
and important investments with a minimum return time of several years, which was typical for e.g.
large manufacturing companies. Lifson and Scheifer (1982) had already defined a two-way
approach, i.e. opportunities were brought into the picture as well. In the same decade, the formal
identification of risk and its response became standard for every investor in the construction
business as well. So far the building product business has not yet tried to grasp opportunities as
eagerly as e.g. their colleagues in the financing business.
7.3  Relations between the findings on the cross-cultural issues and Hypothesis 2a
Hypothesis 2a is that major risks related to the attainment of the targeted business objectives are
inherent within key managers’ competencies and their insufficiency in particular to manage cross-
cultural issues within the focal context.
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7.3.1 Literature findings on the cross-cultural issues and their conformity to Hypothesis 2a
Concerning a firm’s competences in general, Huovinen (2003) defines systemic, organizational
competences consisting of all the technology, embedded knowledge, capabilities, and resources
needed for the attainment of business goals.  In turn, Sanchez and Heene (1996) consider
managerial competences to be the pivotal components of a firm’s organizational competences to
help it attain its goals. In addition, the recent generic references on international business failures or
successes put forward two main themes, expatriate failures and the inability of headquarters
managers to appreciate the cultural challenges of doing business overseas (Johnson et al. 2006).
Olson and Olson (2000) state that cultural differences form the single biggest factor that affects
global projects. Mäkilouko (2003) concentrates on multicultural project leadership to mitigate
multicultural problems. Gratton and Erickson (2007) state that “for success … four general
categories – executive support, HR practices, the strength of a team leader, and the structure of a
team itself.” Out of the eight practices for success, one is “… leaders to be both task- and
relationship-oriented”. Others stress role clarity and task ambiguity. These authors seem to place a
good deal of trust in collaboration as a success factor. According to Fisher and Ranasinghe (2000),
people do not have competences independent of context. Jubb and Robertham (1997) have stated
that certain competencies could be regarded as being situation-specific.
In the contextual literature, there is no framework to analyze success in international
construction (Ofori 2003). Instead, there are many lists of success and failure factors – “risks” – in
various, very specific situations, e.g. related to construction projects in specific business
environments. In plain English, such factors are not firmly connected to business objectives to allow
for the accurate stipulation of their connections to risk. Sometimes the number of success/failure-
related variables (e.g. Ahadzie et al. 2008) is even too high for any organized RM at the project
level, let alone at the business level. In international construction, the Construction Industry
Institute (1993) stresses future needs and points to leadership, efficient resource allocation,
innovation, and organizational effectiveness as success factors. Flanagan (1994) brought up seven
issues, including “joint ventures, alliances and partnering", without prioritizing them. Langford
(2000) stressed the importance of cultures in a direct context. Fisher and Ranasinghe (2000)
studied JVs as a cultural factor playing a role in uncertainty avoidance. In turn, success (and
failure) factors have been investigated with questionnaires on e.g. Korean or Turkish contractors.
For example, Han et al. (2007) and Kim et al. (2008) emphasize a contractor’s own ability, i.e. the
management of various functions, as crucial. Mawhinney (2001) and Oz (2001) even put forward
government actions as an important source of a firm’s competitiveness when reconsidering Porter’s
diamond framework. In particular, Ofori (2003) posits that an internationalizing contractor must
possess certain prerequisites and that managerial expertise is considered the most important
factor (for competitiveness) because of the peculiarities and problems of overseas projects.
To summarize, the contextual literature findings conform to Hypothesis 2a, although the
referred expressions are often admittedly indirect. The somewhat scarce findings emphasize the
importance of managerial competence. However, no direct competence-related expressions for key
managers’ competencies are used. Instead, e.g. “managerial expertise”, “leadership”, and “a
contractor’s own ability to manage”, etc. are named as success factors, without them being
connected to business objectives. The issue of cultures is also widely referred to as a key factor in
success.
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7.3.2 Case-based evidence on the cross-cultural issues and its conformity to Hypothesis 2a
The case evidence conforms well to Hypothesis 2a. More or less major risks were identified and
these risks were almost always inherent in the key managers’ cross-cultural competencies (see
Table 6-3). The level of the key managers’ cross-cultural competencies was more common as a
major risk (or the source of one) than the second hypothetical  major risk,  i.e.  the contractual role
and arrangement selected. Many other major risks were – or they should have been – identified in
the cases as well, but rather sporadically. The significant and efficient measures taken to respond to
the identified risks were not launched without prior identification. Over the years, the contextual
techniques and tools have improved and in some cases have already become routine steps. This has
made early risk identification possible well before implementation (e.g. Case 7, Sertolovo). In the
light of these cases, at least the major risks (and/or their sources) inherent in key managers’ cross-
cultural competencies should always be carefully managed, because this was the most commonly
appearing major risk type in the cases.
7.3.3 Comparison of the literature-based and case-based conformities to Hypothesis 2a
The case-based evidence conforms well to Hypothesis 2a, while the literature findings conform
less directly. Why do these degrees of conformity differ? The research tradition on construction-
based business management was non-existent, at least until recently (Huovinen 2003) and,
consequently, there are no suitable frameworks to analyze international construction (Ofori 2003).
Therefore,  it  is  difficult  to  explain  clearly  and  to  stipulate  connections  between  e.g.  management
competencies (and their components) and success or failure factors. The current trend in RM
research is to replace the “management by rear-window view “of industrial giants, based e.g. on the
cost control and profit and loss analysis of the past, etc., with the  management of more multi-cross-
cultural, complex, fragile, and global networks which look carefully into the future (further in
Chapter 9).
7.4 Relations between the findings on the contractual issues and Hypothesis 2b
Hypothesis 2b is that major risks related to the attainment of the targeted business objectives are
inherent within key managers’ competencies and their insufficiency in particular to manage
contractual issues within the focal context.
7.4.1 Literature findings on the contractual issues and their conformity to Hypothesis 2b
In the generic and contextual literature, contractual issues often appear as the second highest in
importance ranking among success and failure factors. Palojärvi (1986) stated that RM must be
based  on;  (i)  the  equilibrium  of  the  parties’  benefits;  (ii)  incentives  to  other  parties,  and  (iii)  the
specification and adjustment of contract documents. Shumway (2004) puts it more bluntly:
“….biggest risks …today …are the terms and clauses in the prime contract”. Turner (2002) notes
that in the more common approach, “the construction client … negotiates hard to achieve the lowest
possible  price  from  the  vendor...  as  a  win-lose  game”.  Turner  himself  prefers  “the  correct  way”,
where “the owner assembles resources and motivates them  ... to achieve their objectives”. To find
ways to tackle situations as described e.g. by Turner (2002), several other authors recommend a
“best-for-project” approach, e.g. Sakal (2005) in the context of heavy civil engineering. Parties
should look for win-win situations. Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2002), in the contexts of Hong
Kong and China, propose co-operative relationships and even “joint risk management”. Sakal
(2005), in the Australian context, proposes “project alliancing”, particularly for services that are
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difficult  to  define  or  which  have  a  scope  that  is  likely  to  change,  and  cost  under-/overruns  to  be
shared by participants. Rowlinson (2006) connects the advantages of project alliances to RM, i.e.
by proactive RM, participants sharing risks and outcomes and placing risks on the table so as also to
expose the hidden ones. The vital prerequisites of such alliances are e.g. trust, common goals, and
understanding of each other’s expectations and values (Humphreys 2003). Several authors mention
incentives to streamline the objectives of parties. ICE’s (2005) RAMP manual reads that “interests
of various parties to be defined by contractual arrangements” and that “… to ensure that these
arrangements take full account of residual risks.” For example, e.g. FIDIC (2005: 17.3 and
17.4) defines only a list of “Employer’s risks” and their consequences, and usually the measures
required.
Onishi (2002) connects uncertainty to contractual risk. Referring to Kobayashi (2001), he states
that incomplete contracts provide rules to cope with contingencies and one of the most important
ones is a risk-sharing rule. Further, he defines contractual risk (as an internal risk), i.e. “its peril
or hazard is parties’ behaviors”. Parties may identify the risk that some party will not behave as (the
observer) expected. Referring to Posner and Rosenfield (1977), Onishi posits that risk-sharing in
contract  law  boils  down  to  “which  party  would  bear  a  loss  if  they  could  have  foreseen  that
contingency”. This gives support to Turner’s (2002) view that contracts need to be able to respond
to unforeseen circumstances.
Most of the reviewed 20 recent articles discuss managing changes and contingencies, risk-sharing,
contract forms, avoiding and solving claims and disputes, how to improve public procurement, etc.
as the main topics (see Table 3-6). Four semi-common themes on managing contractual risk can
be identified, i.e. managing project risks by (i) relational contracting and (ii) by an owner’s
alternative contract/procurement strategies, (iii) managing risks by partnering (or alliancing), and
(iv) managing international contractors’ risks in evolving country contexts, e.g. China.
To summarize, the abundant findings on generic construction and the scarce ones with an
international focus both clearly support Hypothesis 2b. From  the  view  of  construction
contractors, contractual arrangements and consequent contractual risks are considered as being of
the highest importance. Many approaches to contractual RM have been proposed concerning e.g.
risk-sharing in unforeseeable events. No ways to attack causes of risk are addressed proactively.
The reviewed articles advocate two aims, as follows. (i) How to mobilize the contractual parties’
combined expertise earlier for better performance, rather than to lean on the expertise of one party
only to fight risks outside the control of the parties, especially in public works, where cost overruns
are quite common. (ii) Parties should be able to trust that unforeseeable events should contractually
be dealt with in a fair and reasonable manner. This saves bids from unnecessary covers. Contractors
and suppliers might even share their eventual special expertise to their mutual benefit. How to build
this feature into contractual arrangements in the international construction industry, without
disturbing competition rules, has not been discussed within the reviewed literature.
7.4.2 Case-based evidence on the contractual issues and their conformity to Hypothesis 2b
Overall, the case-based evidence conforms well to Hypothesis 2b (see Table 6-4). The level of
the key managers’ contractual competencies was less common as a major risk (or the source of one)
than the second hypothetical major risk inherent in cross-cultural competencies. The degrees of
conformity are high in seven of the cases,  but not in Case 1 and Case 5.  Case 1 resulted in many
varying degrees of conformity, but the high degree can be linked to the typical “sheer ignorance”
factor at the very beginning. For example, the acceptance of the turnkey responsibility in the
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construction of the low-cost housing area was evidence of this state of affairs, apart from also being
a sign of great courage as well. In Case 5 the reason for not identifying a major contractual risk was
simple. In the acquisition itself, the very straightforward deal, carried out under the conditions of
the quite similar crossing Dutch and Finnish cultures, did not include any challenging contractual
set-up.  Moreover,  the  company  that  was  acquired  (VBI)  was  not  made  to  change  its  proven
contractual roles.
Several cases contained a challenging selection and/or change of contractual role. The outcome
itself varied, depending on the competencies available for managing the situation. When the key
managers’ competencies on the contractual issues were rated as not quite sufficient (e.g. Cases 4
and 8), the overall success rates were clearly lower (medium and very low) than in the cases where
the respective competencies were rated as sufficient and/or there was no challenging contractual
situation regarding the project implementation.
7.4.3 Comparison of the literature-based and case-based conformities to Hypothesis 2b
The literature findings and the case evidence both conform well to Hypothesis 2b. When no
major differences are revealed, it is instead asked: “Did the case evidence also recognize the same
new approaches that were found within the reviewed literature, e.g. project alliancing?” In fact, the
evidence speaks for this. For example, (i) the market entrant’s and its partners’ interests were vested
in  the  joint  venture  firm  in  Case  3,  (ii)  the  interests  of  the  buyers  and  those  of  the  sellers  were
combined (e.g. through the acquisition price condition) in the acquisition Cases 4 and 5, and (iii) the
contractor’s  and  its  client’s  interests  towards  the  ultimate  client  (the  Russian  Army)  were
streamlined in Case 7. However, the earliest case, Case 1, reflects the fact that in the western culture
of public clients, it was, and it may still be, difficult to introduce the idea of joint RM without
compromising the competitive bidding rules, let alone the transparent implementation of the
contract.
7.5 Summary of the respective degrees of conformity to Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b
Besides the emerging theory on risk and its proven RM methods, no novelties were found from
within the reviewed literature or the case evidence. Concerning Hypothesis 1, the application of
the proven project RM tools and techniques at the business level too is, however, considered to be a
theoretical novelty of the RM process within the context of international construction.
Understandably, these RM fundamentals could not be traced within the reviewed contextual
literature.
Concerning Hypothesis 2a, the reviewed literature is somewhat unclear in its expressions,
although “culture(s)” as such is ranked high as a factor to be considered within international
contexts. Even Ofori (2003) speaks about problems and peculiarities without going into detail.
Consequently, no clear recognition of the need for appropriate RM is provided within the literature.
In all of Cases 1-9, the risks inherent in the cross-cultural competencies occurred, which thus
confirms their relative importance. The applications of the proven RM process also proved to be
efficient, because of the time requirements, to manage the respective risks. Concerning Hypothesis
2b, contractual arrangements are widely discussed in the literature. Cases 1-9 also clearly proved
the relative importance of key managers’ contractual competencies. The application of the proven
RM methods (Hypothesis 1) would naturally be a much more efficient way to manage the
respective contractual risks at the business level too, because of their highly irreversible nature.
A possible interdependency between the two hypothetical risk types is discussed in Chs. 8 and 9.
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8. DISCUSSION AND CRITIQUE
8.1 Results and the research methodology
The two main results of this study are as follows.
(1) The proven project RM methods can be applied efficiently at the business level, which thus
enables major risks to be identified proactively and an early response to be made to them
in the focal context of international construction.
(2) Major risks are inherent in key managers’ competencies regarding cross-cultural and
contractual issues and such risks can be managed more efficiently early on at the business
level, rather than at the project level only in the focal context of international construction.
The selected research method is longitudinal, self-ethnographic, and qualitative insider action
research combined with case study research. Overall, this insider action researcher followed up and
remained involved with the nine cases during a period of 32 years (1974-2006). The study includes
the acquisition of a fairly extensive pre-understanding, the longitudinal gathering of the case data,
the setting of the two hypotheses in the year 2007, and the conduct of the comprehensive literature
review on the enlarged risk view, i.e. uncertainty management, RM, and crisis management in
complex conditions, as well as the two limited literature reviews on the areas of the two
hypothetical major risk types and the examination of the hypotheses with combined insider action
and case study research. The backbone, i.e. the combined insider action and case study research,
was conducted in four parts: (i) the rationale of the case study and the RM process (in essence the
setting of objectives, risk identification, and response) are clarified in Chapters 1, 2, and 4, (ii) the
5-page case descriptions, boiled down from their 15-page versions, are presented in chronological
order in Chapter 5, (iii) the cross-case analysis and the respective evidence are reported upon in
Chapter 6, and (iv) the cross-case evidence is briefly compared with the contextual literature
findings in Chapter 7.
The main results are primarily based on the case-specific evidence and other findings drawn from
the nine case studies. The reviewed literature either remains silent about the application of project
RM methods at the business level or it directly or indirectly supports the embeddedness of
hypothetical major risks within key managers’ competencies regarding cross-cultural and/or
contractual issues. Over the years, the case study research turned out to be the only viable method
(see the rationale in Ch. 2). The selection of the nine cases covers the most common business and
project situations of the international growth among the major Finnish construction contractors and
building product suppliers over the three decades. The main results lay the ground to suggest many
solutions for rather severe problems when managing contextual major risks. Thus, the above
rationale gives reason to believe that these results are justified and in balance with the applied
research methodology.
8.2 Connections between this study and the reviewed literature
8.2.1 Basic definitions
In this study, uncertainty is understood traditionally, i.e. it prevails when a decision-maker has no
historical data (e.g. “a group of instances”) relating to a situation for an event, conditions, etc. to
occur (Knight 1921). Uncertainty is an origin of risk. Risks are understood to be derived from the
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everlasting uncertainty of all events, including risky events. Risk is here defined as follows.  Risk is
the possibility that set expectations will not be met (Palojärvi 1986). In turn, Flanagan and
Norman (1993) define a risk as the occurrence of an event. A probability is given to an occurrence,
subjectively or objectively. Rowe (1977) defined a risk as a potential negative consequence of an
event in a chain of events, i.e. “causative event(s) - outcome(s) - exposure - consequence(s) -
consequence value(s)”. Lifson and Scheifer (1982) defined risk thus: “risk is an uncertainty related
to estimated consequences and risk means that results may be worse or better than expected”. A
consequence of a risk is here either positive or negative, depending on expectations, i.e. a two-way
approach has been adopted. This two-way approach was already emerging in the early 1980s
(Lifson and Scheifer 1982). At that time, it was an innovation in the construction-related RM
research. From the point of view of crisis management, crisis is here understood according to
Loosemore’s (2000) definition, i.e. a crisis is a consequence of a mismanaged risk. In turn, system
complexity has been taken into account as a condition of a business or a project, in alignment with
Shenhar and Dvir’s (2004) definition, i.e. it depends on a number of elements and their connections.
Enlarged risk management (ERM) is defined as a causal chain of managing uncertainty >>
risk >> crisis, in conditions of high complexity.  Proven (traditional) RM is defined as RM
measures generally recognized and applied by the practicants. Such measures include at least the
goal setting, risk identification and the response thereto.
8.2.2 Focal context
The  focal  context  of  this  study  is RM in the international growth business of Finnish
construction contractors and building product suppliers. In the reviewed literature, this context
is not applied at all. On the other hand, the project RM literature on domestic construction projects
is abundant. Traditionally, business-level RM is treated as the corporate-level management of
financial risks, e.g. “enterprise RM” (Lam, 2003) or “corporate RM” (DeLoach 2000), which is
excluded from this study. In turn, the contextual denominator “international” stands for the sake of
the cross-cultural issues, although other e.g. cross-industry cultural contexts exist. The denominator
“Finnish” is directly coupled with the four Finnish corporations or employers the insider action
researcher was involved in over the three decades. Within the reviewed literature, no international
construction-related RM references were found (see Table 3-3), which is in line with Ofori’s
(2003) statement that “there is no suitable framework to analyze success in international
construction”. However, several references were found to address the success and failure factors of
focal contractors based in their host countries and having ventures overseas, with the help of
questionnaire surveys (Ofori 2003). Those factors had no connections to management functions.
Many  of  these  references  also  deal  with  the  management  of  cross-cultural  aspects,  e.g.  Langford
(2000) and Fisher and Ranasinghe (2000). This readily available contextual knowledge has been
taken into account in this study. In turn, the contextual “growth” situations have not been referred
to within the contextual literature, which is mainly focused on project-level issues. It is
understandable, because growth is one of the objectives at the business level.  In this study, the
growth objective was present in all the nine cases. Business-level growth objectives serve as vital
triggers of change. In turn, changes are the fundamental reasons of risk – if no change, then no
risk.
8.2.3 Research methodology
Primarily, this study is longitudinal and qualitative, self-ethnographic, combined insider action
and case study research. This combination was the only available method for trying to solve the
rather severe management problems in the focal construction business. In general, the insider action
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research  approach  is  the  only  way to  obtain  deep  and  yet  vital  data  and  information  on  risks  and
their causes and consequences. The rare long period of collecting the case study documents between
the years 1986-2006 made it possible to examine both the business-level and project-level cases of
the same corporation, apart from the simultaneous tackling of the most common international
growth situations. As an insider, this researcher was able to acquire even highly confidential
documents and to be aware of the internal politics, at all times. This opportunity is not allowed to an
ordinary action researcher as an outside observer. No similar studies with long observation periods
of this kind were found within the reviewed literature.
Within the outcomes of the extensive literature review, no innovations of transferring project
RM methods to business-level management were  found.  The  empirical  findings  of  the  RM
literature in the international construction context were mostly based on questionnaires, possibly
answered by the younger cadres of staff within the contracting firms that were approached, i.e. they
are not based on insider action research. When there are no structural frameworks either, those
empirical findings do not provide data for deeper analyses. A lack of suitable frameworks also
prevents researchers from connecting success and failure findings with management functions or
measures (Ofori 2003). The two complementary limited article reviews were also conducted in
the areas of the two hypothetical major risk types. These findings support indirectly and directly the
case evidence on the importance of managing key managers’ cross-cultural and contractual
competencies well. This applies particularly to the avoidance of contractual risks, the importance of
which is stressed in the literature.
8.2.4 Results
The cross-case evidence clearly conforms to Hypothesis 1, i.e. that proven project RM methods
can also be applied reliably at the business level and, thus, the effectiveness of managing major
international business risks can be improved within the focal context. In the literature, more
proactive RM processes are called for. The setting of objectives is not specified as a step of RM.
Risk identification is unanimously considered to be a cornerstone of any further RM. In this study,
the setting of objectives is a founding step for an RM process, when the two other steps, i.e.
risk identification and response launching, are structurally similar (e.g.  Flanagan and Norman
1993).
In the literature, no wider RM views are considered or even challenged. Some references (e.g.
Langlo et al. 2007) suggest that uncertainty should be left with owners and RM with contractors.
From among the large number of co-contributing references of this study, a few are worthy of being
picked out, as follows. In relation to the view of enlarged RM, as applied to the focal context, this
study relies in particular on the following references (see Chapter 3).
(i) Flanagan and Norman (1993) for managing risk in construction
(ii) DeLoach (2000) for managing risk in international non-construction businesses
(iii) Loosemore (2000) for managing crises in construction projects
(iv) Lichtenberg (2000) for uncertainty in firms, businesses, and projects
(v) Shenhar and Dvir (2004) for complexity in non-construction projects.
From among many edited significant manuals and guide books, one reference is here considered
to be perhaps the most applicable one:
(vi)  Institute of Civil Engineers (2005) Risk analysis and management for projects
(RAMP) manual.
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The cross-case evidence clearly conforms to Hypothesis 2, i.e. major risks related to the
attainment of the targeted business objectives are inherent within key managers’ competencies and
their insufficiency in particular to manage (2a) cross-cultural issues and (2b) contractual
arrangements within the focal context. In this study, risk identification is defined as being a
profound step for any further RM. This is in line with the mainstream RM frameworks. The
identification of major risks, at a minimum, is here considered as being carried out by experts,
particularly when dealing with cross-cultural and contractual issues, rather than by computerized
simulation methods. This statement finds both support (e.g. Forbes et al. 2008) and challenges
within the literature (e.g. Kähkönen 2006).
In the literature, the major risks inherent in key managers’ competencies to manage cross-
cultural issues are not discussed in the focal context,  although  the  relative  importance  of
managing cross-cultural issues receives indirect or even direct support within the contextual and
generic research (e.g. Ofori 2003, Langford 2000, Johnson et al. 2006, Olson and Olson 2000,
Fisher and Ranasinghe 2000).
On the other hand, contractual arrangements are widely considered quite important within the
contextual literature (e.g. Onishi et al. 2002). However, the literature is silent on the case-based
evidence of this study, i.e. it is likely that major risks are inherent in contractual arrangements
and the proactive launching of an appropriate response at the business level may be highly
effective.  Instead,  various  tools,  e.g.  relational  contracts,  joint  RM,  and  alliancing,  have  been
suggested to mobilize the contractual parties’ combined expertise and to ensure they are able to
trust that unforeseeable events will be dealt with fairly and reasonably.
This study connects the management of both the hypothetical major risk types with the
competencies of key managers. This connection has not been proposed in the literature. One
underlying reason may be that there is no research tradition on construction-related business
management (Huovinen 2003, 2006). Competencies to manage both cross-cultural and contractual
issues can be connected to the attainment of goals and the competences of focal firms, as stated by
Sanchez and Heene (1996).
8.3 Innovations and impacts of the study
Clearly, the two-way RM approach has gained more “popularity” over the decades. In the 1980s,
the two-way approach was a rare idea. The recent literature, in turn, contains significant support for
both ways of thinking. The two-way approach is visible in the more recent cases as well. Indeed,
the novel features of this study are here posited to be related to the RM process (i.e. identification,
analysis, and response), visible in the cases that are not traceable within the reviewed literature. The
three innovations contain research objects and innovations for the RM process as follows.
(i) The primary innovation is the result that the proven project RM methods and tools can
already be efficiently applied at the business level. The literature remains silent about this. The
listings of risk types have no connection to the emerging theory on risk.
(ii) The second innovation is the result that major risks are inherent in key managers’
competencies regarding cross-cultural issues. Moreover, “cultures” should also include e.g.
industries, businesses, and organizations. This receives indirect support within the non-
construction-related, internationally focused literature, where ethnic and national cultures are
considered an important success (and failure) factor. However, it is possible that some other,




entirely different major risk could have prevented an identified major risk (cross-cultural, that is)
from occurring, and that risk just has not been written about. A similar result concerning
competencies on contractual arrangements is not considered an innovation here.
(iii) The third suggestion involves the proactive management of major risks early on as part of
business-level management. The literature is also silent about this. The major advancement of RM
processes is thus possible. This was strongly hinted at by the case evidence, when proven RM
methods were applied to “projectable” business transactions. Measures to mitigate and avoid risks,
with their consequences, early on at the business level could be based on contractual arrangements
as  a  whole  or  on  distinct  parts  of  them,  such  as  partner  and/or  stakeholder  selection,  contractual
structures, contracts, conditions, CM, disputes, and conflicts.
As for the overall impacts of advanced contextual RM, it can be expected that the number, size,
and complexity of construction projects with cross-cultural issues involved will grow, along with
the globalization trend of businesses. When the proven project RM tools are applied early on at the
business level, business goals can be better attained. When the huge volume of global construction
business is taken into account the significance of such advances will tens to be very big, too.
8.4 Validity and reliability of this study
8.4.1 Validity and reliability in qualitative research
In general, validity refers to the applicability (Figure 8.4-1) of a study to measure what it is
supposed to measure (Hirsjärvi et al. 1997). Reliability refers to the repeatability of a study, i.e.
whether the same result could be achieved when repeating the study (Yin 2003a). In qualitative
research as a whole, there is no firm selection of established research methods (Silverman 2004).
Therefore, each study has to be validated as a case of its own (Silverman 2004). This boils down to
the issue of the validity of a study process (Eskola et al. 1998 p. 210). Therefore, the validity of the
research data and the validity of the conclusions have to be separated (Eskola et al. 1998 p. 212).
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The main validity criterion is the researcher himself. Usunier (1998) posits that researchers are
afraid of challenging dominant assumptions and they believe that the whole research system rests
on these assumptions. Alvesson (2003) supports that and refers to the common danger that a
researcher tends to remain in “frozen positions”. Eskola and Suoranta (1998) point out another
obvious problem, i.e. the transferring of a researcher’s feelings and intuitions cannot be repeated by
other researchers, even if a reader’s pre-understanding were at the same level. Therefore, this
research process has been reported upon in  detail  and  the  case  descriptions,  based  on  the
authentic documentation, have been written in order to make the cases themselves and in particular
the researcher’s conclusive analysis “explainable to others”. In addition, the dynamics of a
phenomenon should be understood in the respective case setting (Yin 2003a-b, 2004). The goal
is to expand and generalize theories, not to enumerate frequencies (Yin 2003a p. 10). A case study,
which is the backbone of this study, should cover the contextual (i.e. international and growth)
conditions (Yin 2003a p. 11) to explain presumed causal links in real-life interventions, which are
too complex for survey or experimental (research) strategies. Thus, the choice of relying on
insider action research (advocated in sub-chapter 2.2.3) further increases the relative weight of the
researcher as the main criterion and, consequently, a danger of falling into traps exists, as pointed
out by e.g. Usunier (1998) and Alvesson (2003).
Traditionally, the validity issues include: (i) internal validity; (ii) external validity; (iii) reliability,
and (iv) objectivity (Creswell 1998). Accordingly, this study has been protected against the
previous biases and the study as a whole is here evaluated and self-criticized as qualitative insider
action research according to each of the four main components, as follows.
8.4.2 Internal validity
Internal validity here means the findings and how justifiable they are, i.e. whether the conclusions
are justified by and in balance with the method, data, and results. “Can readers believe the
researcher’s interpretations?” (Silverman 2004 p. 289).
A qualitative approach was selected because the ultimate aim of the entire study was to develop
effective ways of managing major risks, i.e. the results and findings should, if at all possible, be
useful for practical business management within the focal context. For reasons explained in sub-
chapter 2.2.2., the only research method available was case study research. Together with the case
studies, insider action research was adopted because it was not possible to collect relevant new
case data on contextual risks from “outside” cases, particularly on the failures of competitors. The
study was initiated to solve in part typical severe management problems within their contexts. Some
authors even consider that the alternative of research-oriented action research to the last detail “is
not an achievable challenge” (Eden and Huxham 2006). A solid pre-understanding of the targeted
situation (or business context) is required (e.g. Gummesson 1991, Eden and Huxham 2006),
because without that the repeatability of the study is jeopardized, i.e. readers without sufficient pre-
understanding may not be able to achieve the same result (Yin 2003a). In this study, both the review
of the relevant literature and the rather long period of time between the first and the last case
contributed to this deep pre-understanding. Moreover, the cases covered several different situations,
in fact all the most typical ones of contextual growth, and thus the cases were able to improve the
applicability of the results in other connections (see Chapter 9).
The main result of this study is that proven project RM tools and techniques can be applied to the
business level, thus enabling major risks to be managed early and in a proactive manner. Many of
them turned out to be inherent in the key managers’ competencies regarding cross-cultural and
contractual issues. This result was based on the balance between the method, the empirical case
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data, and the literature, which also justifies the conclusions (to be presented in Chapter 9).
8.4.3 External validity
External validity here means whether the findings could be applied in other settings of any
relevance,  e.g.  within  project  business  in  general  or  in  other  ethnic  cross-cultural  settings  (in
alignment with Gill 2002 p. 162). In Järvenpää and Kosonen (2000) and Järvenpää (2005), it is
posited that external validity can be assessed by studying a connection of empirical data and
conclusions. In this study, the literature review contributed to the pre-understanding of the situation.
Many key references were published later than most of the cases took place. This accommodated
the benchmarking with the results of the examination of the hypotheses.
The external validity of this study is here mainly assessed on the basis of the connection of the
case data and evidence vis-à-vis the conclusions. The assessment focuses on (i) the RM framework;
(ii)issues  covered  by  the  empirical  data;  (iii)  logical  use  of  the  authentic  documentation;  (iv)
rationale for the actual selection of the case grouping , and (v) the  applicability of the contextual
results, as follows:
(1) The RM framework (Chapter 4), i.e. the RM process of setting objectives and identifying and
responding to major risks is experiential in all its steps, instead of some probabilistic or
decomposition techniques being applied. This choice was made in order to capture the profoundly
important risk identification. It seems that experiential techniques have the widest coverage across a
range of risk types from political to environmental, and from fuzziness to randomness (e.g. Forbes
et al. 2008). Moreover, recently the use of experts has been further supported, e.g. by Radujkovic
(1997) and PMP (2005).
(2) The empirical case data covered the relevant issues widely. (i) The cases extended over a
long period of time. The three decades covered both the up- and downtrends in the Finnish
economy, the birth, rise, and stabilizing of the international construction business of the major
Finnish firms, and also the moments of the great, unpredictable discontinuities such as the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the Finnish membership of the European Community. (ii) The cases
covered various contextual projects of both Finland-based construction contractors and building
product suppliers. The annual total value of their international business today is on the same level as
the entire annual value of the new construction business in Finland. (iii) As to the context, several
typical international growth situations, i.e. market penetration and/or expansion by the contractor’s
initial “first” or very complex contract, a green field investment, and an acquisition and integration
project were covered. (iv) The novel way of describing the implementation cases, together with the
background internationalization strategy, as an independent case produced more evidence than the
individual cases alone would have made possible. This also allowed the display of the significance
of the accumulating knowledge, i.e. this improved the outcome within Groups 1, 2, and 3. (v)
Several cross-cultural situations were included, mainly in crossing ethnic contexts (more than 10)
and also in some contexts of many crossing industry cultures. (vi) The roles of the researcher
covered  a  multiple  set  as  well,  ranging  from  the  local  Resident  Manager  (two  cases)  and  Expert
(two cases) to Executive Vice-President (three cases) and Managing Director (two cases) of the
respective businesses, adding to both the pre-understanding and the true possibility of really
knowing the intimate details of certain decisions and their rationale, besides the politics inside the
firms in general. Yet, in the most important decisions, the researcher was not the ultimate decision
maker. At times the Board of Directors and its Chairman was the final decision maker. In most
cases, the other line manager of the respective business made the key decision.
(3) The empirical case data, i.e. the authentic documentation, has been used logically to reach
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the conclusions. With a rich variety of situations and the multiple role set of the insider action
researcher, it is considered that the empirical case data and the conclusions (i.e. on Hypotheses 1,
2a, and 2b, which all stood up to examination, see Chapter 9) are in balance with each other.
(4) For the case data analysis, some other groupings could have been arranged as well,
alternatively or as complementary. For example, there were Cases 3, 4, 5, and 9 on the market
entries  and  Cases  7  and  9  on  the  complex  delivery  projects.  The  overall  success  rates  could  also
have been the basis of the grouping, i.e. there was one case with a very low success rate, four cases
with medium success rates, and four cases with high or very high success rates. Such groupings
were not selected because the fundamental longitudinal issue, i.e. business- and project-level
observations within the same firm, would have been covered in one firm only, instead of the three
(or even four if Case 1 is included) firms within this selected grouping.
(5) The contextual results are also applicable in the case of delivery projects of investment
objects as long as their characteristics are similar to those of unique end products. These
characteristics include shattered supply networks and big transaction sizes (values) in relation to the
turnover of the business as a whole. Often clients, financiers, and various actors should deliver such
end products together. In many respects, the deliveries of large physical products, e.g. ships and
power plants, involve such characteristics. Usually – but not always – the design of end products is
tailored. Consequently, the external validity of the results of this study can be considered fairly high
in any investment project business in change situations. The main result of introducing project RM
tools and techniques to the business level can be further applied to any complex cross-cultural
situations and contractual arrangements.
In addition, the findings of the reviewed literature were supportive, neutral, or silent as to the
examination of the two hypotheses.
8.4.4 Reliability and the issue of rivaling risks
Reliability is here understood as meaning whether the method renders results which are not random
(Kirk and Miller 1986). Yin (2003a) points to the repeatability of the study – could the same result
be obtained if the process were repeated? Mäkelä (1990) posits that readers must be able to follow
the conclusive analysis in order to either agree or disagree with this. It goes without saying that in
such an exercise a (reader’s) sufficient pre-understanding of the issue is a precondition of the
repeatability.
Overall, the empirical case data, the results, and their analysis are here considered reliable.
This is justified as follows. The main results of this study – i.e. Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b – stood
up to examination  and were based more on the empirical case data. However, the reviewed
literature does not yield any contradictory findings either. The case descriptions were based on the
authentic  documentation  of  the  nine  cases,  primarily  on  the  minutes  of  the  meetings  and  the
memoranda of the respective decision-making bodies, supported by some background material, e.g.
statistics, books, reports, and magazines, in order to describe the scenes better. The descriptions
were limited to 6-9 pages each, for obvious reasons. The descriptions provided were extracted from
longer, 15-page case descriptions. The latter are also available (in electronic form) on request. For
better understanding, the same patterns and formats have been used throughout the processing and
reporting of the case data. This method provides readers with a clear path to follow the researcher’s
analysis until the case-specific conclusions (in Chapter 5), followed by the syntheses (in Chs. 6-7).
The degree of the case-based conformity to Hypothesis 1 was quite high. It  is  very  hard  to
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believe that, with these data, the repeated process would yield a different degree of conformity.
However, the lower degrees of conformity related to Hypothesis 2a and 2b are here subjected to
some further counterarguments, e.g. “Could any other risk, inherent in another, at least
primarily independent source, emerge as “a rivaling major risk”? The response is as follows.
First, the researcher has described the cases in a way so “explainable to others” that readers can
follow the analysis of the researcher and either agree or disagree with them (Mäkelä 1990). Second,
a  third  type,  rivaling  major  risk,  emerged  and  caused  the  same  outcome,  sometimes  in  one  case
only. Third, it is hard to believe that such a major potential major risk could have repeatedly been
overlooked  in  the  case  descriptions.  For  example,  a  major  technical  risk  should  either  have  been
identified, or occurred, or both, in several cases in order to qualify as “a major contextual” risk. The
same applies to a political risk, which, in fact, was identified in several cases, and which was
responded to to such an extent that, when it did occur, there was no major negative consequence of
such a risk.
There is one – albeit remote – possibility, that an unmanaged risk of a third type, e.g. a market
risk or a financial risk, or a risk inherent in technical competencies or in administrative registration
status, could have occurred and forced the contractor or the supplier to abandon the order or the
project before the hypothetical major risk had had time to occur. The response is as follows. (a)
A market risk did occur in several cases but it was well managed, at least partly thanks to the
competencies regarding cross-cultural and contractual issues. (b) Corporate-level financial risk,
however, was excluded from within this study. (c) In the international construction business, the
prequalification methods have for a very long time been at such a level that this kind of internal risk
could no longer have repeatedly had any major significance.
An additional threat to the reliability, which has been suggested in the literature, is the common risk
in insider action research that the researcher would be afraid to challenge the dominant school
of thinking. However, this danger was not acute in this study. The mature age and stable financial
status of the researcher, in fact, brought along with them a certain degree of immunity to such fears.
There was rather a desire to shake, rattle, and roll the prevailing beliefs and doctrines, than to stay
scared and hide out.
One more threat to the reliability could be the method used to assess the competencies of the key
managers in each case. This critique can be directed, of course, to the researcher’s choice of
which six persons should be included within each case or whether “six” is the right number at all.
Some other managers might also feel that they should “belong” to this group. The researcher can
here only respond that the selected managers were, in each case, the six most influential ones of
all the managers employed at the time of the case and phase being described. For instance, the
important staff managers in e.g. the finance, personnel, or R&D areas were not included, simply
because they were not within the operative decision-making line but rather the respected experts. A
further critique concerns the issue of whether education, experience, and motivation should be
given equal weight. On the basis of the previous experiences with the respective experts, the
researcher  considers  this  to  be  appropriate  in  the  case  of  Finnish-owned  firms  with  a  Finnish
management culture.
Finally,  one  more  (theoretical)  issue  arises  from the selection of the cases. Why would it not be
very reliable to depend on cases which had (objectively) turned out to be “total failures”? Why were
almost all the cases included in fact (relatively) successful cases? In other words, it seems that it is
not possible to learn efficient RM from repeated failure cases via insider action research. The
answer is simple. In such failed cases, the heavily involved researcher would probably have
defended himself and blamed others involved. Therefore, it is here aligned with the well-known
advice for learning, i.e. it is more efficient to learn (here efficient RM) from success stories rather
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than from failure cases.
8.4.5 Objectivity and the researcher’s bias
Objectivity is related to the fact that, within qualitative research, the researcher is an important
research tool (Eskola 1998 p. 210). His attitude should be clarified (Strauss et al. 1998 pp. 268-
273). To overcome the subjectivity of  a  researcher,  the  result  should  withstand  a  thorough
examination before it can be confirmed instead of sheer “objective correctness” (Creswell 1998 p.
198).
This study is considered reliable. Besides, the researcher’s biases have been avoided to a
satisfactory extent. Whether this study was able to reach an acceptable degree of objectivity,
instead of biased subjectivity, is briefly addressed as follows. In this insider action research, the
researcher himself was indeed the key research tool. The researcher’s attitude towards the object
stemmed from (i) natural interest in his lifetime work around the subject, but also from (ii) the
humble recognition of the complexity of the international construction business, resulting in threats
and opportunities. This interest led to – apart from the daily work – the early study in the form of
(iii) the licentiate thesis probing the subject, i.e. RM in the international construction business, yet
with a narrow scope, as well as thin literature and empirical data. It encouraged the basic interest of
the researcher in obtaining additional data for this more profound thesis that would create (iv) a
better understanding of the phenomenon and maybe (v) some better tools to manage it. To carry out
the research at this stage of the researcher’s life, after nearly 40 years in the business, was also a
preplanned action. It gave, besides ample time to collect sufficient empirical case data and to gain
an ample pre-understanding of the subject, (vi) freedom of thought. The results and conclusions
could be presented free from any considerations of the next employment or academic assignment,
which, at a younger age, would be a natural prerequisite relating to research.
This researcher has tried to overcome his subjectivity, first, by establishing neutral hypotheses.
The  researcher  would  not  have  gained  or  lost  anything  from  a  particular  result  or  a  diverging  or
converging conclusion on the objectively relevant evidence conforming to the hypotheses. Any
result was good. Second, the thorough examination of the hypotheses should reduce the subjectivity
as well. Admittedly, some subjectivity can be identified in the choice of the research context,
i.e. the international construction business. This is due to the fact that – when the international
business of the major Finnish contractors and building product suppliers commenced in the 1970s –
the early exports was considered as a marginal business and a potential source of big losses among
the Finnish construction community. In the year 2009, the annual value of the international
construction operations will be app. 17Bn€, of which nearly 80% is building product-related
(Rakennuslehti 2009). Thus this international value will  exceed the value of the domestic new
construction. The relevance is thus proved beyond any doubt but it has nothing to do with the
results or conclusions of this research.
Secondly, financial RM as a whole has been left outside this study except for some references
(e.g. Busch 2005, DeLoach 2000), because the empirical case data did not include any documents
for this area. However, it would be theoretically interesting to study whether the corporate-level
RM tools that have been developed, mostly designed to manage financial risks such as debt ratio,
insolvency, etc. could be applied to the project level as well. Such an approach may lead us to a
different scene of reactive management of risks,  while the general  approach of this study was the
opposite: to find more proactive RM methods and tools for an early response.
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8.5 Applicability of the results
Within qualitative research, the statistical significance of the results is not focused upon, for
obvious reasons. Instead, generalization is considered as the applicability of theoretical
constructs. This leads to a requirement for an adequate description of the phenomenon under
research (Eskola and Suoranta 1998). In this study, the essence of the contextual phenomenon
was change under complex international conditions. Changes created uncertainty, resulting in
risks. This theoretical starting point can naturally be applied to anything where a change, with its
uncertain outcome, takes place. No change – no risk!
To generalize, the growth situations of a firm are moments of change. A change should be large
in comparison with the past efforts of the same firm, to make any difference. Transactions for
relatively large changes – be it of environment, production capacity, living conditions, technology
level, etc. – in short periods of time are considered to be investments instead of being treated as
expenses, as is often the case even with large R&D expenses (which, in fact, are also investments).
From  the  dual  views  of  risk  and  opportunity,  there  are  no  major  differences  between  project
management or business management approaches or between the methods of construction,
production,  power  plant,  shipbuilding,  or  gas  pipeline  projects  –  to   name  a  few.  Therefore, the
main novel results of this study on the construction project business could be applicable to
any investment project business within various international contexts.
Because of the empirical case data, the study was limited to Finnish contractors and building
product suppliers. The Finnish vis-à-vis other ethnic cross-cultural context can, however, be
applied to any other cross-cultural context as long as the element of cultural difference is present.
Moreover, the 50-year experience of British investors and contractors in Hong Kong may have
already eliminated the factor of cultural difference and the contextual word “international” would
no longer be valid in that context.
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
9.1 Research object of managing risks in the international growth business of
Finnish construction contractors and building product suppliers
The core research object is risk in the focal context of the international growth business of the
major Finnish construction contractors and building product suppliers. The other denominators of
the title of this study are the limitations or the references to the empirical case data, as follows.
· “International” refers to potentially crossing national cultures, i.e. at least two or several
crossing national cultures. The most common crossing cultures are national, which is
evident both within the reviewed literature and the empirical case data.
· “Growth” refers to an important source of change within the empirical case data. Growth
is  a  profound cause  of  (uncertainty  and)  risks,  as  if  there  is  no  change,  then  there  is  no
risk.
· “Finnish” refers to the empirical case data as a specific yet most common attribute of one
of the crossing cultures in each case. Provided that such data are available, focal cultures
could be any among various ethnic, industrial, company, etc. cultures, as long as there are
at least two potentially crossing cultures for an empirical investigation. It should be noted
that “Finnish” encompasses fully and partially foreign-owned major contractors or
suppliers based in Finland.
· “International business of (Finnish) construction contractors and building product
suppliers” refers to the empirical case data and the same approach can be extended to any
other contexts of international, industrial-scale project business.
9.2 Conclusions on the key concepts within the reviewed literature
The relevant recent books on enlarged RM deal with uncertainty and risk as a framework,
complexity as an amplifier, and crisis management as a derivative of RM, all within primary
contexts inside and outside construction. The observations could be made on the steps taken at the
firm, business, and project levels, on international and/or foreign issues (see sub-chapter 3.2). The
construction-related RM literature mainly  deals  with  the  project  level.  The  international  or
foreign aspects are covered thinly or country-specifically. From among the 64 books, the Top 10
RM concepts were selected on the basis of their perceived high degrees of being both theoretically
advanced  and  practically  applicable.  A  timeline  schedule  of  these  RM  concepts  was  compiled  to
reveal the progress versus the timelines of the nine cases (see Figure 2-1).
The 52 articles on the enlarged view of RM were also reviewed (see Table 3-7).  Among them,
some emerging trends could  be  identified,  as  follows:  (i)  RM  is  increasingly  being  transformed
into uncertainty management or opportunity management; (ii) RM is becoming more and more
important in international projects and acquisitions; (iii) RM is becoming more proactive; (iv) early
warnings are being used more regularly, and (v) new tools and models for enlarged RM are being
developed and used more frequently.
Managerial competencies and contractual arrangements are considered to be key sources of
success (“success factors”), although their verification is based on questionnaire surveys and
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limited case descriptions. It seems that the  trend  in  the  related  RM  research is  to  replace
“management by rear-window view” with the dynamic management of multi-cross-cultural,
complex, fragile, and global networks and the taking looking carefully into the future.
9.3 Conclusions on the contributions of the examination of the hypotheses
The two hypotheses are highly relevant in the focal context.
· The internationalization rate of the Finnish construction business will continue its
growth as a result of globalization and other global trends (see Chapter 1).
· Since Hypothesis 1 stood up to examination, it is here assumed that an increasing share
of international major business transactions will be treated as projects, thus
encouraging stakeholders to apply the proven project RM methods at the business level for
early risk response. Consequently, the need to identify both major risks and opportunities
early will increase, too.
The two hypotheses stood up to examination as follows. The case-based evidence conforms well
to Hypothesis 1, but the reviewed literature remains silent. Within the international construction
context, this is a novel research object which has further applications, i.e. (i) to convert more
business transactions to projects, and (ii) to use project RM methods and tools to attain the
objectives of such ‘business’ projects through the following steps:
· to define objectives;
· to identify the respective situation-specific major risks, i.e. at least the cross-cultural and
contractual risks inherent in key managers’ competencies in the international construction
context;
· to launch an early response at the business level, and
· to monitor and repeat this RM process continuously, which may turn out to be the most
difficult task to achieve in practice.
The case-based evidence conforms well to Hypothesis 2a, but the reviewed literature does this
only indirectly. Within the international construction context, cross-cultural risks and the
competencies to manage them are, together, a novel research object. This also has applicability in
other ‘projectable’ business transactions, for example:
· to bring competency assessments and the respective steps into business transactions
converted to projects;
· to apply the issue of “culture” to wider perspectives, e.g. industry types;
· to take into account all relevant cultures, such as organizational and company cultures,
instead of traditional ethnic and/or national cultures only, and
· to adopt better ways of managing cross-cultural uncertainty, risk, and opportunity early at
the business level.
The case-based evidence and the reviewed literature both conform well to Hypothesis 2b. This
is not a novel research object, but an advance in understanding when contractual risks and the
competencies needed to manage them are coupled through selected contractual roles and other
arrangements. This also has applicability in other ‘projectable’ business transactions, e.g. to adopt
better ways of managing contractual uncertainty, risk, and opportunity early on at the business
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level. However, a contractual risk may be dependent on a cross-cultural risk, which certainly invites
future research.
Overall, it is here concluded that the high and medium degrees of conformity to the respective
hypotheses and the complementary findings have together contributed to the suggested
innovations to advance the emerging theory of risk and, in particular, the proven RM process.
Besides, several novel research objects have been found and justified.
9.4 Conclusions on the other interesting findings
The potential, rivaling risks have been discussed (in Chapter 8), as well as the success and failure
factors being exposed within the nine cases, i.e.  reasons why the objectives were met – or not, or
they could have been met – or not (see Table 6-3). The five other interesting findings are as follows.
(a) The emerging theory on risk as derived from uncertainty worked well. Clear business
objectives have to be set before the implementation of the respective projects in order to be able to
assess the probability (“risk”) of any deviation. In all the cases, at least the financial objectives were
set as a standard routine as part of the management both at the business level and the project level
from the 1970s on. Additional objectives concerning e.g. market positions, reputations, brands, etc.
became standard in the construction business later in the 1980s.
(b) The formal risk identification meant “What can go wrong?” In turn, the building product
suppliers, when considering an investment for growth, recognized the opportunities as well. The
synergy effects were typical opportunities. The early identification of the risks at the business level
often led to proactive RM, instead of the consequences being dealt with at the project level only.
However, this did not automatically result in an improved response. For instance, there were Cases
where the experts identified a major risk but, for different reasons, the decision makers either
underestimated or ignored the risk. This should be addressed to when developing the novel method
further ( see 9.5).
(c) Traditional RM was facilitated by the setting of clear objectives. Otherwise, it would not
have been possible to clearly identify the major risks, let alone to launch the most appropriate
response in all the cases. Consequently, uncertainty management – before turning to “traditional”
RM – with upside and downside possibilities may be relied upon as part of efforts (e.g. projects)
with fuzzy or otherwise somewhat unclear objectives.
(d) The high rate of complexity increased the (potential) magnitude of the consequences. This
rendered the response measures more complicated because of the high number of connected
elements and the intensity of those connections. Moreover, the increased complexity rendered a
construction project or business system particularly vulnerable to the fast development of a
mismanaged  risk  into  a  crisis  and  further  into  a  disaster. Reducing complexity, by reducing the
number of elements and/or interconnections of a system, should, therefore, be the key means for
fighting risks with potentially negative consequences. However, positive developments may be fast
as well.
(e) The development of practical RM over time was reflected in the cases. In the 1970s, the
contractors added 15% or so as a risk allowance on their bid estimates against the “something may
go wrong” factor. Along with Porter’s (1985) competitive advantage, the more positive attitude of
“something may go better than…” was emerging. This led to a better understanding of the
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development of competences and, consequently, of where and when the conditions were right to
exploit those competences. The prediction of the future conditions of the external factors became
the art behind strategic planning. Early on, Lifson and Scheifer (1982) defined a two-way
approach, i.e. opportunities were brought into the picture. However, it seems that efforts to convert
RM to more dynamic uncertainty management will continue more within non-construction-related
research.
9.5  Main features of the suggested novel early response-oriented risk and
opportunity management method (EROM), and the contribution to practice
The relations between the two hypotheses, the reviewed literature, and the case-based evidence
were revealed earlier (in Chapter 7) in order to prepare the ground for suggesting some main
features for a novel risk and opportunity management method to be developed. The current
challenge for RM research is to replace “management by rear-window view” with the management
of more multi-cross-cultural, complex, fragile, and global networks. Highly applicable concepts and
applications will be put forward by consultancy firms and industrial companies. One option to meet
this challenge is better management of uncertainty, which leads to proactive and foresighted
RM at both the business level and project level.
It is herein argued that novel early response-oriented risk and opportunity management
(EROM) method need to be invented, too, for the focal context and the effective management of
future growth and changing business transactions into fully-fledged projects with given goals. The
proactive focus of such novel EROM methods should be on the periods preceding any main
commitments, e.g. contracts, and on major risk types. A potential gain may be highly significant
because practitioners assume that current average success rates in international transactions do not
exceed  a  ratio  of  1:3  (see  Chapter  1).  In  turn, the main features of  EROM  are  here  outlined  as
below.
(i) The attainment of international business objectives is to be ensured by applying EROM
principles for the early, continuous monitoring of focal operations or projects and, when
necessary, for re-setting the objectives to reflect major risk (and opportunity)
identification, and an appropriate response.
(ii) The  extension  of  project  RM  to  the  business  level is viable. Consequently, precious
time is gained for managing major risks with the right response measures. Planning and
acting take time.
(iii) The novel EROM is developed and attached to the standard management tool kit,
which is implied by the early reliance on such a method at the business level, along with
the eventual financial RM tools. In international change projects, major cross-cultural and
contractual risks are inherent in key managers’ competencies.
(iv) The response to such major risks takes alternative measures. The most important
one is already to manage respective competencies at the business level, e.g. by
assigning additional expertise, outsourcing certain tasks, and building the required new
competencies by educating and training the appropriate cadres of managers – or even by
refraining from the entire task as an eventual ultimate solution. Of course, complexity
should be reduced whenever this is feasible for risk mitigation and even risk avoidance.
(v) The capacity to identify and respond to – but definitely not to ignore – major
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opportunities is  emphasized,  particularly  during  the  early  phases  of  projects,  i.e.  at  the
business level. This may last up to decades, depending on the investment planning span
applied. The outcomes of both events are uncertain, however. The risk that the expert
advise will not be properly considered, particularly when they have identified a major risk
with negative consequences, has to be avoided e.g. with an added transparency and
controlling rounds of response measures.
(vi) The method allows for a free selection of the viewpoint, e.g. those of an investor and a
contractor. This viewpoint can be suggested by an expert, e.g. a construction manager.
This allows for the full harvesting of modern contractual arrangements, including, on top
of “standard” contracts, other important issues, e.g. the selection of a contractual structure
and key contractual partners, and vital contract annexes (e.g. design, specifications, and
the specific and general conditions of these contracts).
The main contribution to the practice boils down to the imperative: “The hypotheses shall to be
converted to practical actions to  benefit  the  business!”  Those  practical  actions  will  include,  ao,
the further development of EROM (see  above;  the  development  of  the  respective  RM-  service
product for the Finnish national market has already been commenced), and managing key
managers´ competencies related to the areas of major risks, depending on the context. The
contextual major risk identification itself, based on a solid, holistic foresight as a part of EROM
will improve the effect of further RM measures, according to the results.  Applying the better
RM onto the international business gives a broad idea about the potential gains available. For
example, according to the Engineering News Record (ENR), the international turnover of the 225
world’s largest international contractors was 390 billion $ in 2008 (ENR, 2009).
.
9.6 Applicability of the findings to other cross-cultural contexts of investment project
businesses outside construction
It is here posited that the findings of this international construction project business-focused study
are applicable to any other cross-cultural contexts of investment project businesses, as follows:
(i) Complex, cross-cultural investment projects are all  one of a kind. A project business
company cannot rely on statistical methods to manage their risks successfully. Instead, a
dynamic and qualitative approach is necessary, such as the suggested EROM that is to
be developed in due course.
(ii) The wider applicability stems from the fact that the construction business is conducted
through individual projects for a great number of reasons. It is impossible to foresee any
major change as long as the objects of such projects are considered as individual
investments. On the contrary, newly adopted life-cycle thinking may further strengthen the
individuality rates in projects. From the risk and opportunity point of view, there are
no major differences between PM and business management approaches or between the
methods used in construction, production, power plant, ship-building, or gas pipeline
projects, to name a few primary project types.
(iii) Empirically, this study was limited to Finnish construction contractors and building
product suppliers. By analogy, dyadic Finnish versus other ethnic, cross-cultural contexts
can be complemented with any other cross-cultural contexts, as long as the
element of cultural difference is present.
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9.7 Suggestions for future research
This study contributes in the form of a few novel aspects primarily to the advancement of the RM of
growth and change projects in the international construction business. The undercurrent of the
construction-related literature also calls for more proactiveness. The key contributions include the
application of the proven RM methods early on at the business level and the suggested EROM. In
the same vein, it is here suggested that future research efforts should be directed to advancing the
following key issues.
(i) To assess more accurately situation-specific, required competencies and available
managers’ competencies versus cross-cultural and contractual issues. Within the
international construction business, these managerial competencies are stressed because
respective  commitments  performed  at  the  business  level  are  difficult  to  reverse  or  even
alter or modify during project implementation phases. Proactive methods to measure such
competencies should be developed further.
(ii) To mobilize the capacity of modern contractual arrangements to its full extent. The
key elements of a viable holistic approach include a contractual structure, a contract and
its conditions, and competent contract management. On the basis of ICT solutions, new
contractual arrangements need to be developed, e.g. for complex supply networks.
(iii) To clarify how dependent the two major risk types are, i.e. the key questions to be
explored and solved are as follows. “Could a major risk inherent in contractual
arrangements  be  dependent  on  one  or  several  cross-cultural  risks?”  “What  role  do  key
managers play in those decisions?” “Are the respective decisions just left with corporate
lawyers?”
Within the emerging view of enlarged risk management (ERM), the extreme ends should be studied
in particular, with the focal contexts, i.e.
(iv) To explore and understand deeply the internal workings of uncertainty and that of
disasters, particularly in complex conditions.
In this study, reliance on experts is considered to be the only efficient way to identify the risks in
one-of-its-kind  projects  and  similar  project-like  contextual  growth  situations.  Thus,  the  fast
developments in ICT enable future studies to be suggested in order
(v) To find out whether modern ICT applications can be of more help to experts – if the
former  are  replacing  the  latter  fully  or  in  part – when identifying and further managing
major  risks  during  the  earliest  phases  of  construction  projects  and  other  construction
business transactions, in analogy with e.g. the development of oil and gas fields.
After having succeeded in the solving of the fifth issue, collaborative researchers could continue
with subsequent studies, i.e.
To study global environments and alternative future scenarios and to connect them to the view
of ERM. The ultimate end is to enhance competencies and expertise to prepare better for
alternative, yet possible, future events.
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10. SUMMARY
10.1 Background and research problem of the study
Major changes inside Finland catalyzed the internationalization of the Finnish construction
industry to its initial growth in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Its further growth in the 1980s,
the painful domestic recession, and the consequent restructuring, as well as the recent developments
in the 2000s, have resulted in the international, profitable growth business of the Finnish
construction industry. In the year 2008, the value of this international business was app. 16Bn€, i.e.
at the same level as that of new building production in Finland. In the case of Finnish
construction contractors, their export operations peaked in both absolute and relative terms from
the end of the 1970s until the mid-1980s. Thereafter, the value and importance of their international
business diminished when compared with their domestic business. The domestic recession and the
overnight disappearance of the Soviet market accelerated this development. The Finnish building
product suppliers, after starting slightly later than the contractors, internationalized themselves
consistently and fairly fast, primarily in continental Europe in the 1980s. Since the recession of the
early 1990s, their foreign turnover has grown significantly.
The international business of the Finnish construction industry is forecast to grow and to
exceed its domestic business value by the year 2015. Among Finnish practitioners, the general
understanding has been that effective risk management (RM) can reduce the occurrence and
significance of failures, as well as increasing the occurrence and significance of successes.
According  to  some  US-focused  references  and  the  past  performance  of  Finnish  firms,
internationalization provides valuable experience, more of failures and less of successes. Both the
past outcomes of the internationalization of the Finnish construction industry and the relevant
literature indicate that severe losses can be avoided and/or opportunities can be seized with sound
RM.
Thus, the two research questions are posed as follows. “How can the internationalization process
risks of the leading Finnish construction contractors and building product suppliers be managed?”
and “What are the main risks of the internationally growing Finnish contractors and suppliers,
respectively, and how can they be managed, in particular in the evolving EU, Russian, and Asian
construction markets?
10.2 Roots, purpose and two hypotheses of the study
The risks inherent in the international growth business of Finnish construction contractors and
building product suppliers are approached in this study. The roots of the study, however, were laid
down in the mid-1980s with the author’s licentiate thesis on the management of risks in Finnish
construction project exports. On the basis of these early findings, it was posited that the most
significant risks were related to key managers and the contractual balance between project
stakeholders. Contrary to the general expectation in the literature, this thesis revealed that the much-
feared political risks had not directly caused severe problems for the Finnish actors. Upon having
applied RM methods in practice for more than two decades, the author discovered that project risks
can already be efficiently responded to at the business level.
Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to find and develop better ways for construction
contractors and building product suppliers to manage their major risks in both business-level and
project-level situations on the basis of a literature review and combined case and insider action
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research. Broadly,  within the focal context, (i) the impact of the application of proven project RM
methods at the upper business level  (“transfer upwards”), and (ii) the impact of the combined  use
of business-level RM methods and project-level ones (“combined use”) will be studied, and (iii) the
risks embedded within key managers and their competencies concerning managing, in particular,
cross-cultural issues and contractual arrangements (“major risk identification”) will be identified.
As a main focus,  two hypotheses are examined empirically. Hypothesis 1 is  that  proven  project
RM  methods  can  also  be  applied  reliably  at  the  business  level  and,  thus,  the  effectiveness  of
managing major international business risks can be improved. Hypothesis  2 (as divided into two
parts a and b) is that major risks related to the attainment of the targeted business objectives are
inherent within key managers’ competencies, in particular those concerning managing (2a) cross-
cultural issues and (2b) contractual arrangements. The crossing cultures are here mainly ethnic
and/or industrial cultures, because of the empirical case data. The contractual arrangements
include, apart from contract documents, the entire contractual structure, the selection of the main
partners, drawings, specifications, and the general and specific conditions.
10.3 Scope and primary research method of the study
Overall, the scope of this study encompasses firms managing their international businesses and
projects, including the related risks. The focus is on growth situations and the major risks involved
in  these,  as  well  as  proven  project  RM  methods  and  their  applications  at  the  business  level.  The
focal context involves the internationalization of Finnish construction contractors and building
product suppliers, as well as the international operations of foreign-owned subsidiaries based in
Finland.
The main parts of the study are a literature review and action research with nine case studies.
To find data for the examination of the hypotheses, in the mid-1980s this (insider action) researcher
commenced the systematic documentation of his own important international business growth
projects because: (i) within the construction industry, test projects or other relevant business
transactions cannot be built or delivered only for research purposes; (ii) statistical methods were not
viable because of a lack of good-quality information in the available statistics; (iii) a recent
literature review indicated that the literature on the focal area (i.e. the RM of growth projects of
international construction business) is rather scarce; (iv) some other alternative methods were also
dismissed, such as interviews, surveys, and Delphi methods, as being too unreliable. The
researcher’s long experience implies that e.g. questionnaire recipients, unfortunately, in practice,
are often randomly chosen within the younger cadres of firms’ employees, and (v) finally, studies
for social practice should be concerned with a diagnosis of a specific situation.
Therefore, the only remaining research method, apart from a literature review, was a case
method, which is highly applicable to explain presumed causal links in real-life interventions that
are too complex for survey or experimental (research) strategies. The principal choice was to rely
on real-life cases where this researcher had an active and strong influence, because: (i) it
would not have been possible to collect relevant new case data on risks from “outside” the insider
cases, particularly if they had turned out to be the failures of competitors; (ii) the cases presented in
the reviewed recent literature are too thin and short for a deeper analysis, and (iii) the sample data
within the literature seem to be based on questionnaires and/or semi-structured interviews.
This rationale led, at an early stage, to the conclusion that the empirical approach of this study is
qualitative insider action research (IAR) trying to solve typical severe management problems and
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looking for “a positive effect on management practices”, i.e. on RM practices within the focal
context. Therefore, the measure being investigated must be understood from an actor’s
viewpoint. Besides, the  goal  is to expand and generalize theories, not to enumerate
frequencies. This criterion is fulfilled because the researcher has acted, through most of his nearly
40-year-long professional career, in relevant managerial positions within the case firms and/or
projects or businesses.
10.4 Literature and innovations of the study
The purpose of the literature review is to find support for the hypotheses and to find competing
hypotheses, if any. The construction-related risk literature mainly deals with the project level.
International or foreign aspects are covered thinly or country-specifically. Unanimous agreement
between various RM authors exists only on the importance of proper risk identification. The two-
way approach – risk is assumed to have both negative and positive consequences – seems to be one
of  the  proven  approaches  to  pre-managing  uncertainty,  rather  than  risky  conditions.  RM  is  a
concern  only  after  a  decision  to  give  uncertainty  a  probability.  In  some  other  industries,  e.g.
financing, risk and uncertainty are considered to be almost synonymous expressions. A crisis is a
consequence of a mismanaged risk and, when mismanaged, it can further escalate into a disaster.
The variety of risk typologies turned out to be rich. In this study, the broadest classification was
adopted, i.e. external, internal, and unforeseen risks. However, these main types are not analyzed
in more detail because formal typologies are not relevant for the RM hypotheses within the focal
context.
Hypothesis 1 is an innovation, i.e. it is not addressed in the reviewed literature. To examine
Hypothesis 2, the additional, limited reviews enlightened the key managers’ competencies
regarding cross-cultural issues and contractual arrangements as sources of success (and failure). In
this literature, those factors surface frequently but in unstructured ways and on the basis of very
narrow questionnaires or limited case descriptions. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 cannot be considered
to be an innovation. No deeper international construction-related analysis or reference emerges to
connect those factors and the actual outcomes of projects with each other. The challenge for RM
research is to replace “management by rear-window view” with the management of more multi-
cross-cultural, complex, fragile, and global networks and looking carefully into the future.
10.5  Case-based findings and the examination of the hypotheses
Case  1 consists of a summary of the findings of five construction sub-projects of Lemminkäinen
between the years 1974-1984. Originally, Case 1 was already reported upon as part of the licentiate
thesis in the year 1986. Cases 2-9 are either business-level strategy and merger cases or project-
level acquisitions and the delivery projects of the Partek Corporation (1984-1995) and the
Finnforest Corporation (2000-2006). They are also causally coupled, being, respectively, two-level
embedded cases, i.e. growth strategy cases or the implementation of growth strategy cases. These
couplings deepen the longitudinal, explanatory analysis.
The case-based evidence conforms well to Hypothesis 1.  In all cases, the business- and project-
level objectives were set, as this was habitual in Finnish firms. They contained financial objectives
but often other and more qualitative ones e.g. on growth, the market position, the technology base,
and  the  synergy  effect.  In  most  cases,  the  major  risks  were  identified,  at  least  by  the  experts.  In
many – but not all – cases the major risks were responded to at least reasonably well. However, not
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all of them were efficiently responded to because of a lack of identification, the ignoring of expert
advice, the retaining of a sometimes underestimated risk, or for some other reasons. The ultimately
inadequate measures taken in reaction to an identified major risk may not have been the fault of the
RM method but rather despite it. It seems that to manage the hypothetical major risk types (or
their sources), it was more beneficial to take actions proactively, i.e. early on at the business
level, rather than to wait until e.g. the contracts were signed or other commitments had been made.
There was a logical reason for this. (i) When the risks were identified early, this gave the option of
assessing whether it was better to deal with the sources or the consequences of each major risk. In
practice, risk identification at the business level often led further to a proactive response, instead of
the consequences being dealt with at the project level only. Further, (ii) there were more long-term
measures available when acting at the business level rather than at the project level. Additionally, it
was (iii) useful to have ample calendar time available, e.g. when analyzing the contractual role
alternatives or when pondering the most feasible organizational structure or key appointments,
rather than rushing into them. Moreover, (iv) many long-term commitments, e.g. choosing the
foreign market area and segment, the entry mode, the JV policies, and partner selections, may
involve many stakeholders and they were difficult to change at the project level. Besides, it
appeared that it did take time to build the key managers’ new competencies regarding cross-cultural
and contractual issues.
The case-based evidence also conforms well to Hypothesis 2. In all the cases, the major risks that
occurred were inherent in at least one or often even both of the two hypothetical managerial
competencies. In some cases, there were some other major risks, or risk sources, as well, but their
appearance was rather sporadic. This leads to the conclusion that at least these two hypothetical
major risks (and/or their sources) should be carefully identified and further managed in order to
respond to the most commonly appearing major risks in each project.
The key managers’ competencies regarding cross-cultural issues were a more common major
risk (or source of one) than the selected contractual role and other arrangements. The significant
efficient measures taken to respond to a given risk were not launched without its prior
identification. Over the years, the contextual RM techniques and tools have improved and in some
cases they were already routine. This has made early risk identification possible, well before the
implementation. The research tradition in construction-based business management was non-
existent,  at  least  until  recently,  and,  consequently,  there  was  no  suitable  framework  to  analyze
international construction.
The major risks were also inherent in the contractual arrangements. The exception of the 1st
sub-project of Case 1 can be linked to the typical “sheer ignorance” factor at the very beginning,
e.g. the acceptance of the turnkey responsibility in the construction of a low-cost housing area in
Nigeria. Several cases contained a challenging selection and/or change of the contractual role. The
outcome itself varied, depending on the competencies available for managing the issue. Several
cases pointed to e.g. “project alliancing” and other proposals that appear in the reviewed recent
literature on new contractual approaches. For example, the main actors’ interests were: (i) vested in
a  joint  venture;  (ii)  combined  through  the  project  (e.g.  acquisition)  conditions,  and  (iii)  to  be
aligned. Nevertheless, Case 1 reflected that, in the western culture of public clients, it was, and it
may still be, difficult to introduce the idea of joint RM without compromising the competitive
bidding rules.
Some other interesting observations from within the cases included the following three issues. (i)
Uncertainty management with both upside and downside possibilities may be well suited to
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projects with fuzzy or otherwise unclear objectives. Traditional RM, focused on goal-attainment as
a “positive outcome”, needed clear objectives. Without them, it  was  not  possible  to  identify  and
analyze the major risks, let alone launch the most appropriate response. (ii) The development of
practical  RM  over  time  was  also  reflected  in  the  cases. In the 1970s, the contractors added a
percentage as a risk allowance on their bid estimates against the “something may go wrong” factor.
In the year 1982, the two-way approach with the inclusion of opportunities was defined in the
literature. In the focal construction business, the formal identification of risks and their responses
became the standard among the key actors relatively late on. (iii) In most cases, the high rates of
complexity increased the potential magnitude of the consequences because of the possibility of the
rapid escalation of the risk and/or a consequent crisis within the complex systems. It rendered the
response measures themselves more complicated. Therefore, complexity reduction should be the
goal when fighting risks with potentially negative consequences, which may fast develop into crises
– and further even into disasters – if the risks are mismanaged. Positive development may be rapid
as well (particularly in Cases 5 and 6).
10.6 Discussion and key critique of the study
The main results were that proven project RM methods could be applied at the business level
(i.e. the main innovation), thus enabling the major risks to be managed early and proactively,
which, in this context, turned out to be inherent in the key managers’ competencies regarding cross-
cultural and contractual issues. The results of this construction project business-related study should
be applicable to any other investment project businesses with international contexts. The contextual
Finnish versus other ethnic cross-cultural context can also be applied to any other cross-cultural
context.
The study is considered to be internally valid, i.e. the method, the empirical case data, and the
results are in balance and justify the conclusions. The external validity is considered fairly high in
any investment project business in contextual change situations. Attempts have been made to
overcome the subjectivity of the researcher by the definition of the two neutral hypotheses, and
the thorough examination of the two hypotheses should have reduced the subjectivity as well.
Admittedly, some subjectivity can be identified in the choice of the research context – the
international construction business – but it has nothing to do with the results or conclusions of this
study. The combined insider action research and case-based study is based on authentic
contemporary documentation. Thus, the researcher’s bias has been avoided to a satisfactory
extent and, in that regard, the results are considered to be reliable.
10.7  Conclusions and key contributions of the study
In the reviewed literature, international or foreign aspects are covered thinly or country-
specifically. Managerial competencies regarding cross-cultural issues and contractual arrangements
are considered to be sources of success. The trends in the enlarged RM of today include: (i) RM is
increasingly being transformed into uncertainty management or opportunity management; (ii) RM
is becoming more proactive; (iii) early warnings are being relied upon more frequently, (iv) RM is
becoming ever more important in international projects and acquisitions, and (v) new ERM tools
and models are being created. Within the cases, the formal risk identification meant “what can go
wrong?” The building product suppliers recognized the opportunities as well, typically as the
“synergy effect”. The identification of the risks early on at the business level often led further
to proactive RM and increasing reliance on a solid foresight, instead of the consequences being
dealt with at the project level only.
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The two hypotheses both stood up to examination. The case-based evidence conforms well to
Hypothesis 1, but the reviewed literature remains silent. Within the international construction
context, this applied two-level RM is a novel research object. The case-based evidence also
conforms to Hypothesis 2 and the reviewed literature conforms to it indirectly. Within the
international construction context, cross-cultural risks are a novel research object when
connected to key managers’ competencies to manage cross-cultural issues. It is here argued that
these key contributions are also applicable to any investment project businesses with cross-cultural,
e.g. international contexts.
It is here suggested that the novel early (i.e. business-level) response-oriented risk and
opportunity management method (EROM) should be further developed for the contexts of
growth and change business transactions which can be treated as fully-fledged projects with given
goals. The focus of EROM should be on major risks, which, in international change projects,
contain at least cross-cultural and contractual risks inherent in key managers’ competencies. The
potential gain resulting from better RM is significant. One of the main features of the EROM is its
capacity to identify and respond to – but definitely not to ignore – opportunities.
The main contribution to the practice boils down to the imperative: “ The hypotheses shall to be
converted to practical actions to benefit the business !” Those practical actions will include, ao,
(i) the further development of EROM, and (ii) managing key managers´ competencies related
to the areas of major risks,  depending  on  the  context.  (iii)  The contextual major risk
identification itself will  improve  the  effect  of  further  RM  measures. Applying the better RM
onto the total value of the international construction business gives a broad idea about the potential
gains available. For example, the international turnover of the 225 world’s largest international
construction contractors was 390 billion $ in 2008.
Finally, it is suggested that future research be directed to investigate the following issues: (i) to
assess the required competencies and each manager’s competencies more accurately; (ii) to
mobilize the capacity of modern contractual arrangements to its full extent; (iii) to clarify whether
the major risks inherent in contractual arrangements are dependent on cross-cultural risks, and (iv)
to investigate particularly the extreme ends of event chains as part of the development of contextual
ERM, i.e. uncertainty and disasters in complex conditions in order to determine appropriate times,
relying on a solid foresight,  to launch risk identification and response early on at the business level.
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